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Cooperatives received significant attention in recent years as an alternative to investor-owned 
corporations. The objective of a cooperative to advance the interests of its member-owners is appealing 
from a societal perspective, particularly when comparing it with a profit-maximizing objective of an 
investor-owned firm.  This thesis focuses on agricultural cooperatives, i.e. on the enterprises collectively 
owned by farmer-members. It advances the knowledge about a cooperative enterprise in three ways: (i) 
by conceptualizing and evaluating different patterns of emergence of cooperatives; (ii) by delineating an 
efficient allocation of decision rights regarding the profit distribution in cooperatives, from a relational 
contracting perspective; (iii) and by investigating the determinants of cooperative market shares in the EU. 
Chapter 1 discusses the distinguishing features of this governance form. First, the owners of a cooperative 
are also users, because farmers deliver their farm products to the cooperative enterprise. Second, the 
allocation of ownership implies that residual income and decision rights are allocated to the farmers in a 
cooperative. Chapter 2 models cooperative emergence as a non-cooperative game between two farmers 
and an outsider. Chapter 3 formulates a non-cooperative game between the upstream party (farmers) and 
the downstream party (cooperative management) regarding the distribution of profits of the cooperative 
enterprise. Chapter 4 provides an empirical analysis of cooperative market shares in the European 
Union. Lastly, Chapter 5 concludes and addresses how the results can be extended beyond agricultural 
cooperatives.
The Erasmus Research Institute of Management (ERIM) is the Research School (Onderzoekschool) in  
the field of management of the Erasmus University Rotterdam. The founding participants of ERIM are the 
Rotterdam School of Management (RSM), and the Erasmus School of Economics (ESE). ERIM was founded 
in 1999 and is officially accredited by the Royal Netherlands Academy of Arts and Sciences (KNAW). The 
research undertaken by ERIM is focused on the management of the firm in its environment, its intra- and 
interfirm relations, and its business processes in their interdependent connections.
The objective of ERIM is to carry out first rate research in management, and to offer an advanced doctoral 
programme in Research in Management. Within ERIM, over three hundred senior researchers and PhD 
candidates are active in the different research programmes. From a variety of academic backgrounds and 
expertises, the ERIM community is united in striving for excellence and working at the forefront of creating 
new business knowledge.
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1. Introduction 
 
 
Cooperatives received significant attention in recent years as an alternative to investor-
owned corporations. For example, the UN announced 2012 as the year of cooperatives. 
Cooperative forms of organizing are also highlighted in several UN sustainable 
development goals, particularly as means of achieving sustainable and inclusive 
economic growth.  The objective of a cooperative to advance the interests of its member-
owners is appealing from a societal perspective, particularly when comparing it with a 
profit-maximizing objective of an investor-owned firm.  
The most recent cooperative statistics indicate that there are over 2.6 million co-
operatives in the world with about 1 billion members (International Cooperative 
Alliance, 2017). Cooperatives employ around 12% of the total employed population in 
the G20 countries (Roelants et al., 2014).1  The share of economic activity accounted 
for by cooperatives has grown throughout the 20th century (Hansmann, 1999). Besides 
empirical prevalence, there are also theory-driven reasons to study cooperative 
enterprises. Often classified as hybrids in transaction cost economics, cooperatives lie 
in between the hierarchies and markets (Menard, 2007). As a consequence, the 
distinctive governance and the allocation of property rights in a cooperative enterprise 
has generated substantial research interest around this form of organizing. This thesis 
adds to the existing body of knowledge about a cooperative enterprise in three ways: (i) 
by conceptualizing and evaluating different patterns of emergence of cooperatives; (ii) 
by delineating an efficient allocation of decision rights regarding the profit distribution 
in cooperatives, from a relational contracting perspective; (iii) and by investigating the 
determinants of cooperative market shares in the EU. 
1.1 Definition of a cooperative enterprise 
This thesis focuses on agricultural cooperatives. For the purpose of our analysis, we 
define a cooperative as an enterprise owned by a society of many independent farmers. 
The defining feature of a cooperative is the fact that farmers are not only the owners, 
but also the users of the downstream enterprise.2 The user role arises due to the presence 
                                                 
1 The members of the G20 are Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, France, Germany, India, 
Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Republic of Korea, Mexico, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Turkey, the 
United Kingdom, the United States and the European Union (represented by European Comission). 
2 The combination of the ownership and transaction relationships in a cooperative constitutes the first 
core principle of a cooperative enterprise highlighted by Dunn (1988), i.e. a cooperatives is user owned.  
2 
of a transaction relationship between the upstream and downstream parties. This 
characteristic is crucial when comparing a cooperative to an investor-owned firm (IOF), 
because farmers, unlike the outside investors, deliver their farm outputs to the 
downstream firm.  
Figure 1.1 visualizes this definition. The squares in the upper part of the figure 
denote individual farmers, and the square at the lower part of the figure denotes the 
downstream enterprise, such as a processing plant. The crosses inside the squares 
indicate the allocation of ownership. Notice that the square at the lower part has no 
cross. The rest of this section elaborates in more detail on each of these elements of the 
definition.  
 
Figure 1.1. A cooperative  
The governance of transactions in agricultural markets is interesting from the 
theory of the firm perspective, where a standard way of delineating a governance 
structure is to distinguish ownership rights, income rights, and decision rights. First, 
ownership rights are allocated to the society of farmers in an agricultural cooperative. 
To illustrate, consider the case of dairy production. A dairy supply chain typically 
consists of several stages: milk is produced on a dairy farm, transported to a processing 
plant, where it is processed into a variety of dairy products, which are then packaged 
and delivered to a retailer. For analytical clarity, this chain can be further reduced to just 
two stages: an upstream stage, i.e. the production of milk at the farm level, and a 
downstream stage, i.e. processing, packaging, and delivery of dairy products to the final 
market. Crudely, there are three possibilities regarding the distribution of ownership 
rights over the two stages. First, farmers’ milk could be sold to a processing plant in a 
spot market. Such a governance structure, i.e. the market exchange, entails that farmers 
own the upstream stage of production (the farms), and the downstream stage is owned 
by another party, such as investors or private entrepreneurs. Another possibility is that 
the ownership is concentrated at the downstream level. Hence, the backward integration 
3 
implies that the downstream party owns the dairy farms. The third possibility is that 
farmers integrate forward, i.e. they collectively own the downstream processing stage. 
The latter possibility is the focus of this thesis. The concentration of ownership at the 
upstream level is depicted in Figure 1.1 by (i) crosses at the upstream stage, i.e. every 
farmer is also an owner, and (ii) by a large circle, i.e. farmers collectively own the 
downstream enterprise.  
However, the cooperative governance form differs from hierarchy or vertical 
integration conceptually for at least two reasons. The first difference arises due to the 
identity of the owner. A cooperative is owned by a society of farmers-owners, as 
depicted by a dotted line in Figure 1.1. Second, each farmer owns a portfolio of assets. 
Some assets of farmers’ are pulled together to collectively own a downstream enterprise. 
The remaining assets, such as farms, remain under farmers’ individual control and 
ownership.  
1.2 Research questions and positioning of chapters  
The natural starting point in studying cooperative enterprises is to ask why and how they 
emerge. This question is addressed in Chapter 2. The main objective of this chapter is 
to conceptualize the distinction between bottom-up and top-down emergence of 
cooperatives. It investigates under which conditions cooperatives arise bottom-up with 
the initiative of farmers only. It provides an explanation for the emergence of so-called 
coop-champions, i.e. active farmers who initiate the cooperative formation. Next to that, 
the role of the outsiders and their types in the top-down emergence of cooperatives is 
discussed. The distinction is made between a selfish outsider, such as a rent-seeking 
entrepreneur, and a benevolent type, such as an NGO. Lastly, it formulates the 
conclusions regarding the efficient governance of cooperative emergence. In the 
terminology of Cook and Burress (2009), Chapter 2 of this thesis focuses on the first 
stage of cooperative life-cycle.  
Once the patterns of cooperative emergence are delineated, the question of 
organizational design arises. In characterizing the internal organization of the firm, we 
refer to Hansmann (1996) by distinguishing between the decision and income rights. 
The decision rights are about the formal and informal authority, i.e. “who has the control 
to decide regarding the use of assets”. The income rights are about the distribution of 
value created in the cooperative enterprise. The presence of ownership and transaction 
relationships has an effect on the allocation of decision and income rights in a 
cooperative.3 We study the consequences of this effect in Chapter 3. The focus of the 
                                                 
3 Decision and income right allocations in a cooperative constitute the second and the third core 
principles of a cooperative enterprise by Dunn (1988), i.e. cooperatives are user-controlled and user-
benefitted. 
4 
analysis is the decision regarding the profit distribution in a cooperative and the retained 
earnings percentage. The share of profit retained by the cooperative enterprise is an 
important source of internal finance. We study, from an efficiency perspective, the 
optimal allocation of this decision right between cooperative members and the 
management, and the effect of such an allocation on the cooperative retained earnings 
percentage. The repeated, long-term nature of this decision is captured by adopting the 
relational contracting perspective in the analysis.   
Chapter 4 investigates the consequences of cooperative governance on the 
market structure. It explores the variation in agricultural cooperatives’ market shares 
across countries and sectors in the European Union. The goal of this chapter is to explain 
why cooperatives are prevalent in some settings but not in others, where settings are 
distinguished in terms of sector and country. The analysis starts with an observation that 
cooperative market shares in the European Union are significantly higher in some 
sectors, such as dairy, and in some countries, such as the North-West of Europe. The 
main of objective of Chapter 4 is therefore to explain the determinants of varying 
cooperative market shares across the sectors and countries in Europe.  
Chapters 2, 3, and 4 are plotted in Figure 1.2, where the vertical axis represents 
the level of analysis, and the horizontal axis represents the time of a life of a cooperative. 
Chapter 2 studies the strategic choices of farmers and the outsiders in the formation of 
a cooperative enterprise. Hence, it is located at the enterprise level of analysis and at the 
first stage of a cooperative life-cycle.  The analysis of Chapter 3 is also at the enterprise 
level. The decision regarding cooperative profit appropriation is relevant during all 
consecutive stages of a cooperative life-cycle. Lastly, Chapter 4 employs a market level 
perspective by studying the market shares of cooperatives in different sectors in the 
European countries. Once a cooperative is formed, a value of a cooperative market share 
may be associated with any stage of a cooperative life-cycle, i.e. it may be the case that 
some cooperatives are growing while others are mature.  
5 
 
Figure 1.2. Positioning of chapters 
The chapters of this thesis are conceptually linked and can be viewed as stages 
in a game. During the first stage, the type of emergence of a cooperative, i.e. bottom-up 
or top-down, is determined. The second stage deals with organizational design, i.e. the 
decision rights regarding cooperative profit distribution are allocated. This has an effect 
on the retained equity in a cooperative. Lastly, a cooperative market share is viewed as 
an outcome of the game. Because the game is solved by backward induction, the 
connection between chapters is evident. The type of emergence determines the type of 
relational contracts, which develop between the upstream and downstream parties in a 
cooperative. For instance, an equilibrium path may imply that a bottom-up cooperative 
is member-controlled, and the real authority is allocated to a manager in a top-down 
cooperative. The allocation of decision rights determines the equilibrium value of the 
retained equity in a cooperative, and subsequently, the market share of a cooperative.    
The framework regarding the four levels of social analysis by Williamson 
(2000) is useful when positioning the chapters of this thesis in the broader context. It 
distinguishes between the embeddedness, institutional environment, governance, and 
resource allocation levels. A higher level imposes constraints on the level immediately 
below. For instance, cultural norms and traditions impose constraints on the formal 
institutions, which in turn put constraints on the governance structure choice. Lastly, the 
choice of the governance structure affects the decisions regarding the allocation of 
6 
resources in organizations. Chapter 4 is based on this theoretical framework and 
discusses it in more detail.  
Table 1.1 positions the chapters of this thesis according to the four levels of the 
social analysis framework. A large part of the analysis is located at the third level, i.e. 
the governance of enterprises. It entails the governance structure choice: bottom-up vs. 
top-down emergence in Chapter 2, member-controlled vs. delegated cooperative in 
Chapter 3, and cooperative vs. IOF, and consequently the cooperative market share, in 
Chapter 4. Next, Chapter 3 also investigated the decision regarding the allocation of 
cooperative profit, i.e. it is concerned with the analysis on the third level - governance. 
Lastly, the objective of Chapter 4 is to study the determinants of cooperative market 
shares at all levels of social analysis.  
 
Level of social 
analysis 
Positioning of 
chapters 
Embeddedness 4 
Institutional 
environment 
4 
Governance 2, 3, 4 
Resource allocation  4 
Table 1.1. Positioning of chapters according to the four levels of social analysis 
(Williamson, 2000) 
The models in Chapters 2 and 3 do not explicitly model the processes at the 
embeddedness and institutional environment levels of social analysis. Yet, it is 
implicitly assumed that the choices at the third level, i.e. governance, are constrained by 
the higher two levels. For instance, the type of emergence of a cooperative in Chapter 2 
is not independent from the cultural, historical, and institutional environments. We 
reflect this observation by allowing for different ranges of the distance parameter in our 
model. The distance measure is incorporated to reflect the heterogeneity of farmers. Our 
assumption is that heterogeneity of farmers determines the horizontal costs of collective 
action. A theoretical link between homogeneity and trust emphasizes the relationship 
between the embeddedness level of social analysis and the emergence of cooperatives 
(the governance level).  Chapter 3 establishes the conditions for the stability of relational 
agreements in cooperatives, which are not isolated from the embeddedness and 
institutional environment levels. A discounting parameter in the model of Chapter 3 
facilitates more stable contracts. We are not concerned with the determinants of the 
magnitude of a discounting parameter, i.e. the discounting parameter is exogenous in 
the model. However, differences in cultural and institutional environments may give 
rise to a variety of impatience rates. For instance, in an environment where the future is 
characterized by high levels of uncertainty and the possibility of opportunistic behavior, 
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player may be more impatient. Overall, the game-theoretic analyses in the Chapters 2 
and 3 highlight the third level of social analysis, i.e. the governance level. However, the 
interpretation of the models’ predictions cannot be done in isolation form the higher 
levels of social analysis.  
1.3 Methods 
Several methods are used to address the research questions raised in this thesis. Chapters 
2 and 3 apply game theory. Chapter 2 formulates a non-cooperative game between two 
farmers and an outsider. The coordination and hold-up problems between farmers are 
discussed in the context of a cooperative formation. Next to that, the role of the outsider 
in overcoming these problems is addressed. Two approaches are used in modeling the 
behavior of different types of outsiders. The selfish nature of an outsider is captured by 
the “take-it-or-leave-it” type of contract. The benevolent type of an outsider is captured 
by formulating a bi-form game, i.e. the players non-cooperatively determine whether a 
cooperative is formed, and a Shapley value is used in allocating the surplus in a 
cooperative with a benevolent outsider. Hence, this chapter uses the concepts developed 
in both cooperative (Shapley value) and non-cooperative game theory.   
 Chapter 3 formulates a non-cooperative game with complete information 
between the upstream and downstream parties in a cooperative. The upstream party 
(farmers) is to be viewed as a principal, and the downstream party (cooperative 
management) is to be viewed as an agent. Hence, it studies the principal-agent problem 
in the context of the cooperative profit distribution decision. On the one hand, sufficient 
share of the cooperative profits needs to be allocated downstream to meet the 
participation and incentive compatibility constraints of the management. On the other 
hand, sufficient share needs to be returned back to farmers to ensure that the upstream 
party’s participation constraint is satisfied. Lastly, the role of relational contracts is 
analyzed by specifying an infinitely repeated version of the stage game. Both chapters 
2 and 3 formulate the efficiency results, by comparing the total surpluses generated in 
different governance structures.  
Chapter 4 provides a quantitative empirical analysis of cooperative market 
shares in the European Union. It exploits the data which was collected during the major 
EU project “Support for Farmers Cooperatives”, initiated by the European Commission 
in 2010. The data on relevant measures is collected at the country level. Because the 
number of observations in the data set is small, i.e. there were 27 EU member states in 
2010, the possibilities for statistical analysis are also limited. Therefore, Chapter 4 
reports two types of effect sizes – correlation coefficients and differences in means, and 
formulates results in terms of associations between variables, and not in terms of causal 
relations.  
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All chapters of this thesis were written by the author. All chapters incorporate the 
extensive feedback from the promoter. Additionally, feedback from conferences and 
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The author of this thesis is listed as the first author, and the promoter is listed as the 
second author.  
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2. Emergence of Cooperatives and Member 
Heterogeneity: Bottom-up or Top-Down?  
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
The relationship between member heterogeneity and the pattern of emergence of 
cooperatives is studied in a non-cooperative game with members and an outsider, where 
members choose to become active, stay passive or leave. Our results show that when 
the value of the outsider is low and heterogeneity is limited, a cooperative emerges 
efficiently bottom-up by all members taking an initiative. A coordination problem arises 
when heterogeneity increases. Only one member takes the lead when heterogeneity is 
moderate. The game changes to a prisoner’s dilemma when heterogeneity is high. With 
high heterogeneity, no cooperative emerges. We identify the role for a third party by 
considering a selfish outsider, such as the “dragonheads” in China, and a benevolent 
outsider, such as NGOs. A top-down cooperative with a selfish (benevolent) outsider is 
uniquely efficient when the value of the outsider is in the intermediate high (low) range 
and heterogeneity of members is low (high).  
 
Keywords: Cooperative, emergence, heterogeneity, bottom-up, top-down, collective 
action 
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2.1  Introduction 
Cooperative governance of enterprises has received considerable attention in recent 
years. For instance, cooperatives are now recognized as the means for achieving 
Sustainable Development Goals, set by the United Nations in 2015, particularly Goal 8 
on inclusive and sustainable economic growth (UN 2016). The emergence of farmer 
cooperatives accomplishes an inclusive growth objective when it provides sufficient 
incentives for farmers to become active. The initiative to become involved in a 
cooperative may arise from the farmers themselves (bottom-up) or from an outsider 
(top-down). This chapter conceptualizes the bottom-up and top-down emergence of 
cooperatives and formulates conclusions regarding the efficient governance of 
emergence.  
Cook and Burress (2009) distinguish five stages of the life-cycle of a 
cooperative. They are economic justification, organizational design, growth-glory-
heterogeneity, recognition and introspection, and choice. In the first stage, economic 
motives that lead to cooperation between farmers are defined. It is argued that through 
collective action, farmers are able to improve their socio-economic position in the 
presence of market failures and corresponding market contracting costs. During the 
second stage, cooperative principles are formally incorporated into organizational 
architecture. The latter three stages mark the struggle with vaguely defined property 
rights due to evolving member heterogeneity. In this chapter, we focus on the first stage 
of the cooperative life-cycle and examine how member heterogeneity relates to different 
patterns of emergence of farmer cooperatives. To our knowledge, this paper is the first 
attempt to model different types of emergence of collective action during the first stage 
of the cooperative life-cycle. 
Hansman (1996) argues that homogeneity of interests among members in 
farmer cooperatives is crucial because it minimizes the costs of collective decision-
making. More generally, the literature on collective action provides many examples of 
how heterogeneity hampers cooperation (Ostrom 2010). Member heterogeneity is also 
important in establishing a cooperative because it requires coordination among many 
members and the associated coordination costs are lower when players are less 
heterogeneous. Heterogeneity is a variable which has many dimensions. Examples are 
the number of different commodities produced or inputs purchased by the members, the 
variance in members’ age, the variance in members’ educational levels, the differences 
between members as regards to farm size, the percentage of non-farm income, or the 
differences between members in terms of business objectives (Iliopoulos and Cook 
1999; Höhler and Kühl 2017). 
Member heterogeneity is prominent in the theoretical as well as the empirical 
literature regarding cooperatives. Mérel et al. (2009) summarize the horizontal and 
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vertical product differentiation literature. Farmers are distinguished by location and/or 
quality. The empirical literature on cooperatives often refers to heterogeneity.4 Sexton 
and Sexton (1987) observe that cooperatives are often formed within local areas. Liang 
and Hendrikse (2013) identify several reasons why coordination costs are lower for 
farmers within local areas: similar nature conditions, farmers have the same cultural and 
economic backgrounds, members have a high degree of kinship and the same dialect. 
Fernandez (2014) observes that the formation of grain cooperatives in the US was 
problematic due to the farmers’ isolation from each other. We capture the extent of 
heterogeneity between farmers by one heterogeneity parameter in our model. 
Farmer cooperatives may emerge either bottom-up or top-down. We provide a 
number of examples of each type of emergence. First, there are numerous cooperatives 
worldwide that emerged bottom-up, solely on the initiative of farmers. For example, 
starting in 1882, many Danish dairy cooperatives were formed by energetic 
entrepreneurial farmers (Svendsen and Svendsen 2000). These initiatives led to higher 
quality of dairy products and also allowed farmers to charge higher prices. Second, 
cooperatives may arise due to the initiative of coop champions, i.e. individual farmers 
taking a lead in setting up a cooperative. For example, in 1960, Niel Black, a lifelong 
champion of dairy farmers in Australia, helped create the Noorat Artificial Breeders 
Cooperative and became a founding director (Black, 2013). Another example is 
Brazilian credit cooperative San Roque de Minas, which was established by coop 
champion Joao Leite as a response to the banking failure. Third, cooperatives may 
emerge due to some members leaving an existing cooperative and forming one of their 
own. When a cooperative consists of heterogeneous members, it may become more 
attractive for high-quality farmers to leave the cooperative and form a smaller 
homogeneous high-quality cooperative. Such a bee-hive pattern was recently observed 
in several Swedish cooperatives, which emerged due to members de-associating 
themselves from larger cooperatives (Hakelius et al. 2013), as well as in the Dutch 
cooperative The Greenery (Hendrikse 2011). Fourth, LeVay (1983) provides historical 
evidence of cooperatives that were organized by individuals inspired by the idea of 
cooperative principles. She argues that the initial stage of formation of a cooperative is 
not spontaneous but rather a result of a collective perception of an opportunity. 
According to the 1913 report of the Long Clawson Dairy Ltd., this British cooperative 
originally started as an intangible myth in the minds of two or three enthusiasts, but 
consequently turned into a well-performing business (LeVay 1983). Cooperation 
principles based on Raiffeisen or the Rochdale principles are other examples that may 
                                                 
4 Sommer et al. (1983) finds significant homogeneity among members of food purchasing 
cooperatives, which were found to be young, well-educated, ethnically homogeneous, non-affluent, 
and motivated by low prices, food quality, natural food and co-op philosophy.  
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have been crucial in the bottom-up formation of cooperatives.5 Besides economic 
motives, cooperative members have a sense of “moral certainty” and are concerned with 
issues such as the environment and genetically modified crops. 
Fifth, in various countries, the top-down genesis of cooperatives is initiated by 
the government.6 In their study of agricultural cooperatives in Russia, Golovina and 
Nilsson (2011) find that top-down emergence initiated by the Russian government is 
common but has proved to be largely unsuccessful. Similarly, empirical analysis of 37 
farmer cooperatives in China indicated that cooperatives rarely emerge as a result of 
bottom-up collective action (Liang and Hendrikse 2013). Rather, Chinese cooperatives 
emerge due to top-down mechanisms involving entrepreneurs and/or the government. 
In her historical account of agricultural marketing cooperatives, Fernandez (2014) refers 
to compulsory top-down wheat cooperatives established by the government in the 
United States, Australia, and Canada as a response to disruptions caused by World War 
I. A contemporary example of a mandatory top-down cooperative initiated by the 
government is the Greek wine cooperative Santo Wines based in Santorini, where all 
grape-growers are legally obliged to join the wine cooperative (Iliopoulos and 
Theodorakopoulou 2014). Sixth, as in the case of the northern part of the US, the 
initiative may also come from associations like the Farmers Union (Olson 1971). 
Seventh, cooperatives may arise due to an initiative from abroad, such as the strategy of 
the British Empire to promote cooperatives in its dependent territories in the 20th century 
(Rhodes 2012). Finally, an initiative to form a cooperative may also originate from a 
key player. In the south of the Netherlands, cooperatives were often formed with an 
initiative of highly educated members of local communities, such as lawyers, doctors, 
or religious persons. For instance, the priest Van den Elsen was responsible for setting 
up many Dutch cooperatives. 
In other instances there is evidence of the non-emergence of cooperatives. In 
the south of Europe cooperatives emerge much less frequently than in the north (Bijman 
et al. 2012). Nearly ninety percent of the fruit and vegetable products are marketed by 
producer organizations in the Netherlands and Ireland, while in countries such as 
France, Italy, and Spain this share is around fifty percent, and is below twenty percent 
in countries like Poland, Finland, and Portugal (Bouamra-Mechemache and Zago 2014). 
The non-emergence of cooperatives is also observed in other regions, such as the 
Commonwealth of Independent States and Georgia, where cooperatives are expected to 
                                                 
5 Additionally, Hurt (2017) highlights idealism as an organizational and driving force in American 
food cooperatives. 
6 The top-down emergence mechanism by the government may also involve the so-called “extension 
workers” - external agents who communicate with farmers and educate them about new technologies. 
At least 400,000 extension workers are currently employed in developing countries (BenYishay and 
Mobarak, 2013; Spielman et al., 2010). 
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develop as a response to market failures and farmers’ needs, but the development of 
agricultural service cooperatives still lags behind (Sedik and Lerman 2013). 
The emergence of cooperatives in agricultural markets is also relevant from a 
policy perspective. Since the 1970s, the European Union has been continuously 
providing support for the formation of producer organizations, and cooperatives in 
particular. Producer organizations in the fruit and vegetables sector can receive financial 
support to cover initial as well as operational expenses. Yet, despite the presence of 
extensive outside support, a non-emergence of cooperatives is observed in some 
regions. Additionally, due to the unequal emergence of producer organizations, the 
allocation of subsidies across the EU member states is also unequal. For example, 
producer organizations in the Netherlands acquired around 100 million euros out of the 
700 million euros in the subsidies available for the creation of producer organizations 
in the European fruit and vegetables sector in 2012. Hence, the question arises of 
whether the emergence of farmer cooperatives is experiencing problems and whether 
anything could (and should) be done about it (Bouamra-Mechemache and Zago 2014). 
In this paper we formulate a non-cooperative game theoretic model to explain 
why and how cooperatives emerge. We view a cooperative as a group of farmers who 
voluntarily choose to process collectively. The presence of an outside party allows us to 
differentiate between top-down and bottom-up types of emergence. A distance measure 
between farmers is incorporated to reflect their heterogeneity. Our assumption is that 
heterogeneity of farmers determines the horizontal costs of collective action and 
therefore the formation of a cooperative. In addition to studying the relationship between 
farmer heterogeneity and the type of emergence of farmer-to-farmer collective action, 
our model allows for addressing several sub-questions. First, given the variety of 
emergence types observed in the empirical literature, we are interested in how to 
characterize bottom-up and top-down cooperatives and to determine when cooperatives 
emerge bottom-up or top-down. Second, by differentiating between the active and 
passive players, we investigate conditions under which coop-champions may arise. 
Third, we investigate when outsiders arise and whether their type matters to farmers’ 
decisions. The objective of the selfish type of the outsider is to maximize his expected 
payoff. The benevolent type is concerned with a fair distribution of the cooperative 
surplus, which is captured by the Shapley value. Finally, we discuss the governance of 
the emergence of cooperatives from an efficiency perspective. Our main equilibrium 
results suggest that the bottom-up emergence of cooperatives occurs due to the initiative 
of both farmers (one farmer) when the value of the outsider (𝑉) is low and the distance 
parameter (𝑑) is below 1/2  (between 1/2 and  2/3). We also identify the ranges of 
parameters 𝑉 and 𝑑 where different types of outsiders are uniquely efficient. In 
particular, we find that there is a range of relatively low (high) 𝑉𝑠 such that a benevolent 
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(selfish) outsider is best from the total welfare perspective when heterogeneity of 
farmers is high (low).  
Our paper contributes to five streams of literature. First, by studying different 
patterns of emergence of cooperatives, we add to a more general discussion on the top-
down and the bottom-up formation mechanisms. Easterley (2014) criticizes top-down 
developments for their flawed goalsetting: they are often motivated by the strategic 
priorities of sponsoring organizations, and are therefore focused on short-term rather 
than long-term investments. Yet, in other instances outsider’s interventions may create 
substantial value. By evaluating different emergence patterns from an efficiency 
perspective, we are able to compare the bottom-up and the top-down emergence in the 
context of a farmer cooperative. 
Second, to study the mechanisms at stake when there is a selfish outsider, we 
refer to the literature on contracting. One branch of this literature focuses on the range 
of non-cooperative contracting games, in which the principal makes a take-it-or-leave-
it offer to the agent(s) (Segal and Whinston 2003). The principal’s profit is typically 
defined as the difference between the total surplus and the surplus received by the 
agents. As a result, the principal’s rent-extraction motive leads to inefficient contracting 
outcomes (Segal 1999). Hence, the contracting literature is concerned with finding 
efficient mechanisms such that the principal maximizes the total surplus. In our model, 
we investigate the effect of the contract by a selfish outsider on the emergence pattern 
of cooperatives. Additionally, we examine whether the contract by a selfish outsider 
gives farmers different incentives compared to a contract by a benevolent outsider. 
Third, when conceptualizing the role of a benevolent outsider in supporting 
farmers’ collective action, we contribute to the literature on biform games 
(Brandenburger and Stuart 2007). The game with a benevolent outsider is a biform game 
because farmers and the outsider non-cooperatively decide on the governance form in 
stages 1-4 of the game, and then cooperatively allocate the surplus generated in a top-
down cooperative. A fair allocation of cooperative surplus implies that each member 
receives his marginal contribution, i.e. his Shapley value (Shapley 1988).  
Fourth, we contribute to the literature on emergence of organizational forms. 
There are several answers to the question “why are there so many kinds of 
organizations?”, which was raised in the field of organizational ecology (Hannan and 
Freeman 1977). Transaction cost theory states that organizations emerge because some 
transactions are more efficient inside the firm than in markets. Variety of organizational 
form is observed because transactions differ and “efficiency is realized only if 
governance structures are tailored to the specific needs of each type of transaction” 
(Williamson, 1981).  More recently, organizational literature emphasized the emergence 
of new hybrid organizational forms (Makadok and Coff 2009) and the need for new 
theorizing of novel organizational forms (Puranam et al. 2014). In our paper, with an 
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objective of studying the collective action of farmers, we rephrase the original question 
and ask “why are there so many kinds of cooperatives?”  
Lastly, the emergence of cooperatives which originate from farmers can be 
related to the formation of strategic alliances between firms. Strategic alliances are 
voluntarily initiated cooperative agreements between firms (Gulati 1999). According to 
the resource-based view, alliances arise because of strategic needs (i.e. payoffs from 
cooperation are high) and social opportunities (i.e. costs of cooperation are low) 
(Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven 1996). However, unlike strategic alliances, farmer 
cooperatives often emerge due to the outsider’s initiative and support. Hence, 
conceptualizing a top-down farmer cooperative requires additional considerations that 
are not addressed in the alliance literature. We fill in this gap by considering the roles 
of a third party, selfish or benevolent, in cooperative formation.   
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2.2 describes the model, while Section 
2.3 presents the equilibrium results. Section 2.4 discusses the predictions of the model 
in the light of existing empirical evidence about cooperatives worldwide. Section 2.5 
concludes and formulates directions for future research. 
 
2.2 Model 
We model the emergence of a cooperative as a non-cooperative game with two farmers 
and an outsider. Figure 2.1 depicts the timing of the events in the game. In the first stage, 
farmers simultaneously choose the governance structure, i.e. either a setting with (𝑌) or 
without (𝑁) the outsider. In the second stage, the outsider chooses a contract specifying 
a payment to farmer(s). In the third stage, farmer(s) decide to either 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑝𝑡 or 𝑅𝑒𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡 
the outsider’s offer. Finally, in the last stage, farmers choose simultaneously between 
the actions 𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒, 𝑃𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑣𝑒, or 𝐿𝑒𝑎𝑣𝑒. Choosing 𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 entails taking an initiative, 
acting as an enthusiastic leader, and potentially incurring higher costs. The choice 
𝑃𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑣𝑒 implies not taking an initiative and avoiding additional costs. The 𝐿𝑒𝑎𝑣𝑒 
choice denotes leaving the current market and producing elsewhere. The sequence of 
decisions follows the convention of game theory and implies that the long-term 
decisions are made prior to the short-term decisions. Williamson (2000) highlights that 
the governance structure choice is a long-term decision relative to daily choices of 
actions. 
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Figure 2.1. Timing of events 
 
Figure 2.2 presents the game in the extensive form. The farmers’ choice 
𝑌𝑒𝑠 (𝑁𝑜) in the first stage entails the choice of the governance structure with (without) 
an outsider. The contract by an outsider specifies two (twelve) payments when one 
(both) farmer(s) choose(s) a governance structure with an outsider. The payments are 
conditional on the actions of farmers. The last row refers to the subgames [1]-[4], where 
farmers simultaneously choose between actions {𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒, 𝑃𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑣𝑒, 𝐿𝑒𝑎𝑣𝑒}.  
 
Figure 2.2. The game in the extensive form 
 
Subgame [1] in figure 2.3 presents the payoffs when both farmers choose 𝑁𝑜 
in the first stage of the game, i.e. the governance structure without an outsider is adopted. 
When both players are active, more resources are pulled together. Greater value is 
generated due to the benefits of collective action such as improved bargaining power 
and access to input and output markets. Therefore, when a cooperative is formed with 
an initiative of both farmers, the value generated by a cooperative (8) is greater than 
when only one farmer initiates the formation (7). Cooperative formation is costly and it 
is assumed that the horizontal cost of collective action between farmers is a function of 
farmer heterogeneity. Farmer heterogeneity is represented by the distance 
measure 𝑑 between farmers. The total horizontal distance costs are equal to 4𝑑 when at 
least one farmer chooses to be active. When both farmers are active, costs and benefits 
of forming a cooperative are equally shared and each active party receives the payoff of 
4 − 2𝑑. When only one of the farmers is active, he bears the entire horizontal cost 4𝑑, 
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but receives a larger share of benefits (4) when compared to the passive player (3). This 
implies that a payoff to the initiator is equal to 4 − 4𝑑; the passive player does not pay 
for the cost and receives a payoff of 3. When both farmers choose to be passive, no 
coopeartive emerges and the payoff of each farmer is equal to 2 − 𝑑. If one farmer 
chooses to leave, he earns zero, and the other player receives 1 if he is active and 0.5 if 
passive. If both leave the market, each player’s payoff is equal to zero. 𝑉3 is defined as 
the value of the outside option of the outsider.  
 
Figure 2.3. Extensive form of sub-game [1] when there is no outsider 
Bottom-up emergence of cooperative is defined as a situation when there is no 
outsider involved in the formation of a cooperative, when both farmers remain in the 
market and when at least one farmer chooses to be active. So, an initiative is required to 
ensure bottom-up cooperative formation. Top-down emergence of cooperative is 
defined as a situation when at least one farmer chooses 𝑌𝑒𝑠 in the first stage of the game, 
at least one farmer accepts the outsider’s contract to form a top-down cooperative, and 
at least one farmer chooses 𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 or 𝑃𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑣𝑒 in the final stage of the game. All other 
cases are defined as No-emergence. 
When the outsider initiates the formation of a top-down cooperative, he brings 
additional value to the enterprise such as the access to a new technology, markets, and 
financial resources. The value of the outsider can also be in the form of specialized 
knowledge and education which he could offer to farmers. The total value of 𝑉 is 
generated when both farmers accept the outsider’s contract, and V/2 is realized when 
only one farmer accepts. The outsider also incurs a vertical cost of a cooperative 
formation, which depends on the level of the activity of farmers. If both farmers are 
active, outsider’s cost is equal to zero, if one farmer is passive, the cost is equal to 𝑐, 
and if two farmers are passive the cost is equal to 2𝑐, implying that it is more costly to 
organize a top-down cooperative with more passive farmers. When a top-down 
cooperative is formed, the horizontal cost between farmers (a function of d) is therefore 
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replaced by the vertical cost between the outsider and the farmer(s) (a function of c). 
The value created by the farmers in top-down cooperative corresponds to their value in 
a bottom-up cooperative.  Two farmers in a top-down cooperative generate 8 (7, 4) 
when both are active (one is active and one is passive, both are passive). One farmer in 
a top-down cooperative creates 1 (0.5) when active (passive). 
Table 2.1 summarizes the payoffs of the players in terms of the value of each 
coalition of players in each governance structure. We define 𝑣(. ) as the value of a subset 
of the set of players. The value created by a subset of players depends on the choice of 
each farmer in this subset. We capture this in the definition of 𝑣(. ) by distinguishing 
farmers on the choice they make. Define a farmer choosing Active (Passive, Leave) as 
𝐴 (𝑃, 𝐿), and the outsider as 𝑂𝑢𝑡. For example, a coalition consisting of only the outsider 
has a value V3. A coalition of the two farmers, where one farmer chooses 𝐴 and the 
other farmer 𝑃, is equal to 𝑣(𝐴, 𝑃) = 7 − 4𝑑. Notice that it does not matter for the value 
of the coalition whether farmer 1 chooses 𝐴 and farmer 2 chooses 𝑃, or farmer 1 chooses 
𝑃 and farmer 2 chooses 𝐴. Finally, 𝑣(𝑂𝑢𝑡, 𝐴, 𝐿) = 1 + 𝑉/2, i.e. the value of a coalition 
of the three players, with one farmer choosing 𝐴 and  the other farmer choosing 𝐿. Notice 
that 𝑣(𝑂𝑢𝑡, 𝐴, 𝐿) = 1 + 𝑉/2 applies to a setting with a top-down cooperative because a 
bottom-up cooperative consists of a coalition of two farmers and a singleton coalition 
of the Outsider. 
A bottom-up cooperative is characterized by two coalitions: the two player 
coalition of the two farmers and the singleton coalition of the outsider. The total value 
created by the two farmers depends on the choices of action of the farmers. For example, 
a bottom-up cooperative with one active farmer and one passive farmer results in a total 
value of 𝑣(𝐴, 𝑃) + 𝑣(𝑂𝑢𝑡) = 7 − 4𝑑 + 𝑉3. A top-down cooperative consists of either 
one coalition of all players (when both farmers choose 𝑌𝑒𝑠 in the first stage of the game), 
or two coalitions (when only one farmer chooses 𝑌𝑒𝑠 in the first stage of the game). A 
top-down cooperative with two coalitions entails that there is a singleton coalition with 
the farmer choosing 𝑁𝑜 in the first stage of the game and a coalition of the other two 
players. The total value created by the three players depends on the choices of action of 
the farmers. For example, a top-down cooperative with a farmer choosing 𝑁𝑜 in the first 
stage of the game and 𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 in the final stage of the game, and the other farmer 
choosing 𝑌𝑒𝑠 in the first stage of the game and 𝑃𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑣𝑒 in the final stage of the game, 
results in a total value of 𝑣(𝐴) + 𝑣(𝑂𝑢𝑡, 𝑃) = 1 + 0.5 + 𝑉/2 − 𝑐. 
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Table 2.1. Surplus of each coalition 
 
We differentiate between two types of outside parties - selfish and benevolent. 
The objective of the former type is to maximize its own profit. An example of such a 
type is an independent entrepreneur who is interested in the formation of a cooperative 
for rent-seeking reasons. This type of behavior is observed in many cooperatives in 
China, which are formed with an initiative of local elites - the so-called dragonheads - 
with a purpose of extracting extra rents (Lin and Huang 2007). The benevolent type 
ensures a fair redistribution of the coalitional surplus. It could exemplify a governmental 
agency, or a nonprofit organization supporting the creation of a cooperative. For 
instance, the Dutch NGO Agriterra perceives itself as an altruistic organization 
(Blokland 2014). It offers farmers advice and support as to how to run their businesses, 
but also provides financial payments to the cooperatives. US cooperative development 
program assists farmers in the developing countries. For example, “Farmer-to-farmer” 
assignments in Senegal provide technical assistance and training in business skills, such 
as marketing strategies, organizational capacity building, organic farming techniques, 
and other value addition activities (National Cooperative Business Association 2017).  
Unique and fair redistribution of the coalitional payoff is characterized by the Shapley 
value (Shapley 1988). It is determined by the characteristic function embedded in table 
1, and is also presented in Appendix 2.1.  
Coalitions 
of 
Bottom-up 
Cooperative 
Top-down cooperative 
1 player 𝑣(𝑂𝑢𝑡) = 𝑉3 𝑣(𝐴) = 1 
𝑣(𝑃) = 0.5 
𝑣(𝐿) = 0 
𝑣(𝑂𝑢𝑡) = 𝑉3 
2 players 𝑣(𝐴, 𝐴) = 8 − 4𝑑 
𝑣(𝐴, 𝑃) = 7 − 4𝑑 
𝑣(𝐴, 𝐿) = 1 
𝑣(𝑃, 𝑃) = 4 − 2𝑑 
𝑣(𝑃, 𝐿) = 0.5 
𝑣(𝐿, 𝐿) = 0 
𝑣(𝑂𝑢𝑡, 𝐴) = 1 + 𝑉/2 
𝑣(𝑂𝑢𝑡, 𝑃) = 0.5 + 𝑉/2 − 𝑐 
𝑣(𝑂𝑢𝑡, 𝐿) = 𝑉3 
3 players  𝑣(𝑂𝑢𝑡, 𝐴, 𝐴) = 8 + 𝑉 
𝑣(𝑂𝑢𝑡, 𝐴, 𝑃) = 7 + 𝑉 − 𝑐 
𝑣(𝑂𝑢𝑡, 𝐴, 𝐿) = 1 + 𝑉/2 
𝑣(𝑂𝑢𝑡, 𝑃, 𝑃) = 4 + 𝑉 − 2𝑐 
𝑣(𝑂𝑢𝑡, 𝑃, 𝐿) = 0.5 + 𝑉/2 − 𝑐 
𝑣(𝑂𝑢𝑡, 𝐿, 𝐿) = 𝑉3 
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The payoffs of the farmers in a top-down cooperative in the subgames [2]-[4] are 
specified in Appendix 2.1. Subgame [1] characterizes also the final stage of the game 
when the farmer(s) choosing 𝑌𝑒𝑠 in the first stage 𝑅𝑒𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡(𝑠) the outsider’s offer in the 
third stage of the game.  
 
2.3 Equilibrium 
The subgame perfect equilibrium of the game is determined by backward induction. We 
distinguish between governance structures with no outsider, with a selfish, and with a 
benevolent outsider. 
2.3.1 Subgame perfect equilibrium when there is no outsider 
The subgame perfect equilibrium of subgame [1] is depicted in figure 2.4. We 
distinguish between three ranges of the distance parameter. When distance costs are 
low, i.e. 𝑑 < 1/2, the game results in a unique equilibrium with two Active players. 
Each farmer has sufficient incentives to be active, regardless of the actions of the other 
farmer. Each active player’s payoff 4 − 2𝑑 cannot be further improved by choosing 
another action. Therefore, the cooperative emerges bottom-up with the initiative of both 
farmers. With medium distance costs, when 1/2 < 𝑑 < 2/3, the game changes to a 
coordination game with two pure strategy equilibria. As heterogeneity increases, the 
value of 4 − 2𝑑 decreases relative to the constant payoff of 3, earned by a passive player 
when another player is active. As a result, when heterogeneity is medium, the 
equilibrium strategy of each player is to remain passive when another player is active, 
and to be active when another player is passive. This results in a coordination problem 
and multiple equilibria. In the first (second) equilibrium player 1(2) is active and player 
2 (1) is passive. These equilibria are characterized by the formation of a cooperative as 
a result of one of the players taking a lead. There is also a mixed strategy equilibrium. 
Each player chooses to be active with probability (2 − 3𝑑)/(1 − 𝑑), to be passive with 
probability (2𝑑 − 1)/(1 − 𝑑), and to leave with zero probability. When distance costs 
are high, in particular when 𝑑 > 2/3, the game takes the form of a prisoners’ dilemma. 
Intuitively, it becomes too costly for an active player to take an initiative when another 
player is passive when heterogeneity is high. Consequently, with high heterogeneity the 
equilibrium strategy of each player is to remain passive, regardless of the actions of the 
other player. Both players choose to be passive in the Nash equilibrium, and thus no 
cooperative emerges. The conclusions of the subgame without an outsider are 
summarized in Proposition 1. 
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Proposition 1: In the absence of the outsider, a cooperative emerges bottom-up with 
two active farmers when d < 1/2, with one active farmer when 1/2 < d < 2/3, and does 
not emerge when d > 2/3. 
 
Several insights are to be emphasized. First, when no outsider supports the 
collective action process, the threshold which separates bottom-up emergence from no 
emergence is 𝑑 = 2/3. When distance is above this threshold, no cooperative is formed 
because no farmer has an incentive to take the initiative. When distance is below this 
threshold, horizontal distance costs are lower. Thus, a cooperative can emerge either as 
a result of the initiative of both farmers (𝑑 < 1/2) or as a result of one of the farmers 
taking the lead (1/2 < 𝑑 < 2/3). Figure 2.4 depicts this insight.  
 
Figure 2.4. Sub-game perfect equilibrium when there is no outsider 
Second, the efficiency of the equilibrium depends on the level of heterogeneity. 
The highest surplus is 8 − 4𝑑. When farmer heterogeneity is low, this surplus is 
generated in the unique, efficient equilibrium because it is a dominant strategy for each 
player to be 𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒. The efficient equilibrium disappears when farmer heterogeneity 
becomes sufficiently large, i.e. 𝑑 > 1/2. An inefficient equilibrium arises, where the 
nature of the inefficiency depends on the level of farmer heterogeneity. If farmer 
heterogeneity is at an intermediate level, i.e. 1/2 < 𝑑 < 2/3, then the inefficiency is 
due to a coordination problem. Payoffs are such that one farmer chooses to be 𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 
in equilibrium, while the other farmer chooses to be 𝑃𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑣𝑒. Total surplus is equal to 
7 − 4𝑑. If farmer heterogeneity is even larger, i.e. 𝑑 > 2/3, then the game has the 
structure of the inefficient prisoners dilemma. In this setting it is a dominant strategy for 
each player to choose 𝑃𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑣𝑒. Total surplus is reduced to 4 − 2𝑑. Inefficient equilibria 
suggest a role for an outsider to increase the surplus generated by bottom-up 
cooperative. 
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2.3.2 Equilibrium when the outsider is selfish  
We model a situation with an outsider as an ultimatum game. The outsider offers a 
contract to farmers. The selfish outsider makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer to farmers, and 
captures all of the additional surplus generated in the top-down cooperative. The entire 
game with a selfish outsider is solved by backward induction. Equilibrium results in 
terms of the type of emergence are depicted in figure 2.5 with the distance parameter 𝑑 
and the value 𝑉 on the axes.  
 
Figure 2.5. Equilibrium emergence of cooperative when the outsider is selfish 
Various cases are distinguished. First, the case when the selfish outsider has a 
high value in a top-down cooperative, i.e. 𝑉 > 2𝑉3 + 6− 4𝑑,  is depicted in the upper 
part of figure 2.5. The outsider specifies payments 𝑡𝑖
𝑗𝑘
 and 𝑡𝑙
𝑚, where 𝑡𝑖
𝑗𝑘
 is a payment 
to farmer 𝑖 in a top-down cooperative with farmers 1 and 2 choosing actions 𝑗 and 𝑘  
respectively, and 𝑡𝑙
𝑚 is a payment to farmer 𝑙 in a top-down cooperative with only one 
farmer choosing action 𝑚. To induce farmers to become active in a top-down 
cooperative, a selfish outsider offers them an amount slightly exceeding their outside 
option, i.e. the payoff in a setting with no outsider (subgame [1]). These values of the 
contract variables are presented in table 2.2. For the medium values of the distance 
parameter 𝑑, the payment by the outsider slightly exceeds the value of the mixed 
strategy equilibrium payoff of the farmers. To discourage passive behavior a selfish 
outsider offers zero payment if at least one farmer chooses to be passive, i.e. 𝑡1
𝐴𝑃 =
𝑡1
𝑃𝐴 = 𝑡1
𝑃𝑃 = 𝑡1
𝑃 = 𝑡2
𝐴𝑃 = 𝑡2
𝑃𝐴 = 𝑡2
𝑃𝑃 = 𝑡2
𝑃 = 0. The remaining share of the total surplus 
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is kept by the powerful selfish outsider. A top-down cooperative with a high value 
selfish outsider always emerges with two active farmers. 
 
 Low d Medium d High d 
𝑡1
𝐴𝐴 4 − 2𝑑 + 𝜀 4 − 8𝑑 + 2𝑑2 + 2𝑑3
(1 − 𝑑)2
+ 𝜀 
2 − 𝑑 + 𝜀 
𝑡1
𝐴 4 − 2𝑑 + 𝜀 4 − 8𝑑 + 2𝑑2 + 2𝑑3
(1 − 𝑑)2
+ 𝜀 
2 − 𝑑 + 𝜀 
𝑡2
𝐴𝐴 4 − 2𝑑 + 𝜀 4 − 8𝑑 + 2𝑑2 + 2𝑑3
(1 − 𝑑)2
+ 𝜀 
2 − 𝑑 + 𝜀 
𝑡2
𝐴 4 − 2𝑑 + 𝜀 4 − 8𝑑 + 2𝑑2 + 2𝑑3
(1 − 𝑑)2
+ 𝜀 
2 − 𝑑 + 𝜀 
 
Table 2.2. Equilibrium payments when the selfish outsider creates high 𝑉 and farmers 
are active 
Second, a situation when a selfish outsider has medium value, i.e. 𝑉3 − 4𝑑 <
𝑉 < 2𝑉3 + 6 − 4𝑑, is shown in the middle part of figure 2.5. The equilibrium contract 
by a selfish outsider entails 𝑡1
𝐴 = 𝑡2
𝐴 = 0, because a top-down cooperative with one 
active farmer is too costly to a selfish outsider with medium value. Solving the entire 
game results in multiple equilibria. In the first equilibrium, both farmers choose the 
governance structure with a selfish outsider in the first stage. In the second equilibrium, 
both farmers decide on the governance structure with no outsider, i.e. the bottom-up 
emergence.   
Thirdly, the case when the selfish outsider has low value, i.e. 𝑉 < 𝑉3 − 4𝑑, is 
depicted in the lower part of figure 2.5. The selfish outsider with low value offers a 
contract in which every payment is equal to zero because his outside option 𝑉3 always 
exceeds his payoff in a top-down cooperative. As a result, in the equilibrium both 
farmers choose the governance structure with no outsider in the first stage, i.e. a top-
down cooperative with a low value selfish outsider never emerges.  
When the value of the outsider is limited, i.e. 𝑉3 − 4 < 𝑉 < 𝑉3, an increase in 
the distance parameter 𝑑 results in the higher likelihood of top-down emergence due to 
the existence of multiple equilibria. When the distance parameter is high, i.e. 𝑑 > 2/3, 
an increase in the outsider’s value 𝑉 results in more top-down emergence either due to 
multiplicity of equilibria (𝑉 is intermediate) or due to selfish outsider resolving the 
coordination problem (𝑉 is high).   Propositions 2a and 2b summarize the equilibrium 
results regarding the type of emergence when the outsider is selfish.  
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Proposition 2a: A top-down cooperative with a high (low) value selfish outsider always 
(never) emerges with two active farmers;  
 
Proposition 2b: When a selfish outsider has medium value, a cooperative emerges either 
top-down with  two active farmers or bottom-up with two active farmers (bottom-up 
with one active farmer, does not emerge) when d < 1/2 (1/2 < d < 2/3,  d > 2/3). 
 
When a top-down cooperative emerges due to the contract by a selfish outsider, 
it emerges with two active farmers. The payoffs of active farmers in a top-down 
cooperative with a selfish outsider (4 − 2𝑑 + 𝜀) are slightly higher than their outside 
option, i.e. their payoffs in a setting with no outsider (4 − 2𝑑). Farmers’ payoffs are 
negatively related to the distance between them, and are independent of the value of the 
outsider 𝑉. The payoff of a selfish outsider (𝑉 + 4𝑑 − 2𝜀) is increasing in both 𝑑 and 
𝑉.  
2.3.3 Equilibrium when the outsider is benevolent  
The objective of the benevolent outside party is to facilitate the creation of a cooperative 
and to ensure a fair division of the total surplus. The contract by a benevolent outsider 
specifies the payment(s) to farmer(s) to form a top-down cooperative. To reflect the 
benevolent nature of the outsider, the Shapley value is used to redistribute the surplus 
generated in the top down cooperative. The equilibrium result in terms of the type of 
emergence when the outsider is benevolent and 𝑉3 = 4 is depicted in figure 2.6. 𝑉3 =
4 is taken for illustrative purposes. Appendix 2 reports equilibrium results for all values 
of 𝑉3.  
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Figure 2.6. Equilibrium emergence of cooperative when the outsider is benevolent and 
𝑉3 = 4 
Similarly to a governance structure with a selfish outsider, we distinguish 
between high, intermediate, and low ranges of the value of a benevolent outsider. 
However, the thresholds differ in the two cases. The benevolent outsider has high 
(intermediate, low) value when 𝑉 > 2𝑉3 (
4
3
𝑉3 −
8
3
𝑑 < 𝑉 < 2𝑉3, 𝑉 <
4
3
𝑉3 −
8
3
𝑑), as 
shown by the solid line divisions in figure 6. Equilibrium contract payments from the 
high value benevolent outsider to the farmer(s) specify the Shapley value of the 
farmer(s) in a coalition with the outsider, as shown in table 2.3. The medium value 
benevolent outsider specifies a contract as in table 2.3, except for setting  𝑡1
𝐴 = 𝑡1
𝑃 =
𝑡2
𝐴 = 𝑡2
𝑃 = 0. As in the case with the selfish outsider, the low value benevolent outsider 
offers a contract in which every payment is equal to zero because his outside option 𝑉3 
exceeds his payoff in a top-down cooperative. 
 
𝑡1
𝐴𝐴 
4 +
𝑉
4
−
2
3
𝑑 −
𝑉3
6
 
 𝑡2
𝐴𝐴 
4 +
𝑉
4
−
2
3
𝑑 −
𝑉3
6
 
 𝑡1
𝐴𝑃 
3.75 +
𝑉
4
−
2
3
𝑑 −
𝑉3
6
 
 𝑡2
𝐴𝑃 
3.25 +
𝑉
4
−
2
3
𝑑 −
𝑐
2
−
𝑉3
6
 
𝑡1
𝑃𝐴 
3.25 +
𝑉
4
−
2
3
𝑑 −
𝑐
2
−
𝑉3
6
 
 𝑡2
𝑃𝐴 
3.75 +
𝑉
4
−
2
3
𝑑 −
𝑉3
6
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𝑡1
𝑃𝑃 
2 +
𝑉
4
−
1
3
𝑑 −
𝑐
2
−
𝑉3
6
 
 𝑡2
𝑃𝑃 
2 +
𝑉
4
−
1
3
𝑑 −
𝑐
2
−
𝑉3
6
 
𝑡1
𝐴 
1 +
𝑉
4
−
𝑉3
2
 
 𝑡2
𝐴 
1 +
𝑉
4
−
𝑉3
2
 
𝑡1
𝑃 
0.5 +
𝑉
4
−
𝑐
2
−
𝑉3
2
 
 𝑡2
𝑃 
0.5 +
𝑉
4
−
𝑐
2
−
𝑉3
2
 
 
Table 2.3. Equilibrium payments when the benevolent outsider creates high value 
 
Similarly to the case with a selfish outsider, farmers’ payoffs in a top-down 
cooperative with a benevolent outsider are negatively related to the distance 𝑑 between 
them. However, because of the fair division of costs and benefits captured by the 
Shapley value allocations, the payoffs of farmers in a top-down cooperative with a 
benevolent outsider are also negatively related to the value of the outside option 𝑉3 of 
the outsider, and positively related to the value 𝑉 of the outsider. This is reflected by the 
dotted lines in figure 2.6. For instance, when the benevolent outsider creates high value, 
i.e. 𝑉 > 2𝑉3, and   
{
𝑉 < 4 − 4𝑑 + 2𝑉3 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑑 > 2/3
𝑉 <
4(4−8𝑑+2𝑑2+2𝑑3)
(1−𝑑)2
− 4 + 2𝑉3 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑑 ∈ (
1
2
,
2
3
)
𝑉 < 12 − 8𝑑 + 2𝑉3 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑑 < 1/2
, 
it follows that both farmers reject the outsider’s contract in the equilibrium and hence a 
top-down cooperative with the high value benevolent outsider does not emerge. 
Propositions 3a, 3b, and 3c summarize the equilibrium results regarding the type of 
emergence when the outsider is benevolent.  
 
Proposition 3a: A top-down cooperative with a high value benevolent outsider 
emerges with two active farmers when V is sufficiently high. 
 
Proposition 3b: When a benevolent outsider has medium value, a cooperative emerges 
either top-down with  two active farmers or bottom-up with two active farmers 
(bottom-up with one active farmer, does not emerge) when d < 1/2 (1/2 < d < 2/3,  d 
> 2/3). 
 
Proposition 3c: A top-down cooperative with a low value benevolent outsider never 
emerges.  
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2.3.4 Efficient governance of cooperative emergence  
This section will address the question which governance structure creates most value. 
We compare the governance structures - no outsider (N), a selfish outsider (S), and a 
benevolent outsider (B).  
 
   
Figure 2.7 Equilibrium governance structures when 𝑉3 = 0 (left), 𝑉3 = 4 (middle), 
and 𝑉3 = 20 (right) 
Figure 2.7 depicts the efficient governance structures for different values of 𝑉3. 
Several conclusions are formulated. First, bottom-up emergence of cooperative is 
efficient when 𝑉 is low relative to 𝑉3. This efficient equilibrium emerges in all three 
governance structures. Second, there is an intermediate range of 𝑉’𝑠, as depicted by the 
shaded area in figure 7, such that no governance structure generates an efficient 
outcome. Third, there’s a range of values of 𝑉 which is relatively  
high, i.e.  
2𝑉3 + 6 − 4𝑑 < 𝑉 < {
12 − 8𝑑 + 2𝑉3 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑑 < 1/2
4(4−8𝑑+2𝑑2+2𝑑3)
(1−𝑑)2
− 4+ 2𝑉3 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑑 ∈ (
1
2
, 0.63)
,  
(low, i.e.  
{
4(4−8𝑑+2𝑑2+2𝑑3)
(1−𝑑)2
− 4+ 2𝑉3 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑑 ∈ (0.63, 2/3)
𝑉 < 4 − 4𝑑 + 2𝑉3 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑑 > 2/3
< 𝑉 < 2𝑉3 + 6 − 4𝑑)  
and  
low 𝑑’s, i.e. less than 0.63  
(high 𝑑’s , i.e. larger than 0.63),  
such that the governance structure with a selfish (benevolent) outsider is uniquely 
efficient. Finally, when the value of the outsider in a top-down cooperative is 
sufficiently high, the top-down emergence generates the highest surplus, irrespective of 
the type of the outsider.  
The governance structures differ with respect to the sources of inefficiency. For 
example, all three governance structures generate an inefficient bottom-up equilibrium 
in area 2𝑎 in figure 2.8. It is inefficient because the total surplus created by the bottom-
up emergence with two active farmers could have been increased if there was a top-
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down emergence, i.e. 8 + 𝑉 > 8 − 4𝑑 + 𝑉3. A governance structure without an outsider 
is not efficient because a high value of 𝑉 is forgone. A governance structure with an 
outsider is inefficient due to a coordination problem, which arises as a consequence of 
the contract by the outsider. The efficiency result is summarized in Propositions 4 and 
5.  
 
 
Are
a 
𝑁 𝑆 𝐵 
1 Efficient  Efficient  Efficient  
2a 𝑉 is forgone Coordination  Coordination  
2b 𝑉 is forgone & coordination  Coordination  Coordination  
2c 𝑉 is forgone & hold-up Coordination  Coordination  
3 𝑉 is forgone or 𝑉 is forgone 
& coordination  
Efficient  Coordination  
4 𝑉 is forgone & coordination or 𝑉 is 
forgone & hold-up 
Coordination  Efficient 
5 𝑉 is forgone & coordination or hold-up  Efficient Efficient 
 
Figure 2.8. Sources of inefficiency in governance structures 𝑁 (no outsider), 𝑆 (selfish 
outsider) and 𝐵 (benevolent outsider) when 𝑉3 = 4 
 
Proposition 4: There is an intermediate range of relatively high (low) V’s, such that 
the governance structure with a selfish (benevolent) outsider is uniquely efficient when 
d is below (above) 
√73−1
12
≈ 0.63.   
 
Proposition 5: Bottom-up (top-down) emergence of cooperative is efficient when the 
value of the outsider is sufficiently 
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 low, i.e. 𝑉 < {
𝑉3 − 4𝑑, 𝑑 ∈ (0, 1/2)
𝑉3 − 1 − 4𝑑, 𝑑 ∈ (1/2, 2/3)
𝑉3 − 4 − 2𝑑, 𝑑 ∈ (2/3,1)
, 
 (high, i.e. 𝑉 > {
12 − 8𝑑 + 2𝑉3, 𝑑 ∈ (0, 1/2)
4(4−8𝑑+2𝑑2+2𝑑3)
(1−𝑑)2
− 4 + 2𝑉3, 𝑑 ∈ (
1
2
, 0.63)
6 − 4𝑑 + 2𝑉3, 𝑑 ∈ (0.63, 1)
).  
 
The structure of the equilibrium contract payments by both types of the outsider 
implies that when a top-down cooperative emerges in the equilibrium, it emerges with 
two active farmers. Notice that the comparison of propositions 1, 2, and 3 reveals that a 
top-down cooperative results in at least as much activity as a bottom-up cooperative. 
However, the distribution of surplus in a top-down cooperative with two active farmers 
(8 + 𝑉) differs in the two governance structures. Figure 2.9 depicts the payoffs of 
farmers and a selfish (benevolent) outsider in a top-down cooperative, respectively 𝐹1,2
𝑆  
and 𝑆 (𝐹1,2
𝐵  and 𝐵), for different values of parameters 𝑉 and 𝑑, and 𝑉3 = 4. 
 
  
Figure 2.9. Payoffs of the two active farmers and the outsider in a top down 
cooperative when 𝑉3 = 4 and heterogeneity is low, i.e. 𝑑 =
1
4
 (left), and 𝑉 = 9 (right) 
The payoff of a selfish (benevolent) outsider in a top-down cooperative increases 
by 1 (0.5) when V increases by 1, increases by 4 (1.3) when d increases by 1, and stays 
constant (increases by 1/3) when V3 increases by 1. The payoff of active farmers in a 
top-down cooperative with a selfish (benevolent) outsider decreases by 2 (0.6) when d 
increases by 1, does not change (increases by 0.25) when V increases (by 1), and does 
not change (decreases by 1/6) when V3increases by 1. Figure 2.9 (left) shows that there 
is a range of parameters, such that governance structure with a selfish outsider is 
uniquely efficient, but farmers in a top-down cooperative with a selfish outsider are 
worse off relative to a benevolent case. This range is characterized by a low distance 
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parameter, and high-intermediate value of the outsider. Hence, for this range of 
parameters there is a trade-off between efficiency and farmers’ payoffs. On the contrary, 
for the range of parameters, where governance structure with a benevolent outsider is 
uniquely efficient (depicted on the right of figure 2.9), the fair distribution of total 
surplus does not create such a trade-off. This range is characterized by a high distance 
parameter and low-intermediate value of the outsider. Farmers’ payoffs are higher in the 
top-down cooperative with a benevolent outsider, and so is the total surplus.  
2.4 Discussion of results  
This section discusses the predictions of the model in the light of observations about the 
different types of emergence of cooperatives. 
First, we elaborate on the bottom-up type of emergence. Area 1 in figure 2.10 
depicts the range of parameters 𝑉 and 𝑑 such that a bottom-up emergence of a 
cooperative generates the highest total surplus. This occurs for two reasons: (i) due to 
the low value, which the outsider may creates in a top-down cooperative, and (ii) 
sufficient bottom-up incentives, given a sufficiently low range of the distance parameter. 
Consequently, a cooperative emerges bottom-up with two active farmers when 𝑑 <
 1/2 and with one active farmer when 1/2 <  𝑑 <  2/3.  
 
Figure 2.10. Efficient governance of cooperative emergence 
The first case corresponds to a situation in Denmark at the end of the 19th 
century when many dairy cooperatives emerged bottom-up with the initiative of farmer-
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members. It is documented that the cooperative movement did not start with the support 
of the government, philanthropists, landlords, or other outsiders, but was initiated by a 
group of farmers (Chloupkova 2002). In fact, at the time when the first dairy 
cooperatives were formed in Denmark, the conservative and anti-socialistic government 
did not encourage cooperative movement at all (Svendsen and Svendsen 2000). To 
illustrate, in 1882 the first dairy cooperative in Hjedding was established, financed and 
managed by the farmers only. Several studies highlight the homogeneity of Danish local 
communities as one of the key success factors of its early cooperative movement (Larkin 
1988; Svendsen and Svendsen 2000; ORourke 2006). To sum up, the empirical 
observation regarding the emergence of the first dairy cooperatives in Denmark is 
supported by the predictions of our model: in a setting with low distance parameter, i.e. 
high homogeneity of local dairy farmers, cooperatives emerged bottom-up without an 
outsider.  
The second case, i.e. the bottom-up emergence with one active farmer when 
1/2 <  𝑑 <  2/3, applies to the so-called cooperative “champions”. They are 
individuals who initiate the emergence of a cooperative and are willing to invest a larger 
share of resources and effort into its formation. Empirical descriptions of cooperative 
champions are scarce. In Australia, Niel Black was referred to as a cooperative 
champion because he helped to establish the Noorat Artificial Breeders Co-operative 
and became its founding director in 1960 (Black, 2013). He was able and willing to 
initiate the formation of this cooperative partly due to his superior knowledge about the 
dairy sector. Specifically, he studied agriculture at Michigan University in the US, 
where he learned about artificial breeding, which was not common in Australia at that 
time. This observation is reflected in our model through an active farmer making the 
entire contribution for the cooperative formation when another farmer is passive. Then, 
one contribution of Niel Black as a cooperative champion, when setting up his 
cooperative, was in a form of his superior knowledge.  
Bottom-up emergence is an equilibrium result in areas 2a and 2b. However, it 
is not an efficient outcome because the total surplus would have been increased if a 
cooperative emerged top-down. The governance structures with an outsider are also not 
efficient for these ranges of 𝑉 and 𝑑. A top-down cooperative in a governance structure 
with an outsider does not emerge because multiple equilibria lead to a coordination 
problem.7 An interpretation of this result implies that in some instances top-down 
                                                 
7 The existence of two pure strategy equilibria in the governance structure with an outsider imply that 
the players may not be able to coordinate on an efficient equilibrium, i.e. to ensure that a top-down 
cooperative emerges. An alternative explanation is to refer to the existence of a third equilibrium, i.e. 
a mixed strategy equilibrium. In that case, an inefficiency arises because a top-down cooperative 
emerges only probabilistically. 
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emergence of a cooperative is efficient, but not feasible. Top-down emergence does not 
occur in the equilibrium because players fail to coordinate on the efficient equilibrium.  
No emergence is an equilibrium result when the distance parameter is high and 
the value of the outsider is low, as depicted by area 2c. Farmer-to-farmer collective 
action does not emerge due to a hold-up problem. The contract by an outsider leads to 
a coordination problem. This result is illustrative of a setting in many post-Soviet 
economies, such as Georgia, where cooperative development in the agricultural sector 
lags behind (Sedik and Lerman 2013). Consequently, the non-emergence of 
cooperatives is not efficient because of (ii) the lack of bottom-up incentives, and (ii) an 
inefficient outsider due to a coordination problem.  
Area 3 depicts the range of parameters where a top-down cooperative with a 
selfish outsider generates most value. It occurs when the distance parameter is below 
0.63, and the value of the outsider is relatively high. In this range, the contract by a 
benevolent outsider is inefficient due to a coordination problem, i.e. a top-down 
cooperative with a benevolent outsider emerges only probabilistically. In contrast, the 
contract by a selfish outsider in this range results in the unique equilibrium in which 
both farmers choose to join a top-down cooperative. Hence, the governance structure 
with a selfish outsider generates the highest surplus. This range provides an explanation 
for the existence of the so-called dragonheads in China, i.e. the elites who initiate the 
formation of cooperatives in local areas with a goal of extracting extra rents (Lin and 
Huang 2007). The predictions of our model regarding the top-down cooperative 
emergence by a selfish outsider are in line with the empirical observations about Chinese 
agricultural cooperatives for at least two reasons. First, area 3 is characterized by a low 
distance parameter, which is exemplified by the local emergence patterns and low 
heterogeneity of Chinese farmers. Second, area 3 is characterized by the high value of 
the selfish outsider, which is exemplified by the superior financial and social 
connections of Chinese “dragonheads”.  
Area 4 represents the range where the governance structure with a benevolent 
outsider is uniquely efficient. It is characterized by a high distance parameter (𝑑 > 0.63) 
and relatively low 𝑉. In this range, the contract by a selfish outsider generates a 
coordination problem, which implies that a top-down cooperative with a selfish outsider 
emerges only with some probability. Hence, the highest surplus of 8 − 𝑉 is achieved 
with a probability less than one when the outsider is selfish. On the other hand, the 
contract by a benevolent outsider results in a unique equilibrium, in which both farmers 
always join a top-down cooperative, and the surplus 8 + 𝑉 is realized with certainty. 
This result highlights two advantages of the benevolent type of the outsider, such as an 
NGO, in supporting emergence of collective action. First, there is a range of relatively 
low 𝑉’𝑠 such that the benevolent type eliminates the hold-up problem between 
heterogeneous farmers more effectively than a selfish type. Second, when heterogeneity 
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of farmers is high, a benevolent type requires a lower 𝑉 to resolve the farmers’ hold-up 
problem than a selfish type. In other words, the benevolent nature of the contract is 
effective at eliminating the hold-up problem between farmers when their social and 
spatial heterogeneity is high (𝑑 is high), but resources are limited (𝑉 is relatively low).  
Finally, when the value of the outsider in a top-down cooperative is sufficiently 
high, i.e. area 5, the top-down emergence generates more value than the bottom-up 
emergence, irrespective of the type of the outsider. Hence, when an efficient governance 
structure emerges in the equilibrium, bottom-up cooperatives are predicted not to 
emerge.  This result corresponds with the theoretical prediction of Grossman and Hart 
(1986) regarding the efficient ownership of enterprises. It proposes that downstream 
ownership is more efficient, when more value is added at the downstream level. In the 
context of our model, a top-down emergence is more efficient, when more value is 
added by the outsider, i.e. 𝑉 exceeds a certain threshold.  
2.5 Conclusion and further research 
This paper focuses on studying the relationship between member heterogeneity and the 
pattern of emergence of cooperatives. By considering changes in only one exogenous 
parameter, i.e. member heterogeneity, our model provides a novel answer to a question 
of why “there are so many kinds of cooperatives”.  First, we provide a conceptual 
distinction between a bottom-up and top-down cooperative. Bottom-up cooperative 
emerges with an initiative of two active farmers when heterogeneity is low. When 
heterogeneity is medium, farmers face a coordination problem. As a result, a cooperative 
emerges due to an initiative of only one farmer, a coop champion. When no outsider is 
present and when heterogeneity is high, no cooperative is formed due to a hold-up 
problem. The role of an outsider is to facilitate the collective action of farmers by 
replacing horizontal formation costs with vertical costs and by bringing in additional 
value. A top-down cooperative is formed with two active farmers when the outsider’s 
value is sufficiently high.  
Second, we formulate conclusions regarding the efficient governance of 
emergence of cooperatives. Bottom-up emergence generates the highest surplus when 
heterogeneity and the value of the outsider is sufficiently low. When the value of the 
outsider is sufficiently high, top-down emergence is always efficient. We also identify 
the ranges of parameters 𝑉 and 𝑑 where different types of outsiders are uniquely 
efficient. In particular, we find that the “take-it-or-leave-it” contract by a selfish outsider 
is most attractive from an efficiency perspective when the value of the outsider is in the 
high intermediate range and heterogeneity of farmers is low or medium. In the first case, 
i.e. when heterogeneity is low, a selfish outsider increases the total surplus by bringing 
in an additional high value. In the second case, i.e. when heterogeneity is medium, he 
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resolves the coordination problem among farmers. So, a powerful rent-seeking 
entrepreneur who organizes homogeneous farmers in local areas is a feasible and 
efficient outcome in some instances. An example of such an outsider is the 
“dragonhead” who initiates the formation of cooperatives in China. To illustrate, the 
number of cooperatives in China increased from 26,400 to 1,685,900 between the years 
2007 and 2016 (Xu et al. 2017).  The contract by a benevolent outsider, such as an NGO, 
differs from the selfish case because it allocates the cooperative surplus based on a fair 
rule, i.e. the Shapley value. The difference in the nature of the contract leads to a relative 
advantage of a benevolent outsider in his ability to resolve the hold-up problem among 
farmers in a certain range of the parameters 𝑉 and 𝑑. The benevolent outsider is uniquely 
efficient when the value of the outsider is in the intermediate low range and 
heterogeneity of farmers is high.  Besides, from a distributional perspective, farmers 
always receive higher payoffs in a cooperative with a benevolent outsider, than with a 
selfish one. To sum up, we conclude that the type of the outsider matters in the roles of 
“activating” farmers because each type is associated with a range of parameters where 
it is uniquely efficient.  
Our model also suggests that in some cases no-emergence of cooperatives is an 
equilibrium result, but it is not efficient. In the governance structure without an outsider, 
no emergence is a result of a hold-up problem when heterogeneity is high. Hence, in 
such a setting, if a decision-maker is concerned with increasing efficiency, then the goal 
is to decrease the distance parameter 𝑑 to move to a better equilibrium. In the 
governance structure with an outsider, no cooperative emergence is a result of a 
coordination problem. It is resolved efficiently only by a selfish (benevolent) outsider 
when d is below (above) a certain level and V is in a range above (below) a certain 
value. A benevolent type requires a lower 𝑉 to resolve a coordination problem than a 
selfish type.  
We propose several directions for further research. First, the current model can be 
extended in different ways. One extension is to study a case with asymmetric 
information. Another possibility is to assign more bargaining power to the farmers, and 
to allow them to offer a contract to different outsiders. Second, in this paper we focused 
on the first stage of the cooperative life cycle and examined patterns of emergence. For 
further research it is interesting to integrate further stages of the cooperative life cycle 
into a model. The relationship between the type of emergence and the consequences 
during later stages of a cooperative life-cycle is of interest (Chassang 2010; Gibbons 
and Henderson 2012). In particular, it is worth investigating whether the type of 
emergence of a cooperative has a long-lasting influence on its performance. For 
instance, Gibbons identifies relational contracts as one of the most important sources of 
path dependence (2010). We suppose that different types of relational contracts are 
developed in bottom-up and top-down cooperatives. Finally, some observers have 
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doubts about the long-term viability of top-down cooperatives due to the members not 
initiating the cooperative, i.e. top-down cooperatives are “doomed to fail”. Studying this 
question from the behavioral perspective could contribute to such a discussion. For 
example, cognitive frames of reference of members in a top-down cooperative will 
influence their perceptions, inferences, and behavior (Cornelissen and Werner 2014). 
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Appendix 2.1. The subgames in figure 2.2 for the two types of outsiders 
The subgames [2], [3], and [4] in Figure 2.2 when the outsider is selfish are presented 
in the figures 2.11-2.13. The contract in Figure 2.11 specifies two payments {𝑡2
𝐴, 𝑡2
𝑃} to 
farmer 2, which depend on his choice of action in the last stage.  
 
 
Figure 2.11. Extensive form of subgame [2] in figure 2 when the outsider is selfish 
 Figure 2.12 specifies two payments {𝑡1
𝐴, 𝑡1
𝑃} to farmer 1, which depend on his 
choice of action in the last stage. 
 
 
Figure 2.12. Extensive form of subgame [3] in figure 2 when the outsider is selfish 
 Figure 2.13 specifies twelve payments 
{(t1
AA, t1
AP, t1
PA, t1
PP, 𝑡2
𝐴𝐴, 𝑡2
𝐴𝑃, 𝑡2
𝑃𝐴, 𝑡2
𝑃𝑃);(𝑡1
𝐴, 𝑡1
𝑃); (𝑡2
𝐴, 𝑡2
𝑃)} to two farmers, which depend 
on their choice of action in the last stage. 
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Figure 2.13. Extensive form of subgame [4] in figure 2 when the outsider is selfish 
 The payoffs in the subgames [2], [3], and [4] in figure 2.2 when the outsider is 
benevolent are determined by the Shapley value. If both farmers accept the offer, the 
total surplus is divided among the members of the coalition according to the Shapley 
value rule. When both players reject the outsider’s offer, players play the subgame 
without an outsider [1], and the outsider earns his outside option 𝑉3. If only one farmer 
accepts, this farmer forms a coalition with the outsider, i.e. top-down cooperative with 
only one farmer, in which the total surplus is distributed according to the Shapley value 
rule. The other rejecting player produces in isolation and receives 1 (0.5) if active 
(passive). The choices A, P, and L of farmers 1 and 2 entail that there are 9 possibilities. 
If farmer 1 chooses A and farmer 2 chooses P, then the characteristic function is:  
𝑣(𝐴) = 1, 𝑣(𝑃) = 0.5, 𝑣(𝑂𝑢𝑡) = 𝑉3, 𝑣(𝐴, 𝑃) = 7 − 4𝑑, 𝑣(𝑂𝑢𝑡, 𝐴) = 1 +
𝑉
2
,
𝑣(𝑂𝑢𝑡, 𝑃) = 0.5 +
𝑉
2
− 𝑐, 𝑣(𝑂𝑢𝑡, 𝐴, 𝑃) = 7 + 𝑉 − 𝑐. The Shapley value is therefore 
calculated in table 2.4.  
 
Sequence of 
emergence of 
grand coalition 
Value added by player 
𝐴 𝑃  𝑂𝑢𝑡 
{𝐴, 𝑃, 𝑂𝑢𝑡} 1 6 − 4𝑑 𝑉 − 𝑐 + 4𝑑 
{𝐴, 𝑂𝑢𝑡, 𝑃} 1 6 + 𝑉/2 − 𝑐 𝑉/2 
{𝑃, 𝐴, 𝑂𝑢𝑡} 6.5 − 4𝑑 0.5 𝑉 − 𝑐 + 4𝑑 
{𝑃, 𝑂𝑢𝑡, 𝐴} 6.5 + 𝑉/2 0.5 𝑉/2 − 𝑐 
{𝑂𝑢𝑡, 𝐴, 𝑃} 1 + 𝑉/2 − 𝑉3 6 + 𝑉/2 − 𝑐 𝑉3 
{𝑂𝑢𝑡, 𝑃, 𝐴} 6.5 + 𝑉/2 0.5 + 𝑉/2 − 𝑐 − 𝑉3 𝑉3 
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Shapley value 
3.75 +
𝑉
4
−
2
3
𝑑
−
𝑉3
6
 
3.25 +
𝑉
4
−
2
3
𝑑 −
𝑐
2
−
𝑉3
6
 
𝑉
2
+
4
3
𝑑 −
𝑐
2
+
𝑉3
3
 
Table 2.4. Shapley value when farmers 1 and 2 choose actions A and P respectively 
 Table 2.5 shows Shapley value allocations between the two farmers and the 
benevolent outsider in all possible 9 coalitions, based on the actions of farmers. 
 
Shapley 
values in 
coalitions 
Farmer 1 Farmer 2 Outsider 
{𝑂𝑢𝑡, 𝐴, 𝐴} 
4 +
𝑉
4
−
2
3
𝑑 −
𝑉3
6
 4 +
𝑉
4
−
2
3
𝑑 −
𝑉3
6
 
𝑉
2
+
4
3
𝑑 +
𝑉3
3
 
{𝑂𝑢𝑡, 𝐴, 𝑃} 
3.75 +
𝑉
4
−
2
3
𝑑 −
𝑉3
6
 3.25 +
𝑉
4
−
2
3
𝑑 −
𝑐
2
−
𝑉3
6
 
𝑉
2
+
4
3
𝑑 −
𝑐
2
+
𝑉3
3
 
{𝑂𝑢𝑡, 𝑃, 𝐴} 
3.25 +
𝑉
4
−
2
3
𝑑 −
𝑐
2
−
𝑉3
6
 3.75 +
𝑉
4
−
2
3
𝑑 −
𝑉3
6
 
𝑉
2
+
4
3
𝑑 −
𝑐
2
+
𝑉3
3
 
{𝑂𝑢𝑡, 𝑃, 𝑃} 
2 +
𝑉
4
−
1
3
𝑑 −
𝑐
2
−
𝑉3
6
 2 +
𝑉
4
−
1
3
𝑑 −
𝑐
2
−
𝑉3
6
 
𝑉
2
+
2
3
𝑑 − 𝑐 +
𝑉3
3
 
{𝑂𝑢𝑡, 𝐴, 𝐿} 
1 +
𝑉
4
−
𝑉3
2
 
0 𝑉
4
+
𝑉3
2
 
{𝑂𝑢𝑡, 𝐿, 𝐴} 0 
1 +
𝑉
4
−
𝑉3
2
 
𝑉
4
+
𝑉3
2
 
{𝑂𝑢𝑡, 𝑃, 𝐿} 
0.5 +
𝑉
4
−
𝑐
2
−
𝑉3
2
 
0 𝑉
4
−
𝑐
2
+
𝑉3
2
 
{𝑂𝑢𝑡, 𝐿, 𝑃} 0 
0.5 +
𝑉
4
−
𝑐
2
−
𝑉3
2
 
𝑉
4
−
𝑐
2
+
𝑉3
2
 
{𝑂𝑢𝑡, 𝐿, 𝐿} 0 0 𝑉3 
 
Table 2.5. Shapley value allocations among the farmers and the benevolent outsider 
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Appendix 2.2. Equilibrium when the outsider is benevolent and 𝑽𝟑 
changes 
 
Figure 2.14. Equilibrium emergence of cooperative when the outsider is benevolent 
and d=1/4 
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Appendix 2.3. Total surplus evaluation  
   
Figure 2.15. Value generated by the bottom-up emergence (left), top-down emergence 
with a selfish outsider (middle), and top-down emergence with a benevolent outsider 
(right) 
 
Figure 2.16. Efficient total surplus 
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3. Retained Earnings, Delegation, and Membership 
Stability in Cooperatives: A Relational Contracting 
Perspective  
 
 
Abstract 
 
Members of a cooperative decide in the annual general assembly meeting regarding the 
retained earnings percentage. On the one hand, payments to members should be 
sufficient to satisfy the requirements of the member firms; on the other hand, the share 
of retained earnings needs to be sufficient to satisfy the needs of the cooperative 
enterprise. The distribution of profit between the members and the cooperative 
enterprise is studied in a repeated membership-CEO relationship. The decision right 
about the distribution of the cooperative profit is either allocated to the farmers or is 
delegated to the professional management. The results of the one-period setting indicate 
that the member-controlled governance structure is inefficient due to downstream 
underinvestment only when the cost of downstream investment is high and the outside 
option of the management is low. The management-controlled governance structure is 
always efficient in a one-period setting. In an infinitely repeated setting, there exists a 
range of the values of retained earnings percentages where the downstream hold-up 
problem is resolved efficiently. The membership-CEO relationship is most stable when 
the value added by downstream investment is high, the cost of downstream investment 
is low, and the outside option of the downstream party and the impatience rate are low.  
 
Keywords: Cooperatives, retained earnings, delegation, relational contracts 
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3.1 Introduction 
An important annual decision in an agricultural cooperative is the distribution of profits 
between the members and the cooperative enterprise.8 Members use the financial return 
from the cooperative to finance their activities, and evaluate it in terms of the 
attractiveness of being a member of the cooperative. Similarly, retained earnings are not 
only an important source of finance of a cooperative enterprise, but it determines also 
its possibilities to invest and its attractiveness as an employer for highly skilled 
managers.9 Retained earnings in cooperatives differ across countries, sectors, and time. 
Chaddad et al. (2005) report that the average retained earnings percentage in 
cooperatives was around 33%, based on the sample data of 4216 US agricultural 
cooperatives between 1996 and 2000. There are substantial differences between 
different commodity groups – in 1985 the retained earnings percentage in the 100 largest 
US cooperatives varied from 18.1% in dairy and 31.4% in fruits and vegetables 
cooperatives to 58.3% in rice and 73.5% in sugar cooperatives (Cobia, 1989). Mean 
values of retained earnings in the 100 largest US cooperatives have increased gradually 
between 1962 and 1980, from 45.5% to 59.3% (Caves and Petersen, 1986). The 
percentage of retained earnings in the largest Dutch dairy cooperative Friesland 
Campina continuously decreased from 60% in 2009 to 45% in 2016. Despite the 
importance of the retained earnings in cooperatives and the empirical variety, its 
determinants are not addressed in the cooperative literature. This paper develops a 
theory addressing the annual choice of retained earnings in cooperatives. 
We formulate a non-cooperative game between the upstream (farmers) and the 
downstream (cooperative management) parties, while taking into account the repeated 
and long-term nature of interactions between the members and the cooperative 
enterprise, and by delineating the conditions for a stable membership of a cooperative. 
                                                 
8 The allocation of net profit is made among three main categories: patronage refunds, dividends, and 
unallocated reserves (Cobia, 1989). Patronage refunds are distributions of profit returned to members 
in proportion to the value of their patronage; dividends are distributions of profit returned to members 
in proportion to their equity. Retained earnings (unallocated reserves or unallocated equity) is a portion 
of profit kept by the cooperative to increase its investment capital (equity).  
 
9 The finance literature highlights the role of retained earnings as an important source of financing. 
Firms prefer raising capital, first from retained earnings, second from debt, and third from issuing new 
equity (Myers, 1984; Brealey et al. 2012). From a life-cycle perspective, higher retained earnings may 
be needed when firms are in an active growth stage (Donaldson, 2000). Additionally, the retained 
earnings hypothesis states that a firm may voluntarily reduce retained earnings to signal management's 
confidence in its future earnings (Crawford at al., 2005). Lastly, the change in the retained earnings 
percentage could be motivated by tax considerations (Myers, 1984).  
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The first issue highlighted in our model is the decision about the retained earnings in 
cooperatives. The allocation of the decision right is captured by the choice of 
governance structure. We characterize a governance structure by the allocation of the 
decision right to the members or the manager, to decide on the distribution of the 
cooperative profit. The objective is to study from a relational contracting perspective 
whether the members of the cooperative or the professional management formulates the 
proposal about the distribution of profit. Second, we investigate the incentives of the 
downstream party to invest. Third, in our model we explore the influence of farmers’ 
and management’s outside options on the stability of the relationship between the 
farmers and cooperative management.  
The ingredients of the model (delegation, right to take authority away, 
uncertainty, outside options) are delineated and illustrated by various examples. First, 
an implication of the relational contracting perspective is that managers’ authority can 
be considered informal because ultimately owners can reassert control if they wish 
(Baker et al., 1999). It implies that the real authority is “loaned” to the manager. 
Consider the case of the Dutch cheese cooperative “De Producent”, owned by 50 
members, located in the Gouda region (Peng, 2017). The general manager is not a farmer 
member. Instead, he is a professional manager with years of experience in the 
agricultural industry. The professional manager holds the real authority in the 
cooperative. Several decision rights are delegated by the farmers to the cooperative 
management, including the decision about the distribution of profits.  
Because the delegation of decision right is informal, the members have a right 
to reject a manager’s proposal and demand a different division of profits, i.e. farmers’ 
decision rights are loaned to the manager, rather than owned by him (Baker et al., 1999). 
This occurred in the largest Dutch flower cooperative Flora Holland in June 2014. For 
the first time in cooperative’s over 100 years of history, a proposal by the Board of 
Directors was rejected by the members during the General Assembly meeting (Kras, 
2014). The proposal entailed that 50% of the loss which occurred in 2013 (7.4 million 
euros) be covered by cooperative’s own reserves and another 50% (7.4 million euros) 
be covered by the members. Over 60% of the members who were present at the meeting 
voted against such a distribution of losses. In the light of our analysis, this outcome is 
viewed as a change from the delegated governance structure to the member-controlled 
governance structure.  
One of the stylized facts about cooperatives is that they exist in environments 
characterized by a high degree of uncertainty. For example, a prominent characteristic 
of the dairy market is the fact that milk prices fluctuate year to year. In the United States, 
since 1989 the overall trend for conventional milk pay prices has been increasing, while 
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the prices fluctuated year to year from 12 to 20 USD per cwt10 (Su and Cook, 2015). 
The trade-off between providing a stable pay to farmers and maintaining economic 
sustainability of a cooperative has been addressed in the cooperative literature (see Su 
and Cook, 2015).  The general conclusion is that one of the main functions of 
cooperatives is to provide a stable pay price to farmers in uncertain environments. 
Hanish et al. (2012, p. 9) state that “the reason why producers in Europe have chosen 
the cooperative as “the dairy organization of choice” lies in the internal governance 
structure and the relation of trust that has been built up over generations coupled with 
an often market dominating role of the cooperative enterprise promising a relatively safe 
haven in times of instability”. 
On the other hand, there are examples of farmers leaving cooperatives and 
switching to alternative downstream channels. In 2007 almost ten percent of the farmers 
terminated their membership with Friesland Campina. 650 farmers, of whom 500 were 
from Germany, switched to supplying milk to a competitor processor Hochwald-
Eifelperle, which offered higher prices for the farmers (Agrarisch Dagblad, 2007). In 
2015, thirteen percent of the total membership in the Dutch cheese cooperative Doc 
Kaas (163 farmers) terminated their membership in the cooperative. Such outcomes are 
interpreted as ending the relational agreements between the members and professional 
management. By switching to the best alternative outside option, the members forego 
the long-run benefits of honoring the relationship with the cooperative for the short-term 
price difference gain. 
The profit appropriation decision in a cooperative differs from such a decision 
in the investor-owned firm (IOF) due to the defining characteristics of a cooperative 
governance structure.  According to Hansmann (1996), one way to define a governance 
structure is to distinguish ownership rights, income rights, and decision rights. 
Cooperatives are member-owned, member-benefitted and member-controlled 
enterprises (Dunn, 1988). The first feature entails that ownership rights in a cooperative 
are allocated to farmers. As a consequence, a cooperative has no, or limited access to 
outside equity due to the requirement of member ownership. The share of profits 
retained by a cooperative is therefore an important source of internal financing for a 
cooperative enterprise. 
The member-benefitted feature of a cooperative implies that farmers are the 
residual claimants of the cooperative profit. Hence, the decision about the distribution 
of a cooperative profit is viewed as a trade-off between the immediate monetary 
payments to members and the long-run benefits to members, resulting from investments 
in the cooperative enterprise. Immediate benefits to members include payments such as 
                                                 
10 1 cwt equals to 50,8 kilograms. 
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cash patronage refunds and cash dividends. Long-run member benefits from profit 
distribution in a cooperative include retained patronage refunds, stock, and retained 
earnings (unallocated equity). Hence, the decision about the appropriation of profit in a 
cooperative has to address the problem of duality of the cooperative organization form, 
i.e. members are users as well as owners of the cooperative enterprise. On the one hand, 
payments to members should be sufficient to satisfy the requirements of the 
development of the member firms; on the other hand, the share of retained earnings 
needs to be sufficient to satisfy the needs of the cooperative enterprise. 
The presence of the transaction relationship between the owners of a 
cooperative and the downstream enterprise makes the profit appropriation decision in a 
cooperative fundamentally different from an investor-owned firm (IOF). There is an 
inherent conflict between market and member interests in a cooperative (Cook, 1994). 
The issue of cooperative profit distribution and retained earnings percentage is relevant 
from the perspective of a cooperative member farmer. First, the cooperative literature 
suggests that farmers generally have a large personal financial stake in the cooperative 
(Hendrikse and Veerman, 2001). Farmers often hold memberships in multiple 
cooperatives. On average, US farmers are members in 2-6 cooperatives (Dunn et al., 
1979). As a result, a farmer manages a portfolio of assets, including his farm house, 
land, equipment, and stake(s) in the downstream cooperative enterprise(s). Farmers may 
therefore be reluctant to accept a higher retained equity in a cooperative because their 
objective to maximize their entire portfolio of assets. For instance, it could be the case 
that the return on investment at the farm is higher than the return on investment at the 
cooperative enterprise (Staatz, 1987).  
The last feature of a cooperative governance structure is member-control. As 
owners, farmers hold the formal authority in the enterprise. The percentage of profit 
retained by the cooperative enterprise has a direct effect on the stream of payments 
received by the member in a given year, and consequently on the farmer’s asset 
management decisions. Therefore, the decision to retain patronage refunds “reflects the 
desire of the median member and is based on the optimal portfolio choice of the farmer-
member” (Knoeber and Baumer, 1983).    
At the downstream level, cooperative management is concerned about the profit 
distribution decision for at least three reasons. First, the survival of a cooperative 
enterprise is in the CEO’s personal interest due to his job security and salary concerns. 
Second, internal financing through retaining a share of cooperative profit allows a 
manager to pursue interesting and promising projects and consequently to build a 
successful managerial career. Finally, a history of managing a successful and growing 
enterprise is a signal of good managerial skills for the next employer.   
This paper highlights the member-controlled feature of a cooperative, i.e. the 
trade-off in the allocation of the decision rights in a cooperative. We study two 
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allocations of decision rights in an enterprise owned by member suppliers. The decision 
right in terms of formal authority is allocated either to the members, i.e. the centralized 
cooperative (centralized authority), or to the manager of the cooperative enterprise, i.e. 
the decentralized cooperative (delegated authority).11 Property rights theory (Grossman 
and Hart, 1986; Hart and Moore, 1990) argues that this allocation of decision rights is 
important when future circumstances cannot be completely foreseen and described in a 
contract. The decision maker has discretion, i.e. residual rights of control, regarding the 
choice of action in these unforeseen contingencies. They predict that the agents should 
own the assets when their relationship specific investments add most value. In the 
cooperative context, Hendrikse and Veerman (2001) conclude that the marketing 
cooperative is more efficient than a conventional firm when investments in relationship 
specific assets at the member firms add more value than at the cooperative enterprise.  
When, in addition to the ex-ante agreements about future actions, the 
agreements on transfers of authority are also non-enforceable, relational contracts have 
been argued to serve as a solution to the incomplete contracting problem of hold-up 
(Bolton and Dewatripont, 2013). Such contracts represent a type of collaboration 
sustained by the “shadow of the future” rather than through formally enforced 
agreements; relational contracts are “agreements so rooted in particulars of the parties’ 
circumstances that they cannot be written down and hence must be self-enforced rather 
than adjudicated by outsiders, such as courts” (Gibbons, 2010).  
The literature explores the role of relational contracts in organizations.  The 
empirical literature consist of (i) anecdotal evidence based on case studies, and (ii) 
systematic econometric evidence based on larger datasets. The empirical evidence of 
informal contracts is limited due to difficulties in measuring factors, which drive the use 
of informal contracts. Such factors include the intertemporal discount rate, outside 
options of players, and the degree of incentive misalignment. Yet, recent literature 
provides several examples of empirical tests of the theoretical predictions of relational 
contracting models in various settings (Gil and Zanarone, 2015). Gil (2011) investigated 
the issue of profit sharing between distributors and exhibitors in the Spanish movie 
theatre industry. The empirical results show that distributors are more likely to use 
formal contracts for movies with high expected revenue in order to lower the chance of 
opportunistic behaviour by the exhibitors. An empirical study by Macchiavello and 
Morjaria (2015) on the Kenyan rose export use the spot market price to compute a lower 
bound to the future value of relationship between the buyer and the seller. The findings 
                                                 
11 The right to decide about the distribution of profits will have an impact on the residual income 
right (Hansmann, 2009). 
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show that the volume of trade is constrained by the value of the relationship, and that 
the value increases with the age of the relationship between the buyer and the seller.  
We argue that the relational contracting approach is important for studying the 
profit distribution decision in a cooperative because (i) there are long-run repeated 
interactions between the upstream and downstream parties in a cooperative; (ii) the 
decision about cooperative profit distribution is made every period, i.e. on the annual 
basis; and (iii) occasionally the upstream-downstream relation in a cooperative breaks 
down, i.e. farmers reject proposals and take away delegated authority, farmers or 
management leave. The presence of the transaction relationship also implies that 
disinvesting for a farmer-member is problematic, relative to a disinvesting decision in 
an IOF. Hence, due to members’ high switching costs the repeated relationship is 
particularly important in cooperatives. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In section 3.2, the model is 
delineated.  Section 3.3 determines the equilibrium in the one-period setting. Section 
3.4 determines the efficient governance structure. Section 3.5 determines the 
equilibrium in the repeated game. Section 3.6 discusses the results and section 3.7 
concludes. The main results suggest that the management-controlled governance 
structure is always efficient in a one-period setting. In an infinitely repeated setting, the 
hold-up problem can be resolved in governance structure 𝐼. The membership-CEO 
relationship is most stable when the value added by downstream investment is high, the 
cost of downstream investment is low, and the impatience rate is low. 
 
3.2 Model 
Consider a game with complete information between a principal and an agent. The 
principal is to be viewed as the farmers/upstream party owning the cooperative firm, 
and the agent as the cooperative manager/downstream party being employed by the 
cooperative firm. The timing of events is depicted in Figure 3.1. In the first stage, the 
decision right is allocated. In governance structure 𝐼 (𝐼𝐼), the decision right about the 
distribution of the cooperative profit is allocated to the farmers (delegated to the 
professional management). 
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Figure 3.1. Timing of events 
In the second stage, Nature determines the outside option 𝑃𝑗 for the farmers, 
where 𝑗 = 𝐿,𝐻 and 𝑃𝐿 < 𝑃𝐻.
12 The difference between 𝑃𝐿 and 𝑃𝐻 captures the 
variability of outside options of farmers and reflects the uncertainty in agricultural 
markets, such as highly volatile milk prices. In the third stage, the holder of the decision 
right proposes 𝛾𝑗
𝑖, with 𝑖 = 𝐼, 𝐼𝐼, and 𝑗 = 𝐿, 𝐻, which specifies a share 𝛾𝑗
𝑖 ∈ (0,1) of the 
total profits to be paid back to the farmers. Consequently, the share (1 − 𝛾𝑗
𝑖) is the 
retained earnings percentage to be reinvested in the cooperative enterprise. In the fourth 
stage, the agent (cooperative manager) decides whether to stay (𝑆) or to leave (𝐿). In the 
fifth stage the agent (cooperative manager) chooses whether (𝑌) or not (𝑁) to make a 
downstream investment. The cost of downstream investment is 𝑐, i.e. 𝑐(𝑌) = 𝑐 and 
𝑐(𝑁) = 0. The level of profit 𝜋𝑌 (𝜋𝑁) is generated when the manager invests (does not 
invest) (𝜋𝑁 < 𝜋𝑌). Finally, in the last stage the principal decides whether to stay (𝑆) and 
honour the 𝛾𝑗
𝑖 agreement or to leave (𝐿) the cooperative. In the former case, the profit is 
distributed according to the proposed 𝛾𝑗
𝑖 rule, i.e. share 𝛾𝑗
𝑖 is returned to the principal, 
and share (1 − 𝛾𝑗
𝑖) is kept as retained earnings. In the latter case, both players earn their 
outside options, i.e. 𝑃𝐿 or 𝑃𝐻 for the principal, and 𝑠 for the agent.
13 Figure 3.2 depicts 
the extensive form of the subgame when governance structure 𝐼 is adopted. The 
extensive form of the subgame regarding governance structure 𝐼𝐼 is obtained by 
replacing 𝐼 by 𝐼𝐼 and is depicted in Appendix 3.1.  
                                                 
12 Our model assumes that outside options of players are exogenously determined. Endogenous outside 
options of the CEO are discussed by Edmans and Gabaix (2016), and Gabaix and Landier (2008). 
Endogenous outside options from the network perspective are studied by Gagnon and Goyal (2017). 
13 The alternative compensation for the agent (cooperative manager) is assumed to be stable due to the 
competitive labor market for professional management. 
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Figure 3.2. Extensive form of governance structure I 
3.3 Equilibrium in the one-period setting 
The equilibrium of the one period game is determined by backward induction. The 
equilibrium strategy profile, when governance structure 𝐼 (𝐼𝐼) is adopted, specifies for 
each observable history 𝑃𝑗 the value of the sharing parameter 𝛾𝑗
𝐼 (𝛾𝑗
𝐼𝐼), the strategy of 
the downstream party (𝑆 or 𝑁) , and the investment strategy of the downstream party (𝑌 
or 𝑁), and the strategy of the upstream party (𝑆𝑆, 𝑆𝐿, 𝐿𝑆, or 𝐿𝐿). The  𝑆𝑆 (𝐿𝐿) strategy 
of the upstream party in the last stage implies that farmers choose to stay (leave) 
regardless of the investment decision of the downstream party. The  𝑆𝐿 (𝐿𝑆) strategy of 
the upstream party in the last stage implies that the upstream party will stay (leave) only 
if the downstream party invests, and will leave (stay) otherwise.  
In the last stage of the game, the upstream party’s decision to leave or stay in 
the cooperative depends on the value of 𝛾𝑗
𝑖. Farmers choose to stay in the cooperative 
only when their share of cooperative profit 𝛾𝑗
𝑖𝜋𝑘  (𝑖 = 𝐼, 𝐼𝐼, 𝑗 = 𝐻, 𝐿, 𝑘 = 𝑌,𝑁) 
exceeds their outside option. This is the upstream party’s participation constraint. 
Hence, farmers’ strategy, when the outside option  𝑃𝑗 is realized, is 
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(𝑆, 𝑆) when 𝛾𝑗
𝑖 >
𝑃𝑗
𝜋𝑁
 ,
(𝑆, 𝐿) when 𝛾𝑗
𝑖 ∈ (
𝑃𝑗
𝜋𝑌
,
𝑃𝑗
𝜋𝑁
) .
(𝐿, 𝐿) when 𝛾𝑗
𝑖 <
𝑃𝑗
𝜋𝑌
.
 
The optimal choice of the upstream party is related to the equilibrium value of the 
sharing parameter 𝛾𝑗
𝑖 in the following way. When the sharing parameter is sufficiently 
high (either 
𝑃𝐻
𝜋𝑁
 or 
𝑃𝐿
𝜋𝑁
 depending on the realized outside option of farmers), farmers are 
better off staying in the cooperative, regardless of the investment decision of the 
downstream party. When the sharing parameter is in the intermediate range ((
𝑃𝐻
𝜋𝑌
,
𝑃𝐻
𝜋𝑁
) 
or (
𝑃𝐿
𝜋𝑌
,
𝑃𝐿
𝜋𝑁
)), it is only beneficial for farmers to stay if the downstream investment was 
made. When the sharing parameter is below a certain threshold (
𝑃𝐻
𝜋𝑌
 or 
𝑃𝐿
𝜋𝑌
 ), farmers are 
better off going for their outside option, regardless of the investment choice of the 
downstream party. The participation constraint of the upstream party also depends on 
the realization of her outside option. Intuitively, the minimum 𝛾𝑗
𝑖 required to satisfy 
farmers’ participation constraint, increases (retained earnings percentage decreases) 
when the outside options of farmers become more favorable.  
In the fourth stage, the incentive compatibility constraint of the downstream 
party is delineated. The downstream party’s investment decision depends on the value 
of 𝛾𝑗
𝑖 because it determines the share of cooperative profit (1 − 𝛾𝑗
𝑖) which is allocated 
to the downstream enterprise, i.e. the retained earnings percentage. The decision of the 
downstream party is also dependent on the actions of the upstream party during the 
consecutive stage. When the upstream party chooses (𝑆, 𝑆) in the last stage, the 
incentive compatibility constraint of the downstream party is satisfied when (1 −
𝛾𝑗
𝑖)𝜋𝑌 − 𝑐 > (1 − 𝛾𝑗
𝑖)𝜋𝑁.  When the upstream party chooses (𝑆, 𝐿), the incentive 
compatibility constraint of the downstream party is satisfied when (1 − 𝛾𝑗
𝑖)𝜋𝑌 − 𝑐 > 𝑠. 
When farmers’ strategy is (𝐿, 𝐿), the management is indifferent between making an 
investment or not (𝑌 or 𝑁), because both choices result in the same final payoff, i.e. 𝑠. 
The participation constraint of the downstream party is determined during the 
third stage. The stay (𝑆) or leave (𝐿) decision of the downstream party depends on the 
sharing parameter 𝛾𝑗
𝑖 as well as on the actions of players in the consecutive stages. The 
downstream party will choose to stay only when her payoff from staying, i.e. either 
(1 − 𝛾𝑗
𝑖)𝜋𝑌 − 𝑐 or (1 − 𝛾𝑗
𝑖)𝜋𝑁, outweighs her outside option 𝑠. The downstream party’s 
incentive compatibility and participation constraints are summarized in Table 3.1. The 
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incentive compatibility constraint (IC) and the first participation constraint (PC 1) of the 
downstream party determines the maximum value of 𝛾𝑗
𝑖, i.e. the minimum percentage 
of retained earnings, which facilitates downstream staying and investment. However, it 
is possible that when low incentives are provided to the downstream party, i.e. lower 
retained earnings percentage is proposed, the downstream party may choose to stay, but 
will not invest. Then, the (low-powered) second participation constraint (PC 2) is 
specified as (1 − 𝛾𝑗
𝑖)𝜋𝑁 > 𝑠, or 𝛾𝑗
𝑖 < 1 −
𝑠
𝜋𝑁
. 
 
 Strategy of the upstream party in the last stage 
 (𝑆, 𝑆), i.e. 𝛾𝑗
𝑖 >
𝑃𝑗
𝜋𝑁
 (𝑆, 𝐿), i.e. 𝛾𝑗
𝑖 ∈ (
𝑃𝑗
𝜋𝑌
,
𝑃𝑗
𝜋𝑁
) (𝐿, 𝐿), i.e. 𝛾𝑗
𝑖 <
𝑃𝑗
𝜋𝑌
 
Downstream party’s 
incentive 
compatibility 
constraint (IC) 
𝛾𝑗
𝑖 < 1 −
𝑐
∆𝜋
 
 
𝛾𝑗
𝑖 < 1 −
𝑐 + 𝑠
𝜋𝑌
 
 
Indifferent between 
𝑌 and 𝑁 
Downstream party’s 
participation 
constraint (PC 1) with 
investment 
𝛾𝑗
𝑖 < 1 −
𝑐 + 𝑠
𝜋𝑌
 
Indifferent between 
𝑆 and 𝐿 
Downstream party’s 
participation 
constraint (PC 2) 
without investment 
𝛾𝑗
𝑖 < 1 −
𝑠
𝜋𝑁
 
n/a14 Indifferent between 
𝑆 and 𝐿 
Table 3.1. Downstream party’s incentive compatibility and participation constraints 
  Finally, the choice of the value of 𝛾𝑗
𝑖 depends on the governance structure, i.e. 
on whether the members or the management hold the decision right. 𝛾𝑗
𝑖∗ is defined as an 
equilibrium choice of the sharing parameter. Figure 3.3 depicts the equilibrium values 
of the sharing parameter in the two governance structures. When governance structure 𝐼 
is adopted, members choose the equilibrium value of 𝛾𝑗
𝐼 to maximize their payoff at the 
end of the period, subject to the constraints of the downstream party. Similarly, when 
governance structure 𝐼𝐼 is adopted, the management chooses the value of 𝛾𝑗
𝐼𝐼 to 
maximize their payoff, given the participation constraint of the farmers.  
The equilibrium value 𝛾𝑗
𝑖∗ is contingent on the realization of other parameters 
in the model, such as the outside options of players. Therefore the categorization of all 
possible realizations of parameters is needed in order to solve for an equilibrium sharing 
parameter. Figure 3.3 depicts the classification of all possible cases regarding the 
                                                 
14 Because of the upstream strategy (𝑆, 𝐿), staying without investment is not possible for the 
downstream party. Hence there is no participation constraint (PC 2) without investment. 
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outside options of the upstream party. Each case characterizes the attractiveness of 
outside options and also the variability of outside options of the upstream party. For 
example, the variability of outside options of farmers, i.e. 𝑃𝐻 − 𝑃𝐿, is low in case 1, and 
is high in case 3, because the value of 𝑃𝐻 increases relative to 𝑃𝐿. The switching points, 
i.e. 𝑃𝑗 = 𝜋𝑁 −
𝑠𝜋𝑁
𝜋𝑌
 and 𝑃𝑗 = 𝜋𝑌 − 𝑠 −
𝑠∆𝜋
𝜋𝑌
, indicate the ranges where different outcomes 
occur in the equilibrium. A change in the outside options of players has an effect on the 
equilibrium choice of the sharing parameter because it (i) changes the participation 
constraints of players, and (ii) it determines which constraint is binding. Consequently, 
the equilibrium sharing parameter determines the equilibrium outcome in each 
governance structure.  
 
Figure 3.3. Classification of cases regarding the outside options of the upstream party 
Equilibrium values 𝛾𝑗
𝑖∗ for Case 1, i.e. when 𝜋𝑁 > 𝑃𝑗 + 𝑠 are delineated for 
each governance structure for different ranges of the cost parameter in Figure 3.4. This 
case represents a setting where (i) the outside options of the upstream and downstream 
parties, i.e. 𝑃𝑗 and 𝑠, are limited, and (ii) variability of outside options of the upstream 
party is low, i.e. the difference between  𝑃𝐻 and 𝑃𝐿 is relatively small. The first 
characteristic implies that leaving a cooperative is relatively (to other cases) unattractive 
for upstream and downstream parties, because they cannot earn much outside their 
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relationship. The second characteristic implies that the equilibrium strategies of players 
are similar in the two observable histories, i.e. regardless of whether good or bad outside 
options for farmers are realized.   
 
Figure 3.4. Equilibrium 𝛾𝑗
𝑖∗ in governance structures 𝐼 and 𝐼𝐼 when 𝜋𝑁 > 𝑃𝑗 + 𝑠 (solid 
line depicts 𝛾𝑗
𝐼∗ and dotted line depicts 𝛾𝑗
𝐼𝐼∗) 
First, consider the maximization problem facing the farmers. The final payoff 
of the upstream party is equal to 𝛾𝑗
𝐼∗𝜋𝑌 when both the incentive compatibility and the 
participation constraints of the downstream party are satisfied. This is captured in Figure 
3.4 by the area below the two constraints functions, i.e. the incentive compatibility 
constraint 𝛾𝑗
𝑖 < 1 −
𝑐
∆𝜋
, and the participation constraint 𝛾𝑗
𝑖 < 1 −
𝑐+𝑠
𝜋𝑌
. Both functions are 
downward sloping because as the cost increases, a larger share of cooperative profit 
needs to be allocated downstream, i.e. 𝛾𝑗
𝐼∗ must decrease. When the incentive 
compatibility constraint is not met, the downstream party may still choose to remain in 
a cooperative without making the investment. In this case the participation constraint of 
the downstream party is 𝛾𝑗
𝑖 < 1 −
𝑠
𝜋𝑁
 , which secures a payoff of 𝛾𝑗
𝐼∗𝜋𝑁 for the upstream 
party. Lastly, when none of the constraints of the downstream party are met, the 
upstream party earns her outsider option 𝑃𝑗. To sum up, the equilibrium strategy of the 
upstream party is to (i) set 𝛾𝑗
𝐼∗ = 1 −
𝑐+𝑠
𝜋𝑌
  when the cost of downstream investment is 
very low (PC 1 is binding); (ii) set 𝛾𝑗
𝐼∗ = 1 −
𝑐
∆𝜋
  when the cost is intermediate (IC is 
binding), and (iii) to set 𝛾𝑗
𝐼∗ = 1 −
𝑠
𝜋𝑁
 when the cost is high (PC 2 is binding). In the 
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former two cases, sufficient incentives for the downstream party are provided and the 
upstream party collects 𝛾𝑗
𝐼∗𝜋𝑌. In the latter case, providing incentives downstream 
becomes too costly for the upstream party. Therefore, it sets the sharing parameter just 
low enough to meet the participation constraint of the downstream party without 
investment. By collecting 𝛾𝑗
𝐼∗𝜋𝑁, where 𝛾𝑗
𝐼∗ = 1 −
𝑠
𝜋𝑁
, the upstream party is better-off 
than going for her outside option.  
Second, the downstream party chooses 𝛾𝑗
𝐼𝐼   to maximize her expected payoff 
subject to the participation constraint of the upstream party. Three possible payoffs of 
the downstream party are (1 − 𝛾𝑗
𝐼𝐼  )𝜋𝑌 − 𝑐, (1 − 𝛾𝑗
𝐼𝐼  )𝜋𝑁, and 𝑠. As depicted in Figure 
3.4, the downstream party maximizes her payoff by setting 𝛾𝑗
𝐼𝐼∗ =
𝑃𝑗
𝜋𝑌
, which is equal to 
the participation constraint of the farmers.  
The equilibrium values of the sharing parameters in governance structures 𝐼 
and 𝐼𝐼 are calculated for all remaining cases, i.e. when inequality 𝜋𝑁 > 𝑃𝑗 + 𝑠 does not 
hold, in Appendix 3.2. The equilibrium sharing parameter in governance structure 𝐼, i.e. 
𝛾𝑗
𝐼∗, is always higher than the equilibrium sharing parameter in governance structure 𝐼𝐼, 
i.e. 𝛾𝑗
𝐼𝐼∗. In other words, the value of retained earnings is higher when the decision right 
about cooperative profit appropriation is delegated to the management. This result is 
intuitive and is due to the upstream party being inclined to decrease the retained earnings 
percentage, for example in favor of immediate cash payments. Proposition 1 
summarizes this result.  
 
Proposition 1: The equilibrium retained earnings percentage in governance structure 
𝐼, 𝑖. 𝑒. (1 − 𝛾𝑗
𝐼∗),  is always lower than the equilibrium retained earnings percentage in 
governance structure 𝐼𝐼, 𝑖. 𝑒. (1 − 𝛾𝑗
𝐼𝐼∗). 
 
Consequently, given the equilibrium sharing parameters, the equilibrium 
outcomes of the one period game for all ranges of parameters are delineated. Figure 3.5 
depicts equilibrium outcomes in the two governance structures for different ranges of 
the parameters in the model. Labels 1, 2, and 3 refer to three equilibrium outcomes 
respectively – both parties stay in the cooperative and management invests, both parties 
stay and management does not invest, at least one party leaves.  
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Figure 3.5. Equilibrium outcomes in governances structures I and II 
Figure 3.5 also specifies the equilibrium values of the sharing parameter for 
each governance structure. Propositions 2 and 3 establish the comparative statics results 
regarding the changes in the cost of downstream investment (horizontal axis) and the 
value of the outside option of the downstream party (vertical axis). For example, when 
the cost of the downstream investment and the value of the outside option of the 
downstream party are sufficiently low (𝑐 <
∆𝜋(∆𝜋+𝑠)
𝜋𝑌
 and 𝑠 < 𝜋𝑌 − 𝑃𝑗 − 𝑐), the 
equilibrium outcome in both governance structures is such that both parties remain in a 
cooperative, and the downstream party invests. This is due to the equilibrium sharing 
parameters which satisfy all the constraints of the upstream and downstream parties. 
However, note that the same outcome is achieved in the two governance structures, but 
the equilibrium sharing parameters differ. Proposition 2 puts forward an explanation for 
the different equilibrium outcomes in the two governance structures when the cost of 
investment is high and the value of the outside option of downstream party is low. It 
proposes that in a member-controlled cooperative, the upstream party will first propose 
the equilibrium retained earnings percentage which is sufficiently high to encourage 
downstream investment. However, when the cost of investment becomes too high, the 
upstream party will propose in equilibrium retained earnings percentage which is too 
low. This is because it becomes too costly to satisfy the incentive compatibility 
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constraint of the downstream party, but satisfying the low-powered participation 
constraint is still feasible. 
 
Proposition 2: When the outside option of the downstream party is unfavorable, i.e. 𝑠 is 
below 𝜋𝑁 − 𝑃𝑗, as the cost of downstream investment increases, the equilibrium retained 
earnings percentage in governance structure I (II) first increases and then drops for 
very high 𝑐 (remains stable).  
 
Proposition 3 suggests that when 𝑠 and 𝑐 are sufficiently high, the upstream 
party will propose the equilibrium retained earnings percentage which is too low in order 
to encourage the leave choice of the downstream party because the participation 
constraint becomes too costly, given an increase in 𝑠. In contrast, the downstream party 
will propose the equilibrium retained earnings percentage which is too high in order to 
encourage the leave choice of the upstream party because this would allow the 
downstream party to earn her outside option 𝑠.  
 
Proposition 3: When the outside option of the downstream party is favorable, i.e. 𝑠 is 
above 𝜋𝑁 − 𝑃𝑗, as the cost of downstream investment increases, the equilibrium 
retained earnings percentage in governance structure I (II) first increases (remains 
stable) and then drops (increases) for very high 𝑐.  
 
 
3.4 Efficient governance structure  
This section evaluates equilibrium outcomes from an efficiency perspective. There are 
several possible sources of inefficiency in our model. When the equilibrium 𝛾𝑗
𝑖 is too 
low, i.e. the retained earnings percentage is too high, it may result in an inefficient 
leaving of the upstream party, inefficient staying of the downstream party and/or 
overinvestment by the downstream party. On the other hand, when the equilibrium 𝛾𝑗
𝑖 is 
too high, i.e. the retained earnings percentage is too low, this may result in an inefficient 
staying of the upstream party, inefficient leaving of the downstream party, and/or 
underinvestment by the downstream party. 
An efficient governance structure is defined as generating the highest total 
surplus. From the total surplus perspective, an outcome when both parties stay and 
management invests is always preferred to an outcome when both parties stay and 
management does not invest because 𝜋𝑌 − 𝑐 > 𝜋𝑁 by definition. When 𝑠 + 𝑃𝑗 > 𝜋𝑌 −
𝑐, leaving a cooperative is efficient, because more value can be created outside. Efficient 
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governance structures are depicted in Figure 3.6. The two horizontal lines, partitioning 
the figure, i.e. 𝜋𝑌 − 𝑃𝑗 and 𝜋𝑁 − 𝑃𝑗, will shift downward as the value of the outside 
options of farmers increases. It depicts a setting when the variability of outside options 
of farmers is high, i.e. 𝑃𝐻 − 𝑃𝐿 is high. Efficient governance structures for other cases 
regarding the outside options of farmers are presented in Appendix 3.2. 
 
Figure 3.6. Efficient governance structures when the variability of farmers’ outside 
options is high 
There exists a range of parameters, such that governance structure 𝐼𝐼 is uniquely 
efficient. In this range of parameters both parties remain in the cooperative, but 
downstream investment is made only in governance structure 𝐼𝐼.  Hence, the source of 
inefficiency in governance structure 𝐼 is the downstream underinvestment due to 
insufficient incentives provided in governance structure I.   Such a situation occurs when 
the cost parameter is in the high range, i.e. 𝑐 >
∆𝝅(∆𝝅+𝒔)
𝝅𝒀
), and the outside option of the 
downstream party is low, i.e. 𝑠 < 𝜋𝑁 − 𝑃𝑗. Consequently, an equilibrium sharing 
parameter 𝛾𝑗
𝐼 provides insufficient incentives for the downstream party to invest because 
the share of cooperative profit allocated downstream is not sufficient to satisfy the 
incentive compatibility constraint of the management. This occurs because the upstream 
party’s payoff is maximized only when the low powered participation constraint of the 
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downstream party is satisfied. Therefore it is the equilibrium strategy of the upstream 
party to set 𝛾𝑗
𝐼 = 1 −
𝑠
𝜋𝑁
 and to collect a share (1 −
𝑠
𝜋𝑁
) of the total surplus 𝜋𝑁. Then, 
the equilibrium payoffs of the upstream and downstream parties are 𝜋𝑁 − 𝑠 and 𝑠 
respectively. As a consequence, the value of ∆𝜋 − 𝑐 is foregone in governance structure 
𝐼. This result is summarized in Propositions 4 and 5. 
Proposition 4: Governance structure II is always efficient in a one-period setting.  
Proposition 5: Governance structure I is inefficient due to downstream 
underinvestment, when the outside option of the management is low and the cost 
parameter is high. 
Downstream underinvestment is the only source of inefficiency in the 
equilibrium. An inefficient exit of parties never occurs in the equilibrium because there 
always exists an equilibrium sharing parameter 𝛾𝑗
𝑖 which is sufficiently high for each 
party to stay. In both governance structures, when staying is efficient, i.e.  𝜋𝐻 − 𝑐 >
𝑃𝑗 + 𝑠, it is always true that the proposing party can offer a sharing parameter such that 
another party receives at least their outside option, i.e. either 𝑃𝑗 or 𝑠. This is achieved 
due to the observability of outside options of players and the possibility to condition the 
value of the retained earnings on the outside options. Hence, our model suggests that 
too much exit may occur only when there is imperfect information about players’ 
outside options and the retained earnings percentage is rigid. Intuitively, this result 
suggests that the inefficient exit of farmers or the management may only occur when, 
following a change in the outside options of players, there is a delay in adjusting the 
proposed retained earnings percentage accordingly.  Overstaying does not occur in the 
equilibrium for a similar reason. When the outside options of players rise, the total 
surplus from leaving a cooperative increases. Hence, there exists a turning point where 
the efficient outcome changes from parties remaining in a cooperative to parties leaving 
a cooperative. Therefore, even though the rising outside options of players increase their 
incentives to leave, it does not result in a decrease in efficiency because the total surplus 
from leaving also increases.  Lastly, overinvestment by the downstream party does not 
occur in the equilibrium because (i) in governance structure 𝐼 the downstream party is 
always compensated with an amount equal to the binding incentive compatibility or 
participation constraint, and hence never creates incentives to overinvest; (ii) in 
governance structure 𝐼𝐼, the objective function of the downstream party ((1 − 𝛾𝑗
𝐼𝐼 )𝜋𝑌 −
𝑐) is aligned with the function of the total surplus 𝜋𝑌 − 𝑐, which implies that investment 
is always efficient.  
Next, we delineate the comparative statics result regarding changes in players 
outside options and an efficient governance structure. Overall, a more attractive outside 
59 
option changes the ranking of equilibrium outcomes because leaving a cooperative 
becomes more efficient when 𝑃𝑗 or 𝑠 increase. In particular, the exit becomes an efficient 
outcome when  𝑃𝑗 + 𝑠 > 𝜋𝑌 − 𝑐. Whether the efficiency of a governance structure is 
changed following an increase in an outside option depends on the equilibrium choice 
of 𝛾𝑗
𝑖 and consequently on the equilibrium outcome. Propositions 6 and 7 summarize 
this result.  
 
Proposition 6: When the outside option s of the downstream party increases, 
governance structure I becomes efficient when 𝑐 >
∆𝜋2
𝜋𝑌
. 
The effect of a change in the outside option of the downstream party 𝑠 is evident 
from Figure 3.6. An increase in 𝑠 (depicted on the vertical axis) increases the efficiency 
of governance structure 𝐼 for the range of high cost parameter. An equilibrium outcome 
in governance structure 𝐼 changes from an inefficient situation where both parties 
remain in a cooperative but the downstream party does not invest to either (i) an efficient 
situation when the downstream party invests, when 
𝑐𝜋𝑌
∆𝜋
− ∆𝜋 < 𝑠 < 𝜋𝑌 − 𝑃𝑗 − 𝑐; or to 
(ii) an efficient situation when both parties leave, when 𝑠 > 𝜋𝑌 − 𝑃𝑗 − 𝑐. In the first 
case the change in the equilibrium sharing parameter 𝛾𝑗
𝐼 is due to the switch from the 
binding low powered participation constraint to a high powered participation constraint. 
As 𝑠 increases, the profit maximizing 𝛾𝑗
𝐼 drops for the upstream party and eventually the 
benefit from not proving downstream investment, i.e. higher 𝛾𝑗
𝐼, is eliminated. In the 
second case, as 𝑠 increases even further, it becomes too costly for the upstream party to 
satisfy the participation constraints of the downstream party, and therefore it chooses 𝛾𝑗
𝐼 
in such a way that the downstream party leaves.  
 
Proposition 7: When the outside option of the upstream party increases from 
𝑃𝑗
𝑜𝑙𝑑 𝑡𝑜 𝑃𝑗
𝑛𝑒𝑤, then governance structure I is 
 efficient when {
𝑐 >
(∆𝜋−𝜋𝑁−𝑃𝑗
𝑛𝑒𝑤)
∆𝜋)
𝜋𝑌
𝑠 ∈ (𝜋𝑁 − 𝑃𝑗
𝑛𝑒𝑤 , 𝜋𝑁 − 𝑃𝑗
𝑜𝑙𝑑)
. 
 
Figure 3.7 illustrates proposition 7. The range of parameters in proposition 7 
characterises a setting with relatively high costs of downstream investment and an 
intermediate value of the outside option of the downstream party. It follows that an 
increase in the variability of farmers outside options (𝑃𝐻 increases while 𝑃𝐿 is fixed), 
improves the efficiency of a member-controlled cooperative, i.e. governance structure 
𝐼. It improves the efficiency of governance structure 𝐼 for two reasons. The range of 
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parameters specified in Proposition 7 may be further divided in two ranges. First, when 
𝑠 < 𝜋𝑌 − 𝑃𝑗
𝑛𝑒𝑤 − 𝑐, the equilibrium 𝛾𝑗
𝐼 will no longer satisfy the low-powered 
participation constraint of the downstream party because 𝑃𝑗
𝑛𝑒𝑤 exceeds the payoff of 
the upstream party in a low value cooperative, i.e. 𝜋𝑁 − 𝑠. However, for this sub-range 
of parameters, the payoff of the upstream party in the high value cooperative, i.e. 𝜋𝑌 −
𝑠 − 𝑐  is higher than 𝑃𝑗
𝑛𝑒𝑤. As a result, the upstream party chooses 𝛾𝑗
𝐼 such that the 
downstream party invests. Second, when 𝑠 > 𝜋𝑌 − 𝑃𝑗
𝑛𝑒𝑤 − 𝑐, it follows that 𝜋𝑌 − 𝑠 −
𝑐  becomes lower than 𝑃𝑗
𝑛𝑒𝑤.  Therefore, increasing 𝑃𝑗
𝑛𝑒𝑤 creates larger incentives for 
farmers to leave, which in turn increases the total surplus, and the efficiency of 
governance structure 𝐼.  
 
Figure 3.7. Changes in efficiency of governance structure I when 𝑃𝑗
𝑜𝑙𝑑  increases to 
𝑃𝑗
𝑛𝑒𝑤 
There are two ways to address this source of inefficiency in governance structure 
𝐼. The first way is to change the governance structure from 𝐼 to 𝐼𝐼, i.e. to delegate the 
decision right to decide on the retained earnings percentage to the downstream party. 
The second way is to rely on a relational contract because there are usually many 
exchanges between the upstream and downstream parties. It entails possibilities for an 
informal agreement between the upstream and downstream parties to commit to an 
efficient outcome. The conditions, under which the relational contract is sustained, are 
delineated in the next section.   
 
61 
3.5 Equilibrium in the infinitely repeated setting 
This section addresses the question of whether the efficiency in governance structure 𝐼 
can be improved in a repeated game. Consider an infinitely repeated version of the stage 
game depicted in Figure 3.2. We propose that the repeated game approach is relevant 
for studying the profit distribution decision in a cooperative for at least three reasons.  
First, the relation between an upstream and a downstream party in a cooperative can be 
characterized as a long-run repeated interaction. Second, the decision about cooperative 
profit appropriation (the same stage game) is made every period, i.e. on the annual basis. 
Third, occasionally the agreements in a cooperative break down, i.e. farmers take away 
delegated authority by rejecting the proposal, and farmers or management leaving a 
cooperative. 
Suppose, players adopt grim trigger strategies, i.e. cooperate until one party 
fails to cooperate, which triggers a switch to non-cooperation forever after.15 
Cooperation implies honoring the relational contract, while defection is viewed as 
breaking the relational contract. If the principal or the agent reneges on the relational 
contract, the cooperation breaks down forever. Making such an assumption implies that 
the strongest punishment for deviation is implemented. Hence, it allows for the largest 
possible set of relational contracts. 
Section 3.4 demonstrated that in a one-period setting there is always a range of 
parameters (low outside option of the downstream party and high cost of downstream 
investment) where governance structure 𝐼 is inefficient because the downstream party 
does not make the downstream investment. Inefficient underinvestment is a 
consequence of a hold-up problem. Valuable investments of the downstream party are 
forgone because it is not able to secure a sufficient share of the total surplus in the ex-
post bargaining. This occurs due to the allocation of decision rights in governance 
structure 𝐼. The downstream party anticipates a high value of the sharing parameter, and 
consequently a low retained earning percentage, and therefore chooses not to invest. 
Such an inefficiency can be resolved in an infinitely repeated setting if both parties can 
credibly commit to an efficient equilibrium. In particular, such a commitment implies 
that an upstream party proposes a sufficiently low sharing parameter, or sufficiently 
high retained earnings percentage, and a downstream party invests. 
Denote a relational sharing parameter in governance structure I when 𝑃𝐻 and 
𝑃𝐿 occur, Γ𝐻
𝐼  and Γ𝐿
𝐼respectively. The relational contract is self-enforcing when the long-
run benefits from honoring the relational contract outweigh the short-run gains from 
deviation for both parties. If the upstream party honors the agreement it earns a stream 
                                                 
15 According to Sannikov, grim strategies may not be optimal in continuous-time models (Athey and 
Skrzypacz, 2017). 
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of payoffs Γ𝑗
𝐼𝜋𝑌 +
1
𝑟
(Γ𝑗
𝐼𝜋𝑌), i.e. a share of high cooperative profit every period. If the 
upstream party deviates from the agreement it earns a stream of payoffs 𝛾𝑗
𝐼𝜋𝑁 +
1
𝑟
𝛾𝑗
𝐼𝜋𝑁, 
i.e. the share of the low cooperative profit, determined by the spot sharing parameter, in 
every period. The punishment for deviation of the upstream party is limited due to the 
distribution of power in governance structure I (the upstream party holds all the power). 
The dynamic enforcement constraint of the upstream party is satisfied when the long-
run benefits of honoring the relational agreement outweigh short-run gains from 
deviation. The upstream party’s dynamic enforcement constraint is therefore  
Γ𝑗
𝐼 ≥
𝜋𝑁−𝑠
𝜋𝑌
  [1]. 
If the downstream party respects the agreement it earns a stream of payoffs 
(1 − Γ𝑗
𝐼)𝜋𝑌 − 𝑐 +
1
𝑟
((1 − Γ𝑗
𝐼)𝜋𝑌 − 𝑐), i.e. a share of high cooperative profit minus the 
cost. If the downstream party deviates from the agreement it earns a stream of 
payoffs (1 − Γ𝑗
𝐼)𝜋𝑁 +
1
𝑟
( (1 − γ𝑗
𝐼 )𝜋𝑁), i.e. it gains from not paying the cost in the 
current period, but receives a lower share, i.e. determined by the spot sharing parameter, 
forever after. Therefore the dynamic enforcement constraint of the downstream party is  
Γ𝑗
𝐼 ≤ 1−
𝑐(𝑟+1)+𝑠
𝑟∆𝜋+𝜋𝑌
 [2]. 
The inefficient underinvestment in governance structure I is resolved when 
there exists a range of parameter such that the relational contract is stable, i.e. conditions 
[1] and [2] are satisfied. This result is summarized in Proposition 8.  
 
Proposition 8: An infinitely repeated game resolves the inefficient downstream 
underinvestment in governance structure I when 
𝜋𝑁−𝑠
𝜋𝑌
 < 1 −
𝑐(𝑟+1)+𝑠
𝑟∆𝜋+𝜋𝑌
 . 
As a consequence, when such a range of parameters is non-empty, a sharing 
parameter in an infinitely repeated setting is always lower than in a one-period setting. 
So, in a repeated game, there exists a range of feasible retained earnings values which 
support an efficient equilibrium, and the value of retained earnings is higher relative to 
a one-period setting. This result is summarized in Proposition 9. 
 
Proposition 9: In governance structure I, the (efficient) equilibrium value of retained 
earnings in the repeated setting is higher than (the inefficient) equilibrium value of 
retained earnings in the one-period setting. 
 
The range of parameters for which the efficiency of governance structure 𝐼 is 
improved in an infinitely repeated setting is depicted in Figure 3.8 as a shaded area. It 
follows that the upstream party is willing to commit to a lower sharing parameter, and 
the downstream party is willing to commit to making an investment, when the cost 
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parameter is in the intermediate range. Yet, there remains a high range of the cost 
parameter where the relational contract is not feasible, i.e. governance structure 
𝐼 remains inefficient even when the repeated long-term nature of interaction is 
accounted for.  
 
Figure 3.8. Efficient governance structures in a repeated setting 
Next, we derive the comparative statics results regarding the parameters which 
affect the stability of the relational agreement between the parties. As summarized in 
Table 3.2, the relational contract between the upstream and the downstream party in a 
cooperative is most stable when the value added by the downstream investment is high, 
when the cost of downstream investment is low, the outside option of the downstream 
party is low, and the impatience rate is low.     
 
An 
increase in 
the 
parameter 
Meaning 
Which 
participation 
constraint is 
affected 
Feasible Retained 
Earnings percentage 
range 
𝜋𝑌 
Cooperative’s profit 
when downstream 
party invests; 
Both Expands 
𝜋𝑁 
Cooperative’s profit 
when downstream 
party does not invest; 
Both Shrinks 
𝑐 
Cost of downstream 
investment 
Downstream Shrinks 
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∆𝜋 
Value added by 
downstream 
investment 
Both Expands 
𝑠 
Outside option of the 
downstream party 
Both Shrinks 
𝑟 Interest rate Downstream Shrinks 
Table 3.2. Comparative statics in an infinitely repeated game 
To conclude, we find that changing the rules of the game from a one-period to 
an infinitely repeated setting may improve the efficiency of governance structure 𝐼. Our 
results indicate that when taking into account the long-term repeated interactions 
between the upstream and the downstream parties, credible commitments to a more 
efficient outcome can be made. Specifically, the upstream party can credibly commit to 
a higher percentage of retained earnings in the long-run, and the downstream party can 
commit to the downstream investment. Many equilibrium outcomes are supported as a 
Nash Equilibrium in an infinitely repeated setting. In particular, any value of the sharing 
parameter Γ𝑗
𝐼 in the range ( 
𝜋𝑁−𝑠
𝜋𝑌
 , 1 −
𝑐(𝑟+1)+𝑠
𝑟∆𝜋+𝜋𝑌
) would support an efficient equilibrium. 
Hence, the problem of underinvestment in the member-controlled cooperative can be 
resolved when the interaction between the upstream and downstream parties is infinitely 
repeated. However, there still remains a range of high values of the cost parameter where 
the relational contract is not feasible.  
 
3.6 Discussion 
To study the retained earnings in cooperatives, a non-cooperative game between the 
upstream and the downstream parties in a cooperative is formulated. It is then solved 
for an equilibrium in a one period and an infinitely repeated settings. This section 
discusses the predictions of the model and the role of players’ outside options, 
uncertainty, profit distribution rejection decisions, delegation, and the repeated nature 
of interactions in a cooperative.  
The equilibrium percentage of retained earnings, and therefore the equilibrium 
outcome in our model depends on the outside options of players. This is the case because 
outside options determine the participation constraints of parties. The outside option of 
the downstream party increases when the competition for managerial talent in a market 
drives managerial compensation up. The empirical evidence in advanced countries show 
that increased competition for managers has contributed to a rise in managerial 
compensation (Fabbri and Marin, 2011; Frydman, 2007). According to Frydman (2007), 
competition for managerial skills has intensified due to lower mobility costs, i.e. it has 
become easier for top-managers to switch to a more favorable position when it becomes 
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available. This claim is supported by two empirical findings. First, starting from around 
1970’s there was a major shift from firm-specific managerial skills to more general 
managerial ones for top US executives (Frydman, 2007). Second, there was also a sharp 
increase in the number of sectoral experiences acquired throughout a typical executive 
career. Similar shifts are also documented for cooperative managers. For instance, the 
CEO of the Dutch dairy cooperative FrieslandCampina during 2009-2015, had 
previously held top-management positions at Unilever (transnational consumer goods 
company) and moved on to being the CEO of Carlsberg (global beer brewer) in 2016. 
Hence, the upper part of Figure 3.4 where the outside option of the downstream party is 
high characterizes a competitive market for managerial talent.  
Bénabou and Tirole (2016) show that competition does not only increase the 
level of compensation, but also changes the structure of compensation towards high-
powered incentives. Our results are in line with this prediction. When 𝑠 exceeds the 
threshold of 𝜋𝑁 − 𝑃𝑗, i.e. the competition for managers increases, the equilibrium 
percentage of retained earnings is always higher relative to a case when 𝑠 < 𝜋𝑁 − 𝑃𝑗. 
Consequently, up to a certain maximum value of 𝑠 (𝑠 < 𝜋𝑌 − 𝑃𝑗 − 𝑐), both the incentive 
compatibility and participation constraints of the downstream party are satisfied, i.e. she 
remains in the cooperative and invests. In other words, the upstream party provides high-
powered incentives downstream in terms of a sufficiently high retained earnings 
percentage. When 𝑠 exceeds the maximum value of 𝑠 > 𝜋𝑌 − 𝑃𝑗 − 𝑐, providing 
downstream incentives becomes too costly, and the upstream party goes for her outside 
option instead. Note, that an outcome where the downstream party stays but does not 
invest, i.e. the low-powered participation constraint is satisfied, does not occur in the 
equilibrium when the market for managers is competitive, i.e. when 𝑠 > 𝜋𝑁 − 𝑃𝑗. 
The outside option of the upstream party increases when the alternative prices 
for farmers’ output outside a cooperative become more favorable. The rising outside 
options of farmers have two effects on the efficiency of a member-controlled 
cooperative. First, it changes the ranking of outcomes for the upstream party in such a 
way that providing low-powered incentives downstream is no longer attractive. 
Therefore, in one range of parameters the efficiency of governance structure 𝐼 increases 
because high-powered incentives are provided to the downstream party. For the other 
range of parameters, higher outside option increases the incentive of farmers to exit the 
cooperative. However, such an increase in alternative prices also increases the total 
surplus in the outcome, where players exit the cooperative, and consequently improves 
the efficiency.  
Our model also provides an explanation for the observed exit behavior of 
farmers. An inefficient “too much” exit does not occur in the equilibrium of our model. 
The reason is that it can only occur when (i) there is imperfect information about the 
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outside options of farmers and/or when (ii) the retained earnings percentage is rigid. 
Consequently, in a setting where farmers’ outside options are likely to change frequently 
and by large amounts, our model suggests to leave as much leeway for the retained 
earning percentage as possible. For example, setting the retained earning percentage 
fixed for prolonged periods, such as several years, is then likely to result in the “too 
much” exit of farmers. To illustrate, in 2007 around ten percent of the membership of 
the dairy cooperative FrieslandCampina switched to an alternative processor in 
Germany due to more favorable prices. In the light of our model, this exit behavior can 
be viewed as an inefficient outcome if the retained earnings percentage was rigid and 
did not allow for an appropriate retained earnings adjustment. As depicted in Table 3.3, 
FrieslandCampina sets the cooperative profit distribution policy for a period of three 
years. This interpretation is also supported by the retained earnings percentage decrease 
in the subsequent years.  
Year 
Retained 
earnings, 
 % 
Cash 
performance 
premium, 
% 
Fixed 
member 
bonds, 
% 
2009-2010 60 25 15 
2011-2013 50 30 20 
2014-2016 45 35 20 
2017-2019 55 35 10 
Table 3.3. Retained earnings percentage in FrieslandCampina (Annual reports) 
One way to view the rejection of management’s proposal regarding cooperative 
profit distribution by the members is to describe it as a switch from governance structure 
𝐼𝐼, i.e. delegation, to governance structure 𝐼, i.e. member-controlled cooperative. So, 
members retract the real authority from the management. In the light of the results of 
our model, such a switch is always inefficient because it will result in insufficient 
downstream investment. However, the interpretation of the rejection decision by the 
members would be different in a model where most value is created at the upstream 
stage.  
One possible way to deal with the underinvestment inefficiency is to change 
the governance structure, i.e. to delegate the decision right to the downstream party. 
Such an allocation of the decision right would result in an increase of the retained 
earnings percentage, which in turn mitigates downstream underinvestment. This pattern 
was observed in the Dutch cheese cooperative De Producent, where the manager holds 
a substantial decision power, including the right to decide on the cooperative profit 
distribution (Peng, 2017). In the case of FrieslandCampina, the management’s proposal 
regarding cooperative’s profit appropriation is formulated annually in February (for the 
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preceding year). In April, this proposal needs to be approved by the cooperative 
membership (it is the Board of the cooperative, which functions as a general meeting of 
cooperative membership).   
Alternatively, we investigate whether an efficient outcome can arise in the 
member-controlled governance structure in an infinitely repeated setting. We find that 
there exists a range of the values of retained earnings, such that the upstream and 
downstream parties commit to an efficient equilibrium. In particular, our results suggest 
that due to the “shadow of the future” the upstream party can commit to raising the 
retained earnings percentage, and the downstream party can commit to making the 
valuable downstream investment. We show that the equilibrium percentage of retained 
earnings in the repeated setting is always larger than in the one-shot game. Hence, our 
results indicate that a member-controlled cooperative may resolve the problem of 
insufficient downstream investment. The crucial is that a stable relational contract is 
built between the members and the management of a cooperative. The membership-
CEO relationship is most stable when the value added by downstream investment is 
high, the cost of downstream investment is low, the outside option of the downstream 
party is low, and the impatience rate is low. This result highlights the importance of 
developing long-term oriented agreements between the upstream and downstream 
parties in a cooperative. 
Lastly, we find that even when a relational contract is feasible between the 
upstream and downstream parties in a cooperative, there still remains a range of 
parameters, characterized by very high cost of downstream investment and low outside 
options of farmers, such that governance structure 𝐼 is inefficient. It is therefore the only 
range of parameters in our model where delegation of real authority downstream is 
uniquely efficient.   
 
3.7 Conclusion and further research 
Retained equity is one of the main sources of finance in farmer cooperatives due to their 
limited access to external finance. The decision regarding cooperative’s retained 
earnings percentage differs from such a decision in an IOF because members are the 
owners and also users of the downstream enterprise. Therefore there exist an intrinsic 
conflict between market and member interests in a cooperative (Cook, 1994). This paper 
studies the retained earnings percentage in cooperatives from a relational contracting 
perspective. It highlights delegation of decision making, the value of the repeated 
relationship between the members and their cooperative, outside options and 
uncertainty. 
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First, we differentiate between two governance structures. In governance 
structure 𝐼 (𝐼𝐼), the members (management) of a cooperative decide(s) on the 
distribution of cooperative profit. It is determined by the participation constraint of the 
upstream party and incentive compatibility and participation constraints of the 
downstream parties.  The first result of our model implies that the equilibrium retained 
earnings percentage is always lower in a member-controlled cooperative relative to a 
cooperative where the profit distribution decision is allocated to the downstream 
management. 
Our second result from the one-period setting implies that governance structure 
𝐼𝐼 is always efficient due to the alignment between the objective of the downstream 
party and the total surplus, i.e. the downstream investment determines how much value 
is created. Governance structure 𝐼 is inefficient due to the insufficient equilibrium 
retained earnings percentage. The upstream party faces a tradeoff between providing 
downstream incentives and capturing a higher share of the value created in a 
cooperative. Our results suggest that there exists a range of parameters such that the 
upstream party is better-off by capturing a larger share of a low profit than a lower share 
of a high profit. This has an implication on the investment decision by the downstream 
party. Hence, an inefficiency arises due to an underinvestment at the downstream level.  
Third, our model adds a novel insight regarding the profit distribution decision 
in a cooperative by formulating an infinitely repeated version of the stage game and by 
establishing the stability conditions for the relational contract between the upstream and 
the downstream parties in a cooperative. In an infinitely repeated setting the efficiency 
of a member-controlled cooperative improves for some range of parameters. However, 
the results also indicate that when the cost of downstream investment is very high and 
the outside opportunities of the management are limited, the relational contract does not 
resolve the hold-up problem in a member-controlled cooperative.    
The outside options of players determine the participation constraints of parties 
and therefore have an effect on the equilibrium strategies of players. Intuitively, a larger 
outside option of the upstream (downstream) party decreases (increases) the maximum 
(minimum) retained earnings percentage required for her to remain in a cooperative. A 
large value of the outside option of the downstream party serves as a “disciplining” 
device to an upstream party by forcing her to offer a sufficiently high equilibrium 
retained earnings percentage. An increase in the outside options of the upstream party 
increases her incentive to leave, but also increases the total surplus from leaving. As a 
result, the inefficient “too much” leaving of parties does not occur in the equilibrium 
because the outside options are perfectly observable, and the retained earnings 
percentage is flexible and can be made contingent on the outside options.  
We highlight several directions for further research. First, the model could be 
extended by adding and additional upstream investment stage.  It would result in an 
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increased efficiency of governance structure 𝐼 and diminish the attracivelness of 
govenance structure 𝐼𝐼. The efficiency results in our model are a consequence of the 
assumption that cooperative profit level is mainly determined by the downstream 
investments. In a setting where the most value is added at the upstream stage, the reverse 
result holds, i.e. governance structure 𝐼 is uniquely efficient. This result is in line with 
the predictions of the property rights theory (Grossman and Hart, 1986; Hart and Moore, 
1990), which suggests that ownership should be allocated to the party whose 
relationship specific investment adds most value. Second, to investigate further the 
possibility of “too much exit” of parties, one could allow for (i) imperfect information 
regarding the outside options; (ii) rigidity in adjusting the retained earnings percentage. 
Third, a transaction relationship between the upstream and downstream parties is not 
modelled in this chapter. Adding this additional dimension to the relationship between 
the upstream and downstream parties may influence the allocation of decision rights, 
equilibrium retained earnings percentage, and consequently the equilibrium outcomes. 
Fourth, the predictions of the model could be tested empirically by collecting primary 
data on the retained earnings percentages in cooperatives, by studying the exit behavior 
of the upstream and downstream parties, as well as by assessing the types of allocations 
of decision rights within cooperative boundaries. It is also of interest to study 
empirically the determinants of cooperative retained earnings across sectors, countries, 
and time. Lastly, the managerial implications of our results can be deliberated further 
by considering the challenges for the chairman of the cooperative board in explaining 
the value of the long-term focus to the membership.  
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Appendix 3.1. Governance structure II 
 
 
Figure 3.9. Extensive form of governance structure II 
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Appendix 3.2. Classification of cases, equilibrium 𝜸𝒋
𝒊  and efficient 
governance structures 
 
Figure 3.10. Classification of cases regarding the variability of the outside options of 
farmers 
The first step is to determine equilibrium 𝛾𝑗
𝐼 and 𝛾𝑗
𝐼𝐼 for each case. The upstream 
(downstream) party chooses 𝛾𝑗
𝐼 (𝛾𝑗
𝐼𝐼) to maximize her final payoff. In general, 𝛾𝑗
𝑖 defines 
how the total surplus will be split between the upstream and downstream parties. There 
are three possible values of the total surplus. First, when both parties remain in the 
cooperative and the downstream party invests, the total value of 𝜋𝑌 − 𝑐 is generated. It 
can occur in two circumstances. When  
 
{
 
 
 
 𝛾𝑗
𝑖 >
𝑃𝑗
𝜋𝑁
 [𝑃𝐶  𝑈𝑃𝑆𝑇𝑅𝐸𝐴𝑀]
𝛾𝑗
𝑖 < 1−
𝑐
∆𝜋
 [𝐼𝐶  𝐷𝑂𝑊𝑁𝑆𝑇𝑅𝐸𝐴𝑀]
𝛾𝑗
𝑖 < 1 −
𝑐+𝑠
𝜋𝑌
 [𝑃𝐶  𝐷𝑂𝑊𝑁𝑆𝑇𝑅𝐸𝐴𝑀 1]
, 
i.e., when the strategy of the upstream party in the last stage is (𝑆, 𝑆), the strategy of the 
downstream party in the fourth stage is 𝑌, and the strategy of the downstream party in 
the third stage is 𝑆.  
The total surplus of 𝜋𝑌 − 𝑐(𝑚) may also be generated when  
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{
 
 
 
 𝛾𝑗
𝑖 <
𝑃𝑗
𝜋𝑁
 [𝑃𝐶  𝑈𝑃𝑆𝑇𝑅𝐸𝐴𝑀]
𝛾𝑗
𝑖 >
𝑃𝑗
𝜋𝑌
 [𝑃𝐶  𝑈𝑃𝑆𝑇𝑅𝐸𝐴𝑀]
𝛾𝑗
𝑖 < 1 −
𝑐+𝑠
𝜋𝑌
 [𝐼𝐶 = 𝑃𝐶  𝐷𝑂𝑊𝑁𝑆𝑇𝑅𝐸𝐴𝑀 1]
, 
 
i.e., when the strategy of the upstream party in the last stage is (𝑆, 𝐿), the strategy of the 
downstream party in the fourth stage is 𝑌, and the strategy of the downstream party in 
the third stage is 𝑆.  
Then, in governance structure 𝐼 the objective of the upstream party in the above 
two situations is to choose 𝛾𝑗
𝐼 to maximize 𝛾𝑗
𝐼𝜋𝑌. Similarly, in governance structure 𝐼𝐼 
the objective of the downstream party in the above two situations is to choose 𝛾𝑗
𝐼𝐼 to 
maximize (1 − 𝛾𝑗
𝐼𝐼)𝜋𝑌 − 𝑐. 
 The second possible value of the total surplus, 𝜋𝑁, is generated when both 
parties remain in a cooperative, but the downstream party does not invest. In can only 
occur in one situation, i.e. when  
{
 
 
 
 𝛾𝑗
𝑖 >
𝑃𝑗
𝜋𝑁
 [𝑃𝐶  𝑈𝑃𝑆𝑇𝑅𝐸𝐴𝑀]
𝛾𝑗
𝑖 > 1 −
𝑐
∆𝜋
 [𝐼𝐶  𝐷𝑂𝑊𝑁𝑆𝑇𝑅𝐸𝐴𝑀 𝑖𝑠 𝑛𝑜𝑡 𝑚𝑒𝑡]
𝛾𝑗
𝑖 < 1 −
𝑠
𝜋𝑁
[𝑃𝐶  𝐷𝑂𝑊𝑁𝑆𝑇𝑅𝐸𝐴𝑀 2]
, 
i.e., when the strategy of the upstream party in the last stage is (𝑆, 𝑆), the strategy of the 
downstream party in the fourth stage is 𝑁, and the strategy of the downstream party in 
the third stage is 𝑆. Then, in governance structure 𝐼 the objective of the upstream party 
in this situations is to choose 𝛾𝑗
𝐼 to maximize 𝛾𝑗
𝐼𝜋𝑁. Consequently, in governance 
structure 𝐼𝐼 the objective of the downstream party is to choose 𝛾𝑗
𝐼𝐼 to maximize 
(1 − 𝛾𝑗
𝐼𝐼)𝜋𝑁. 
  The third possible value of the total surplus, 𝑃𝑗 + 𝑠, occurs when the strategy 
of the downstream party is 𝐿 and/or the strategy of the upstream party is (𝐿, 𝐿). In this 
case the upstream party earns 𝑃𝑗 and the downstream party earns 𝑠. 
 The equilibrium choice of 𝛾𝑗
𝐼 and 𝛾𝑗
𝐼𝐼 are delineated for case 1 in Figure 3.11. 
Case 1 implies that 𝑃𝐿 < 𝑃𝐻 < 𝜋𝑁 − 𝑠. Equilibrium outcomes and efficient governance 
structures for case 2 are depicted in Figure 3.12.  
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Figure 3.11. Equilibrium 𝛾𝑗
𝐼 and 𝛾𝑗
𝐼𝐼 for case 2, i.e. when 𝑃𝐿 < 𝑃𝐻 < 𝜋𝑁 − 𝑠 
(Solid (dotted) line depicts 𝛾𝑗
𝐼(𝛾𝑗
𝐼𝐼)) 
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Figure 3.12. Equilibrium outcomes (top) and efficient governance structures (bottom)    
when 𝑃𝐿 (left)  and  𝑃𝐻 occur,  case 2, i.e. when 𝑃𝐿 < 𝑃𝐻 < 𝜋𝑁 − 𝑠 
The equilibrium choice of 𝛾𝑗
𝐼 and 𝛾𝑗
𝐼𝐼, equilibrium outcomes and efficient 
governance structures for all other cases are delineated in the same way. The results are 
depicted in Figure 3.13.  
 
Figure 3.13. Efficient governance structures in all cases regarding the variability of 
outside options 
  
75 
4. Market Shares of Agricultural Cooperatives in the 
European Union 
 
 
 
Abstract 
This paper investigates empirically the market shares of agricultural cooperatives in 
Europe. We test a number of theoretical predictions regarding the degree of forward 
vertical integration by using the data from the dairy and sugar sectors in the European 
Union. Our results indicate that dairy cooperative market shares are higher in countries 
with high levels of trust, low levels of heterogeneity, and strong contracting institutions. 
Additionally, dairy cooperative market shares are higher when countries are more milk 
self-sufficient. Variables measuring country-level differences in embeddedness, 
institutional environment, governance, and resource allocation are not related to 
cooperative market shares in the sugar sector. Sugar cooperative market share results 
from the combination of policy changes and the product differentiation strategy of the 
investor-owned competitor(s). 
 
Keywords: cooperative, market share, dairy, sugar, European Union 
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4.1 Introduction  
Cooperatives co-exist and compete with investor-owned firms in agricultural markets 
in the European Union. In some sectors, such as dairy, cooperative market shares are 
dominant, i.e. 65.3%, while in others, such as sugar and sheep meat, cooperative shares 
are relatively low, i.e. 18.8% and 7.5% respectively (Table 4.1). Additionally, 
cooperative market shares are higher in the northwest of Europe than in the southeast 
(Table 4.2).16 We study empirically the determinants of cooperative markets shares. The 
goal of this paper is to explain why the cooperative organizational form is likely to 
blossom in some environments and not in others, where environments are distinguished 
in terms of sector and country.17  
 
Sector Mean Coop 
Market Share 
Number of 
observations 
Dairy 65.3 21 
Fruit and Vegetables 39.9 21 
Olives 33.3 3 
Pig meat 30.2 18 
Cereals 28.9 17 
Wine 27.9 13 
Sugar  18.8    16 
Sheep meat 7.5 17 
Total 32.3 126 
Table 4.1. Cooperative market shares per sector in the European Union (Bijman et al., 
2012) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
16 The Scandinavian region includes Denmark, Finland, and Sweden. Western EU countries are 
Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Ireland and the UK. Southern 
member states include Greece, Italy, Malta, Portugal, Slovenia, Spain, and Cyprus. Lastly, Eastern 
Europe includes Bulgaria, Estonia, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, 
and Slovakia. 
17 Cooperative market shares were reported by Bijman et al. (2012) for eight agricultural sectors in 
twenty-seven EU countries for 2010.  
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EU region 
Mean Coop 
Market Share 
Number of 
observations 
Scandinavia 55.2 14 
West 39.2 37 
South 36.3 34 
East 15.1 41 
Total 32.3 126 
Table 4.2. Cooperative market shares per region in the European Union (Bijman et al., 
2012) 
Agricultural sectors may differ with respect to several product characteristics. 
First, production of agricultural products entails different levels of asset specificity, both 
at the upstream and downstream levels of production. Some agricultural sectors are 
characterized by a higher degree of “temporal asset specificity”, which implies that the 
value of a commodity is time-dependent due to its perishability (Masten, 2000). Based 
on the transaction cost theory, this characteristic has an effect on the efficient asset 
ownership, i.e. on the degree of vertical integration and the presence of cooperatives.18 
Second, an important characteristic determining contractual relations in agricultural 
markets is uncertainty (Hardaker et al., 1997). Vertical integration and cooperatives may 
therefore be viewed as an organizational response to external uncertainty, such as 
volatile market prices (Carlton, 1979a and 1979b). For instance, dairy farmers expect 
their dairy cooperatives to smoothen the impact of market price fluctuations (Hanisch 
et al., 2012). Third, sectors may differ with respect to the supply and demand side. 
Sectors differ regarding the supply side in terms of product complexity, which is based 
on the number of intermediate inputs used in production (Blanchard and Kremer, 1997; 
Levchenko, 2007). Sectors that require joining a large number of inputs to production 
are more institutions dependent because there are more relationships that can be 
“potentially distorted due to imperfect institutions” (Levchenko, 2007). The rankings of 
sectors typically classify agricultural sectors as “least complex” and therefore least 
institutionally dependent. Sectors also differ regarding the demand side in terms of the 
possibilities for product differentiation. For example, milk is an important ingredient in 
dairy as well as pharmaceutical products, while fruits and vegetables show much less 
product development. Finally, EU countries differ with regards to several characteristics 
– historical, cultural, legal and institutional factors.  
To organize the study of the determinants of cooperative market shares in the 
EU, we distinguish four levels of social analysis (Williamson, 2000). As depicted in 
                                                 
18 The relationship between asset specificity and vertical integration was explored empirically in 
various sectors (footwear, trucking, technology, and housing market) by Woodruff (2002), Baker and 
Hubbard (2003), Acemoglu et al. (2010), and Gebhardt (2013). 
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Figure 4.1, the first level is the social embeddedness level. It includes informal 
institutions, such as norms, customs, and traditions. Informal institutions change very 
infrequently, between one hundred and one thousand years. We quantify this level by 
the measures of cultural dimensions, trust, and heterogeneity of a country. The second 
level, i.e. the institutional environment, includes the formal rules, such as the 
specification and enforcement of property rights and contract laws. The frequency of 
change of formal rules is once in every ten to one hundred years. We capture the cross-
country variations in the institutional environment by the Rule of Law measures, namely 
the property rights and judicial effectiveness measures. Additionally, variations in the 
national cooperative laws are distinguished. The third level deals with the governance 
of contractual relations. The changes in governance occur more frequently, i.e. every 
one to ten years. The ways of organizing transactions, such as vertical integration or 
long-term contracts, can be adjusted periodically. Finally, the fourth level is concerned 
with market exchange, such as price and quantity adjustments. The changes at this level 
occur regularly, or even daily. We discuss this level in the context of industry structure, 
and price and quantity restrictions due to EU regulation of the agricultural sector.  
   
 
 
Figure 4.1. Four levels of social analysis (Williamson, 2000) 
To determine whether varying cooperative market shares across sectors and 
countries constitute a “statistical regularity” or a random by-product, we test for the 
presence of sector and country effects on cooperative market shares.19 The main results 
are as follows. We cannot reject the hypotheses regarding the presence of sector and 
country effects on cooperative market shares. There are large and statistically important 
differences in cooperative market shares between the dairy sector and other sectors. 
There are also regional effects. Cooperative markets shares are significantly lower in 
the Eastern European countries relative to other EU regions. This effect is statistically 
                                                 
19 One way to test for the presence of sector and country effects is to calculate the standardized 
differences in means (in cooperative market shares) between groups, where groups are distinguished 
by sectors and EU regions. When such a difference is statistically different from zero, we conclude 
that the differences in cooperative market shares across groups are statistically important. Hence, it 
serves as an evidence for the presence of sector or country effects. 
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significant and quantitatively large. Overall, the effect of the dairy sector appears 
quantitatively to be the most important. This result motivates the focus on the 
determinants of the cooperative market shares in the dairy sector in Section 3. It is then 
contrasted with the sugar sector, which is characterized by a very low presence of 
cooperatives. 
The empirical literature regarding cooperative market shares is limited. First, 
Caves and Peterson (1986) studied cooperative market shares in the US in 1983, which 
were 77% in the dairy sector, and 19% in fruits and vegetables sector. They formulate 
hypotheses regarding the relations between cooperative market shares and public 
policies, tax, and antitrust laws. Overall, they conclude that cooperative market shares 
are higher for crops which are perishable and in capital intensive industries due to 
cooperative tax advantages.  Second, our paper is related to the “Doing Cooperative 
Business Report”, commissioned by the International Cooperative Alliance 
(Groeneveld, 2016). The objective of the report was to study the elements of the 
enabling environment for cooperatives. The main findings of the report suggest that 
cooperatives foster in countries with low power distance, a favorable business 
environment, good governance conditions, low perceived level of corruption, low 
income inequality, and high overall state of democracy. Our paper differs from the 
existing literature for several reasons. The dependent concept studied in the report, i.e. 
the Cooperative Economy Index, is a broader concept than cooperative market share. 20 
The scope of the report is beyond the EU, and covers 33 countries, including countries 
in North and South America, India, Asia, and Australia. Finally, the scope of the report 
also goes beyond the agricultural sector. Hence, our paper adds to the discussion about 
the enabling environment for cooperatives by making a focused contribution about 
cooperative market shares in the EU dairy and sugar sectors.   
Cooperative literature highlights several theoretical reasons for the co-
existence of cooperatives and investor-owned firms (IOFs). First, cooperatives and IOFs 
may co-exist in one market due to a competitive yardstick effect of cooperatives 
(Sexton, 1990, Liang and Hendrikse, 2016). It implies that the presence of a cooperative 
in a market puts a limit on the minimum procurement price, paid by a competitor IOF 
to farmers. Hence, some farmers do not join a cooperative. The co-existence of 
cooperatives and IOFs is also predicted by the spatial models, where homogeneous 
farmers are sorted between downstream enterprises (Sexton, 1990; Tribl, 2012). In a 
Cournot duopsony model with homogenous farmers, Karantininis and Zago (2001), 
show that the cooperative market share (as measured by the equilibrium number of 
                                                 
20 The index consists of the weighted average of three ratios: membership penetration of cooperatives 
relative to total population, cooperative employment divided by total population, and annual gross 
revenue of cooperatives relative to country’s GDP. 
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farmers in a cooperative) is higher in a closed membership cooperative than in an open 
membership cooperative.21 When heterogeneous farmers choose an enterprise, the co-
existence of cooperatives and IOFs occurs because a cooperative attracts more of the 
less efficient farmers. Lastly, from a transaction cost perspective, Hendrikse (2007) 
explains the co-existence of spot and contract markets with a model of endogenous 
contract formation and endogenous uncertainty. He argues that the co-existence of the 
two governance structures is natural due to (i) the costs associated with a spot market 
and (ii) a contract formation externality. Consequently, the market share of a 
cooperative increases when the transaction costs associated with a spot market increase.  
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 4.2 formulates the 
hypotheses regarding cooperative market shares. Sections 4.3 and 4.4 test the 
hypotheses in the European dairy and sugar sectors, respectively. Section 4.5 concludes.  
4.2 Hypotheses  
An agricultural cooperative is an enterprise owned by an upstream or downstream 
society of members. A cooperative is viewed as a form of vertical integration, because 
many farmers own collectively an upstream or downstream enterprise. It differs from 
vertical integration due to at least two features of the owner. First, the owner is a society 
of members, where each member has an ownership and transaction relationship with the 
cooperative enterprise. For instance, the Dutch dairy cooperative FrieslandCampina is 
collectively owned by almost 19,000 dairy farmers. Second, each member has a 
portfolio of assets. One of the assets is an ownership stake in the cooperative enterprise. 
There is no ownership relationship between the other assets of the member and the 
cooperative enterprise. A cooperative therefore pools some resources of the members to 
own an upstream or downstream party, while each member remains the sole owner of 
other assets, such as the farms.22 This characterization of a cooperative implies that there 
are at least two sources for the formulation of hypotheses regarding cooperative market 
share. Given the conceptual similarity between a cooperative and vertical integration, 
we investigate whether the determinants of cooperative market shares are consistent 
with the determinants of vertical integration. Additionally, the portfolio of assets of a 
member may be related to the cooperative market share. 
One stream of vertical integration literature has been concerned with 
investigating the boundaries of the firm, i.e. the determinants of vertical integration 
                                                 
21 The authors also explore the relation between a cooperative market share and the cost efficiency of 
farmers, and find that it is neither monotonically increasing nor decreasing. For example, when farmers 
are very cost-efficient, the share of farmers in a cooperative is very high. This share then decreases up 
to a certain minimum cost-inefficiency, and then increases again (Karantininis and Zago, 2001).  
22 Cooperative literature defines the consequences of this feature as the portfolio problem (Cook, 
1995).    
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(Geyskens et al., 2006; Lafontaine and Slade, 2013). From the incomplete contracting 
view, asset specificity is the primary determinant of vertical integration (Grossman and 
Hart, 1986).23 Forward vertical integration entails that a supplier employs the assets of 
the downstream party, and hence becomes a residual claimant regarding the income at 
the downstream enterprise (Grossman and Hart, 1986; Acemoglu at al., 2010). Another 
stream of literature studies whether the boundaries of the firm matter, i.e. whether 
vertical integration is a by-product of other processes (Atalay at al., 2014). The latter 
literature proposes that the degree of vertical integration may not be a consequence of 
systematic make-or-buy decisions. Instead, a firm is viewed as an outcome of an 
“assignment” mechanism which allocates high quality intangible inputs, such as best 
management, across a “better and / or greater number of production units” (Atalay et 
al., 2014, p.1141). The organizational capabilities view of the firm then implies that 
vertical integration is a by-product of firms’ efficient transfers of intangible inputs. 
Hence, the question about sector and country effects on cooperative market shares is 
resolved, because firm boundaries do not matter.  
 The ownership and transaction relationship of a member regarding the 
cooperative enterprise is expected to be one of the determinants of cooperative market 
share, especially in markets with low margins. The ownership stake of a member 
represents often a substantial percentage of the total value of the entire portfolio of assets 
of the member (Hendrikse and Veerman, 2001). A member is therefore reluctant to 
allow the cooperative enterprise to abandon the input supplied, or the goods or services 
demanded, by the member. This is called the single origin constraint (Cook, 1997; Deng, 
2015). A second implication may be that it has an impact on the product diversification 
choices of the cooperative enterprise. A member wants to bring his entire portfolio of 
assets to value, which differs from the composition of assets of the cooperative 
enterprise. A cooperative enterprise is therefore expected to face requests to provide 
member services (Feng and Hendrikse, 2012).  
In the sections 4.2.1-4.2.4, we organize the hypotheses regarding the determinants 
of cooperative market shares based on the four levels of social analysis.   
4.2.1 Embeddedness  
The organization of individual agents in groups and networks influences outcomes of 
many social and economic interactions. Granovetter (1985) developed an 
                                                 
23 The real world complexity results in necessarily incomplete contracts, because it is not possible to 
ex-ante foresee all possible contingencies and describe them in a contract. When a party, engaged in 
the exchange, made large relationship specific investments it may fear the ex-post opportunistic 
behavior of the other party due to the “gaps” in the contract. This gives rise to a hold-up problem, 
because important investments may be forgone. The choice of governance structure, for instance 
vertical integration, may resolve the hold-up problem by establishing ex-post bargaining positions. 
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“embeddedness” argument suggesting that existing ties in social networks influence 
rational economic decisions. In his seminal paper, Greif (1994) shows empirically how 
cultural aspects, such as religion and collective reputation mechanisms, may result in 
different societal and economic structures in the Arab world. In Europe, Tabellini (2010) 
finds that an exogenous component of history-related culture strongly correlates with 
regional economic development.24 
 High levels of social capital, and trust in particular, are recognized as conditions 
which foster the development of cooperatives (Svendsen and Svendsen, 2000). 
Generalized trust reflects the beliefs about to what extent other people in a society are 
trustworthy, i.e. can be trusted (World Values Survey). It is conceptually different from 
particularized trust, i.e. trust towards particular groups of people. Therefore, it is 
possible that high levels of trust develop within small groups (such as a cooperative), 
while the level of generalized trust is low (such as a country-level measure of 
generalized trust).    
First, a cooperative faces a number of collective action problems due to its 
characteristics such as joint ownership, collective decision-making and equal 
distribution of benefits (Valentinov, 2004; Deng, 2015). We argue that the costs 
associated with these characteristics are lower in environments characterized by high 
levels of generalized trust. In other words, there are at least three theoretical reasons for 
a positive relationship between the generalized trust and the cooperative market share 
in a country. First, one prediction of experimental game theory is the fact that people 
tend to be “conditional cooperators” when engaging in collective action, i.e. they 
cooperate when they expect others to cooperate (Axelrod, 1990; Sugden, 1984). Hence, 
the share of “conditional cooperators” is necessarily larger in an environment with a 
high level of generalized trust. Second, cooperation based on reputation is more difficult 
to develop when the membership of a cooperative is large (Sonderskov, 2009). That is 
because individual members may have private information, which is difficult to obtain 
for others.  They may also not communicate with each other sufficiently often to develop 
reputation mechanisms, which ensure cooperation. Therefore, a generalized social trust 
can serve as an alternative source of information about the trustworthiness of others. 
Third, the relationship between generalized trust and a market share of an enterprise 
differs between an IOF and a cooperative. The differences between the objectives of a 
cooperative and an investor-owned firm (IOF), i.e. member benefit versus profit 
maximization, may create greater trust in the relation between farmers and cooperatives 
than between farmers and IOFs (Sykuta and Cook, 2001). Trust is relatively more 
important for the success of a cooperative relative to an IOF because the contracts 
                                                 
24 Exogenous variation in culture is isolated by using the literacy rate at the end of 19th century, and 
historical political institutions as instrumental variables. 
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between suppliers and cooperatives are more relational than between suppliers and 
IOFs, and cooperatives are more reluctant to impose strict sanctions on the members 
(Shaffer, 1987). Based on these observations, we propose that cross-country differences 
in generalized trust scores could explain the variety of cooperative market shares 
observed across the EU. Hypothesis 1a summarizes the relationship between 
cooperative market shares and trust.   
 
Hypothesis 1a: Cooperative market shares are higher in countries with high trust 
scores.   
 
In farmer cooperatives, homogeneity of interests among members is important 
because it minimizes the costs of collective decision-making (Hansman, 1996). 
Establishing a cooperative requires coordination among many members and the 
associated coordination costs are lower when members are homogeneous. On the one 
hand, homogenous membership may emerge in a homogeneous country. For example, 
the first dairy cooperative in Denmark was established in 1882, and was financed and 
managed by the farmers. Several studies highlight the homogeneity of Danish local 
communities as one of the key success factors of its early cooperative movement 
(Larkin, 1988; Svendsen and Svendsen, 2000; O’Rourke, 2006). Denmark is also one 
the most homogeneous countries, based on the Fractionalization dataset by Alesina et 
al. (2010), as exemplified by low values of ethnic (0.08), linguistic (0.10), and religious 
(0.23) heterogeneity. Besides, the functioning of a cooperative is negatively affected by 
the heterogeneity of members due to the issues involving commitment, decision-
making, influence and agency costs (Bijman, 2005). On the other hand, a homogenous 
cooperative may also exist in a country characterized by high heterogeneity. However, 
the positive relationship between homogeneity and trust also supports a link between a 
country’s homogeneity measure and a cooperative market share.  For instance, 
homogeneity is considered the key correlate with organizational trust in cooperatives 
(James and Sykuta, 2005). 
 Homogeneity among suppliers benefits cooperatives more than IOFs for at least 
two reasons. First, homogeneity of interests among suppliers minimizes the costs of 
collective decision-making in a cooperative. It is not relevant for the decision-making 
process in an IOF, because heterogeneity of suppliers in an IOF is not important for the 
aggregation of financial outcomes. Second, cooperatives may be less able than IOFs to 
tailor to member heterogeneity due to prevailing egalitarian considerations in 
cooperatives. It may be less cumbersome for IOFs than cooperatives to deal with the 
requests of individual farmers. These observations illustrate that the governance of a 
cooperative is subject to a cultural variable, i.e. the degree of homogeneity of a 
population in a country. They motivate Hypothesis 1b. 
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Hypothesis 1b: Cooperative market shares are larger in more homogeneous countries 
(as measured by low scores of ethnic, linguistic, and religious fractionalization). 
4.2.2 Institutional environment 
One prediction of the incomplete contracting theory suggests that market failures and 
weak contracting institutions encourage greater forward vertical integration (Acemoglu 
et al., 2007). Weak contracting institutions imply difficulties when contracting between 
citizens, judicial inefficiency, and weak property rights enforcement.  Then, forward 
vertical integration, i.e. cooperative organizational form, serves as a substitute for well-
functioning contracting institutions. We therefore expect to see higher cooperative 
market shares in countries with weak contracting institutions, and especially in contract-
intensive industries.25 Empirically, this hypothesis is supported when higher market 
shares of cooperatives are associated with countries that score low on the relevant 
components of the Rule of Law index (property rights and judicial effectiveness). 
Hypothesis 2a formulates the substitute relationship between contracting institutions 
and cooperative organizational form.  
 
Hypothesis 2a: Countries with weak contracting institutions have higher market shares 
of cooperatives.   
On the other hand, cooperative organizational form may complement well-
functioning contracting institutions when the latter is a necessary condition for the 
blossoming of cooperatives. Strong contracting institutions may benefit a cooperative 
more relative to an IOF due to the differences in contracts in the two types of 
organizations. Sykuta and Cook (2001) claim that the contracts between the farmers and 
IOFs tend to be more complete in specifying the rights and responsibilities over a 
broader range of contingencies. This in turn reduces the need to deal with the 
consequences of incomplete contracts, such as hold-up. Consequently, cooperatives 
may benefit from strong contracting institutions more than IOFs due to more contractual 
incompleteness, which cooperatives are subject to. Should a problem arise due to 
                                                 
25 Agricultural sectors are typically classified as some of the least institutionally dependent. The 
underlying intuition is that industries that require joining of a large number of inputs to production are 
more institutions dependent because there are more relationships that can be “potentially distorted due 
to imperfect institutions” (Levchenko, 2007). For example, Levchenko (2007) ranks fluid milk and 
creamery butter as 6th and 5th least institutionally intensive industries. 
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incompleteness of a contract, it is resolved more efficiently in a country with strong 
contracting institutions. If this is the case, we expect to observe higher market shares of 
cooperatives in countries with strong contracting institutions. Hypothesis 2b formulates 
the complementary role of institutions and cooperative organizational form. 
 
Hypothesis 2b: Countries with strong contracting institutions have higher market shares 
of cooperatives. 
A cooperative is generally categorized as a user-owned, user-controlled, and 
user-benefitted enterprise. However, this categorization does not uniformly translate 
into the European and national cooperative legislation. Although there have been 
regulatory attempts to harmonize national cooperative laws across the European Union, 
they were unsuccessful (van der Sangen, 2012). Legal scholars emphasized several 
aspects of national cooperative laws, which differ across EU countries. First, there are 
differences in the cooperative business organizational law with respect to the 
enforcement of the “one member – one vote” rule. The first part of Hypothesis 2c 
formulates a claim that a more liberal treatment of the “one-member – one vote” rule is 
favorable for cooperative market shares. Second, tax law is more favorable towards 
cooperatives in some countries than in others due to a different degree of exemption 
from corporate tax. This observation is summarized in the second part of Hypothesis 2c.  
Third, different regulations exist with respect to the minimum required capital and 
minimum number of members required at the formation of cooperative. Minimum 
requirements regarding the size of the membership and the minimum capital investment 
may prevent new cooperatives from being formed and new members from joining 
existing cooperatives.  This argument is reflected in last part of Hypotheses 2c.  
Hypothesis 2c: The market share of cooperatives is higher in countries  
(i) where the national cooperative law permits more deviation from 
the “one member – one vote” rule; 
(ii) where cooperatives are subject to a more favorable corporate 
income tax; 
(iii)  where the minimum requirement regarding capital and/or 
number of members at formation are lower. 
 
As emphasized by Williamson (2000), changes in formal institutions occur 
once every ten to one hundred years. We identify two changes in institutions relevant to 
the analysis of cooperative market shares. First, nine countries, classified as Eastern 
European, were all part of the ten countries under the communist regime after World 
War II (Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, 
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Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia). Unlike other EU countries, most of these countries 
were subject to the collectivization of the agricultural sector in the second half of the 
20th century. Putnam (1993) suggests that there is a correlation between the time of 
dictatorship and the destruction of trust and cooperation, as well as a tendency in post-
communist states to passively rely on the state. Centrally planned economies left little 
room for entrepreneurship, experiments, and voluntary organization into social groups 
(Chloupkova et al., 2003, Fukuyama, 1995). Based on these observations and the 
descriptive data about the quality of institutions, Hypothesis 2d is formulated.   
Hypothesis 2d: Cooperative market shares are lower in former communist countries. 
Second, three European countries were characterized by the protracted 
presence of the fascist regime in the 20th century. It lasted for 21 years (1922-1943) in 
Italy, 36 years (1939-1975) in Spain, and 42 years (1932-1974) in Portugal. 
Organizational forms that are consistent with the environmental ideology, are more 
likely to persist (Simons and Ingram, 1997). On the contrary, the democratic governance 
of cooperatives can represent a rival ideology to a dictatorship. For instance, it is 
documented that the Franco regime in Spain had the legal right to veto democratic 
decisions of cooperatives at any time, based on the “Law of Cooperatives of the New 
State” (Núñez‐Nickel and Moyano‐Fuentes, 2004). The objective of this law was to 
strictly control the “ideological purity”. The hierarchical governance of the investor-
owned firm is more in line with the hierarchical government structure of the fascist 
regime. Based on the descriptive data about the quality of institutions and seemingly 
conflicting ideologies of fascist regimes and cooperatives, Hypothesis 2e is formulated.  
Hypothesis 2e: Cooperative market shares are lower in countries which were under a 
prolonged fascist regime in the 20th century. 
4.2.3 Governance  
The third level of social analysis is concerned with governing the transactional relations. 
The theory of the firm formulates adaptation as the central organizational problem, and 
proposes that the role of governance is to establish “order” to mitigate conflict and 
realize efficiency (Commons, 1932). On the two extremes of the governance structures 
spectrum are hierarchies and markets. Markets are best for transactions when 
autonomous adaptations are needed; hierarchies are preferred when bilaterally 
dependent parties benefit from coordinated adaptation (Tadelis and Williamson, 2013). 
Then, as suggested by Coase (1937), the governance structure should not be taken as 
given, but should be derived. As a result, “getting the governance structure right” is the 
purpose at the third level of analysis. In the context of our analysis, the governance 
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structure decision implies the choice between a cooperative form and an alternative, 
such as an IOF. 
The governance structure choice needs to account for the fact that managing a 
cooperative enterprise differs from managing an IOF, and may be more difficult in some 
cases (LeVay, 1983; Staatz, 1987; Cook, 1994). Residual claims in cooperatives are tied 
to patronage, rather than to capital investment in IOFs. Differences in property rights 
allocations between cooperatives and IOFs also imply differences in managerial 
incentives (Staatz, 1987; Caves and Peterson, 1986; Cook, 1994). In particular, the 
vaguely defined objective function of a cooperative gives rise to a more complex 
managerial decision matrix (Cook, 1994). To illustrate, the task of maximizing the 
return on assets is less complex than the task of maximizing the joint farm and 
cooperative objective function. As a consequence, a cooperative manager faces a larger 
set of conflicts, and requires at least four additional qualifications, relative to an IOF 
manager (Cook, 1994). He highlights being comfortable with complexity, people-
oriented resource allocation, multi-stakeholder communication, and having coalition-
building skills as additional qualifications required for a cooperative manager. 
A large body of empirical literature is concerned with explaining large and 
persistent total factor productivity differences across firms and countries. A recent 
empirical study by Bloom et al. (2017) documents that good managerial practices 
predict a firm’s success better than IT, R&D, or employee skills. Several conclusions 
are emphasized regarding the cross-country variation in management practices (Bloom 
and Van Reenen, 2010). First, strong product market competition boosts average 
management practices. Second, multinational companies are generally well-managed in 
all countries. Third, family-owned and government-owned firms are badly managed. 
Lastly, firms with more educated workers tend to have better management practices.26 
In addressing the question of whether cooperatives are better managed in some countries 
than in others, the empirical evidence about the quality of management practices across 
Europe is useful (Bloom and Van Reenen, 2010). Hypothesis 3a proposes that in a 
setting with an overall high level of managerial skills, a cooperative firm may benefit 
from good management practices more than an IOF. This can result in higher 
cooperative market shares in countries with higher management practices scores.  
 
                                                 
26 The World Management Survey measures management practices based on three areas: (i) 
“monitoring - how well do companies monitor what goes on inside their firms, and use this for 
continuous improvement; (ii) targets - do companies set the right targets, track the right outcomes and 
take appropriate action if the two are inconsistent; (iii) incentives - are companies promoting and 
rewarding employees based on performance, and trying to hire and keep their best employees?” 
(Bloom and Van Reenen, 2010). 
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Hypothesis 3a: Countries with higher overall management score are associated with 
higher market shares of cooperatives.  
4.2.4 Resource Allocation  
The climate differs across Europe. Therefore, the natural conditions for the development 
of different agricultural sectors also vary across Europe. In fact, geography could be 
placed at level zero, above the embeddedness level in the Williamson’s levels of social 
analysis. For the purpose of this paper, we refrain from discussing the relationship 
between geography, culture, and institutions, and only focus on one consequence of 
geographical variety, namely country’s milk or sugar self-sufficiency. For example, 
some regions in Europe are referred to as the "milk belt" or “sugar beet belt” due to the 
favorable climatic conditions for either grassland and livestock, or sugar beet growing.  
We propose that a country’s degree of self-sufficiency in an agricultural sector 
has consequences for the industry composition at the country level. One reason is the 
difference in the objectives of cooperatives and investor-owned firms. The former’s 
objective is to serve members interests, i.e. to collect members’ supplies. The latter’s 
objective is profit maximization. Oversupply of products results in a very competitive 
market, which is not attractive for enterprises in the market, or enterprises considering 
entry in the market. However, the attractiveness differs between cooperatives and IOFs. 
Given cooperatives’ primary goal of collecting the supply of the members and 
“operating at cost” principle, they are able to operate with relatively low profit margins, 
and thus are a fierce competitor to potential new (IOF) entrants (Albæk and Schultz, 
1998). Hence, countries with an oversupply of farmers’ produce are likely to have high 
market shares of cooperatives. On the contrary, IOFs enter markets characterized by 
high prospective profit margins. It is likely to happen when a country is not self-
sufficient. Cooperatives may have an entry disadvantage in these markets due to having 
access to only inside equity. Additionally, a historical observation by Fernandez (2014) 
suggests that in the 19th and early 20th century marketing cooperatives emerged in 
exporting countries, i.e. countries with high levels of self-sufficiency, as a response to 
the opportunistic behavior of traders.   
The assurance of output market explanation for forward vertical integration 
(Carlton 1979a) is more important in settings with an oversupply of farmers’ produce. 
To illustrate, when the upstream market is characterized by an undersupply, there is less 
need for the upstream party to forward integrate because downstream firms compete for 
limited supplies. As a result, a setting with an undersupply may have less cooperatives, 
relative to a setting with an oversupply of inputs. Based on these arguments, Hypothesis 
4a is formulated.  
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Hypothesis 4a: The cooperative market share is higher when a country is more milk 
(sugar) self-sufficient. 
Next, cooperatives and IOFs may differ with regards to their product 
diversification strategies. For instance, a dairy cooperative can be active in sectors such 
as fluid and dry milk, butter, ice cream, or pharmaceuticals. The extent of product 
diversification of a firm is approximated by the number of 4-digit industry codes (SIC, 
i.e. Standard Industrial Classification). It measures the number of sectors in which a 
firm operates. Hypothesis 4b claims that the cooperative market share is higher when 
cooperatives are more diversified than IOFs. When a cooperative adds more value to 
farmers’ products at the downstream level, relative to an IOF competitor, it may capture 
a higher market share. We construct a measure of firm’s product diversification, 
measured by the total number of SIC codes, i.e. the sum of primary codes (company’s 
primary activity of business, i.e. an activity which generated the highest revenue for that 
company in a past year) and secondary codes (other revenue producing activities).  
 
Hypothesis 4b: If cooperatives add more value at the downstream level (as measured 
by the degree of product diversification), then the cooperative market share is higher. 
Cooperatives and IOFs are likely to develop different product portfolios due to 
the differences in the two governance structures. The consequence of the single origin 
constraint is that a cooperative will not divest the input supplied by member farmers 
(Cook, 1997; Deng, 2015). An IOF does not face such a constraint because there is no 
transaction relationship between the owners and the downstream enterprise. 
Additionally, farmers’ objective to maximize the returns on their entire portfolio of 
assets may have an influence on the diversification decisions of the cooperative 
enterprise.  
One important characteristic of the European agricultural markets is the strict 
regulation since the end of World War II. The regulation has an influence of the price 
and quantity decisions in agricultural markets. After the war, Europe was not self-
sufficient in terms of food (Masure, 2010). The objective of the Common Agricultural 
Policy (CAP, 1957) was to provide incentives to maximize agricultural production. By 
the 1970-1980s, due to high guaranteed prices, large surpluses were produced, which 
had to be bought by the European Union.  
Consequently, to eliminate overproduction EU quotas were introduced in 1984. 
The production quotas are first allocated per country at the EU level. Next, the quantity 
is allocated among the producers in each country. Hence, the quantity restrictions in 
terms of production quotas ultimately stabilized the market structure of these 
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agricultural sectors overtime.27 Milk volume restrictions encouraged more efficiency 
(increasing production per cow). In March 2015 the milk quotas were abolished. It 
resulted in a significant increase in EU milk production. In combination with lower 
demand, this lead to a sharp decrease in milk prices in 2015. Similarly, the sugar quota 
system in the EU ended 30 September 2017. 
4.3 Measurements 
This section explains the measurements of the variables of the different levels of social 
analysis. The estimates of dairy and sugar cooperative market shares are obtained from 
the final report of the “Support for farmers’ cooperatives” project (Bijman et al., 2012). 
It measures the percentage of the value of farm produce (milk or sugar) handled by 
cooperatives in a country. This measure reflecs the combined market shares of all 
cooperatives in the sector compared to the cumulative market share of all IOFs in the 
same sector. The measure is regarding the farm-gate transaction. Country’s experts 
provided an estimate regarding the value of a cooperative market share for each 
agricultural sector in their country.  
 The embeddedness level of analysis is captured by cross-country variations in 
measures of trust and heterogeneity. The generalized trust measure, obtained from the 
World Values Survey for 2010, captures the extent to which “most people can be 
trusted” in a country. A higher trust score implies a higher level of generalized trust. 
The measures of ethnic, linguistic, and religious heterogeneity are obtained from the 
Fractionalization dataset (Alesina et al., 2003). Each measure reflects the probability 
that two randomly selected individuals from a population belonged to different ethnic, 
linguistic, or religious group. It is calculated as one minus the Herfindahl index of group 
shares, i.e. the shares of different ethnic, linguistic, or religious groups. A higher 
fractionalization measure implies a higher degree of heterogeneity of a country.   
 The Index of Economic Freedom (Heritage Foundation, 2017) provides two 
measures of the quality of contracting institutions, namely the property rights and 
judicial effectiveness. The former measure captures “the extent to which a country’s 
legal framework allows individuals to freely accumulate private property, secured by 
clear laws that are enforced effectively by the government” (Heritage Foundation, 
2017). The score consists of five equally weighted sub-factors: physical property rights, 
intellectual property rights, strength of investor protection, risk of expropriation, and 
                                                 
27 This paper provides a static analysis, because cooperative market shares were measured only in 
2010. Given the little variation in the market structures due to the quota system since 1984, time series 
approach would not add much value, unless it examines time period prior and/or after the quota system. 
The former approach requires scarce historical data; the latter approach requires more time for the new 
data to become available.       
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quality of land administration. A higher score indicates a more effective legal protection 
of property in a country. The latter measure reflects “the degree of efficient and fair 
judicial systems, which ensure that laws are fully respected, with appropriate legal 
actions taken against violations”. The score consists of six equally weighted sub-factors: 
public trust in politicians, irregular payments and bribes, transparency of government 
policymaking, absence of corruption, perceptions of corruption, and governmental and 
civil service transparency. A higher score indicates better judicial effectiveness in a 
country. 
 In addition to cross-country differences in the quality of contracting institutions, 
there are also differences in cooperative law across the EU. We capture this variety by 
four cooperative law measures, which were coded based on the “Support for farmers 
cooperatives: Legal aspects” report (van der Sangen, 2012). First, the “Favorable 
cooperative tax” variable captures the extent to which cooperatives enjoy a favorable 
tax treatment in a country.  A score of 2 is assigned to countries where cooperatives are 
exempt from the corporate income tax. A score of 1 is assigned to countries where 
cooperatives have the same corporate income regime as IOFs, while some facilities are 
provided for the deduction of patron dividends paid to the members related to the 
economic transactions between the cooperative and its members. A score zero is 
assigned to countries which do not have special tax facilities for cooperatives or have 
tax facilities that have no impact on the promotion or success of cooperatives. Second, 
the “Liberal voting rules” variable measures the extend to which cooperatives are 
permitted to depart from the one member-one vote rule by law. A score of 2 is assigned 
to countries where the voting rights are liberal and can be attributed to members 
according to their volume of economic transactions with the cooperative. A score of 1 
is assigned to countries that allow cooperatives to depart from the principle of “one 
member - one vote”, but only to a limited degree. A score zero is assigned to countries 
that do not allow departing from the “one member – one vote rule”. Third, the 
“minimum capital requirement” measure captures the legal requirement regarding the 
minimum member capital upon the formation of a cooperative in a country. Lastly, the 
“minimum member requirement” measure reflects the legal requirement regarding the 
minimum number of members upon the formation of a cooperative in a country. 
 Historical shocks on the institutional level of analysis are captured by two 
dummy variables, i.e. communist and fascist regimes. In the former case, a score of 1 is 
assigned to a country which was under the communist regime after World War II, and 
a zero score is assigned otherwise. In the latter case, a score of 1 is assigned to a country, 
which was under the fascist regime for more than 20 years, and a zero score is assigned 
otherwise. 
 On the governance level, we classify EU countries according to the general 
management practices scores from the World Management Survey (Bloom and Van 
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Reenen, 2010). Management practices are measured based on three areas: (i) 
monitoring, i.e. how well firms monitor and accordingly adjust processes; (ii) targets, 
i.e. whether firms set the right targets and take consistent actions; (iii) incentives, i.e. 
whether performance-based rewards are properly implemented. A higher country’s 
score indicates a better managerial practices in a country. 
 On the resource allocation level, we first measure a country’s degree of milk 
and sugar self-sufficiency. The former is obtained from a consultancy company 
CLAL.it. The percentage of a country’s milk self-sufficiency is calculated as  
𝐶
𝐶+𝐼−𝐸
, 
where 𝐶 is the country’s total milk deliveries, 𝐼 is the milk equivalent imports, and E is 
the milk equivalent exports. A percentage above (below) one t indicates that a country 
is (not) milk self-sufficient. A country’s sugar self-sufficiency is computed in the same 
way by using FAO statistics for 2010, i.e. a country’s sugar self-sufficiency is calculated 
as  
𝐶
𝐶+𝐼−𝐸
, where 𝐶 is the country’s total raw sugar equivalent production, 𝐼 is the raw 
sugar equivalent imports, and E is the raw sugar equivalent exports.  
 Lastly, the degree of product diversification of cooperatives relative to IOFs is 
calculated for the dairy and sugar sectors per country, by using the industry codes data 
from Bureau van Dijk database. It is calculated as a difference in means regarding the 
degree of total diversification. It is measured by the number of 4-digid industry codes. 
A positive (negative) score indicates that cooperatives are more (less) diversified than 
IOFs in this country in a given sector. 
 
4.4 Determinants of cooperative market shares in the EU dairy sector 
The European dairy sector is traditionally characterized by the high presence of 
cooperatives. Ten out of the twenty largest European dairy companies are cooperatives 
(Hanisch et al., 2012). In some countries, the entire dairy market is dominated by 
cooperatives, such as in Sweden, Ireland, and Finland. In others, cooperatives and IOFs 
co-exist and the market share of cooperatives varies (Figure 4.2). The differences in 
cooperative market shares across the EU are statistically significant (differences in 
means are reported in Appendix 4.4). Overall, the differences in dairy cooperative 
market shares are statistically significant between the North and South, North and East, 
West and East, and South and East of Europe.  
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Figure 4.2. Market shares of cooperatives in the dairy market in EU countries, 2010 
(Bijman et al., 2012) 
A dairy cooperative is an enterprise, collectively owned by many milk 
suppliers. An investor-owned firm (IOF) is owned by shareholders. They do not have a 
transaction relationship with the downstream enterprise. Investor-owned firms and 
cooperatives in the dairy sector differ in contracts, which they offer to dairy farmers. 
The sources of differences include the duration of the contract, delivered amounts and 
the flexibility of amounts, price, and information duties (Hanisch et al., 2012). One 
explanation for the large presence of cooperatives in the dairy sector is the characteristic 
of the raw product, namely the perishability of milk. This characteristic is labeled as 
temporal asset specificity in transaction cost theory (Masten, 2000). The dairy sector is 
characterized by a high degree of temporal asset specificity, which implies that the value 
of milk is time dependent due to its perishability, and therefore makes forward vertical 
integration more likely (Masten, 2000). Given their vulnerable position due to the 
perishability of milk, dairy farmers may choose to integrate forward to limit 
opportunistic behavior at the downstream level. This argument explains why 
cooperative dairy market shares are high relative to other sectors. However, it provides 
no insight regarding the cross-country variation in the cooperative market shares. 
Additionally, cheese making at the farm was a response of farmers to the perishability 
problem of milk, long before the first vertically integrated dairy.  
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Table 4.3 reports the correlation matrix between the dairy cooperative market shares 
and variables measuring cross-country differences in embeddedness, institutional 
environment, governance, and resource allocation. Results regarding the social 
embeddedness level, i.e. trust and heterogeneity, are discussed in subsection 4.3.1. 
Institutional environment level, i.e. the quality of institutions, national cooperative laws, 
and historical shocks to regimes are discussed in subsection 4.3.2. Subsection 4.3.3 
discusses the governance level, i.e. country-level differences in management practices, 
and cooperatives’ degree of product diversification. Lastly, subsection 4.3.4 discusses 
country’s degree of milk self-sufficiency. 
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4.4.1 Embeddedness 
First, Figure 4.3 depicts EU countries in terms of dairy cooperative market shares (the 
horizontal axis), and trust scores (the vertical axis). The trust score measures the extent 
to which “most people can be trusted” in a country (World Values Survey, 2017).  
Overall, Scandinavian countries are associated with higher levels of interpersonal trust, 
relative to other EU countries.28 As reported in Table 4.3, a statistically significant 
pairwise correlation coefficient of 0.50 (p-value 0.020) suggests that cooperative dairy 
market shares are positively correlated with trust.  
 
 
Figure 4.3. Correlation between dairy cooperative market shares and trust 
Second, we refer to the degree of ethnic, linguistic and religious heterogeneity 
in various countries (Alesina et al., 2003).29 The rankings of countries based on the three 
heterogeneity measures suggest that Scandinavian countries are the most homogeneous 
countries, followed by the Southern, Western, and Eastern countries. Pairwise 
                                                 
28 Appendix 4.5 presents descriptive statistics of the generalized trust variable across EU regions.  
29 Alesina et al. (2003) find that more ethnic fragmentation is more common in poorer countries. Ethnic 
and linguistic fractionalizations are also associated with negative outcomes in terms of governance 
quality. In the European Union, the countries with lowest (highest) ethnic and linguistic heterogeneity 
are Malta and Portugal (Latvia and Luxembourg). On the contrary, religious fractionalization is 
associated with measures of good governance because measures of religious fractionalization tend to 
be higher in more tolerant and free countries. In the EU the lowest (highest) religious fractionalization 
score is in Luxembourg (Netherlands) Appendix 4.6 presents descriptive statistics of the heterogeneity 
variables across EU regions. 
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correlation coefficients between cooperative dairy market shares and measures of 
religious, linguistic, and ethnic heterogeneity are -0.45 (0.039), -0.34 (0.129), and -0.58 
(0.006) respectively, with p-values in parentheses (as reported in Table 4.3). Negative 
and statistically significant pairwise correlation coefficients suggest that cooperative 
dairy market shares are negatively correlated with religious and ethnic heterogeneity.   
To conclude, based on effect sizes in terms of correlation coefficients, we 
cannot reject Hypotheses 1a and 1b. In particular, cooperative market shares in the EU 
dairy sector are positively correlated with the cross-county measures of trust, and 
negatively correlated with religious and ethnic heterogeneity. 
4.4.2 Institutional environment 
First, we quantify the quality of institutions in the EU countries by using two 
components of the Economic Freedom index, namely the property rights and judicial 
effectiveness components. The former component assesses the “extent to which a 
country’s legal framework allows individuals to freely accumulate private property, 
secured by clear laws that are enforced effectively by the government” (Heritage 
Foundation, 2017). The latter component, i.e. judicial effectiveness, measures the 
degree of efficient and fair judicial systems, which ensure that “laws are fully respected, 
with appropriate legal actions taken against violations” (Heritage Foundation, 2017). 
The two measures of the quality of institutions indicate that the strongest institutions are 
in the Scandinavian countries, followed by the Western, Southern, and Eastern 
countries. Table 4.3 reports the correlation coefficients between measures of 
institutional quality (property rights and judicial effectiveness) and cooperative dairy 
market shares, which are positive (0.55 and 0.57), and statistically significant (p-values 
of 0.001, and 0.07). Thus, Hypothesis 2b (2a) cannot be rejected (is rejected).   
 The general prediction of the transaction cost economics is that vertical 
integration is predominant when it is hard to write long-term contracts between 
upstream and downstream parties. Hence, we expect to observe a higher degree of 
vertical integration in countries with weak contracting institutions. Yet, we find that 
dairy cooperative market shares are higher in countries with strong contracting 
institutions, and this correlation is statistically significant. There are several 
interpretations of this result. First, determinants of cooperative market shares appear to 
differ from the determinants of vertical integration, i.e. we observe that in the European 
dairy sector farmers do not integrate forward in order to economize on costly contracting 
due to poorly functioning contract institutions. However, this result may also indicate 
the presence of a third variable, which influences both the quality of institutions and 
cooperative market shares, and thus drives this positive correlation. Address in final 
section. 
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Second, we examine whether country-level differences in cooperative 
legislature are associated with cross-country variation in the market shares of dairy 
cooperatives. Descriptive statistics of the national cooperative law measures are 
presented in Appendix 4.5. As depicted in Table 4.3, pairwise correlation coefficients 
between the measures of national cooperative law and cooperative dairy market shares 
are of small magnitude and are not statistically significant. Hence, Hypothesis 2c is 
rejected.   
Third, we study the role of historical shocks, namely the association between 
the presence of the communist and fascist regimes in a country’s history, and 
cooperative market shares. In addition to correlation coefficients reported in Table 4.3 
(-0.58 for communist and -0.23 for fascist regimes), standardized differences in means, 
reported in Table 4.4, also provide evidence in support of Hypothesis 2d, i.e. a large 
negative and statistically significant difference in cooperative market shares between 
countries, which were and were not subject to a communist regime. Relative to the effect 
sizes measuring the effect of communist regimes, the effect size of the fascist regime is 
less negative, and is not statistically significant. Hence, it is not possible to rule out the 
possibility that the effect of the fascist regime on the current cooperative dairy market 
shares is negligent. 
 
 
Effect Size Estimate [95% Conf. Interval] 
Communist regime 
    
 Cohen's d -1,41 -2,38 -0,41 
 
Hedges's g -1,35 -2,29 -0,39 
Fascist regime     
 Cohen's d -0,64 -1,87 0,61 
 Hedges's g -0,61 -1,79 0,58 
Table 4.4. Effect sizes measuring the association between the communist and fascist 
regimes and dairy cooperative market shares 
 Overall, the results regarding the institutional environment suggest that 
cooperative organizational form, as measured by dairy cooperative market shares, 
flourishes in settings where the quality of contractual institutions is high. This claim is 
further supported by statistically important differences in dairy cooperative market 
shares between EU countries which were subject to the communist regime and those 
that were not. This result is puzzling from the transaction cost theory perspective. When 
viewing a cooperative as a form of forward vertical integration, it predicts a higher 
degree of vertical integration in settings with poor functioning contracting institutions. 
Hence, we can conclude that in the dairy sector in the EU, cooperative organizational 
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form does not function as a response to weak institutions.  Lastly, our results suggest 
that cooperative market shares are not associated with differences in cooperative laws 
across EU countries.  
4.4.3 Governance 
Observed cooperative market shares are the results of the governance structure choice 
at the third level of social analysis. It has been argued that the management of a 
cooperative enterprise requires an additional set of skills relative to the management of 
an IOF (Cook, 1994). Hypothesis 3a proposes that cooperatives could benefit from good 
management more in settings characterized by high overall management quality. The 
rankings of EU countries based on the management scores are listed in Appendix 4.6 
(Bloom and Van Reenen, 2010). The pairwise correlation coefficient between overall 
management scores and cooperative dairy market shares is 0.0080 (p-value 0.986), 
which indicates that there is no evidence to support Hypothesis 3a.  
Overall, based on the correlation coefficient, we do not find support for the 
incomplete contracting explanation of cooperative market shares. Variations in 
management practices do not appear to be statistically important for explaining dairy 
cooperative market shares.  
4.4.4 Resource Allocation 
We investigate whether industry composition, captured by a country’s milk self-
sufficiency score, is related to dairy cooperative market shares (Hypothesis 4a). In other 
words, we investigate whether the structure of the dairy industry is associated with a 
particular way of governing transactions between dairy farmers and downstream 
enterprises, i.e. forward vertical integration or spot exchange. In particular, we are 
interested to see whether there are statistically significant differences in dairy 
cooperative market shares in countries which differ with respect to milk self-sufficiency. 
Table 4.3 reports a statistically significant (p-value of 0.049) pairwise correlation of 0.5 
between the degree of a country’s milk self-sufficiency and dairy cooperative market 
share. The standardized difference in means between countries which are dairy self-
sufficient (score>100%) and those which are not dairy self-sufficient (score<100%) also 
indicates that such difference is statistically significant (Table 4.5).  
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 Effect size 
Cohen’s d (95% CI) 1.56 (0.33, 2.73) 
Henge’s g (95% CI) 1.47 (0.31, 2.59) 
Table 4.5. Effect sizes measuring the relationship between country’s degree of milk 
self-sufficiency and dairy cooperative market shares. Excluding Sweden and 7 
member states, which collect less than 1% of EU total milk deliveries (Latvia, Estonia, 
Bulgaria, Slovenia, Luxembourg, Cyprus, Malta)30 
Second, a cooperative’s market share could be higher when it is active in more 
industries, relative to an IOF. As Table 4.3 reports, the correlation coefficient between 
the measure of cooperative product diversification relative to IOFs and cooperative 
dairy market shares is positive (0.26) but not statistically significant (p-value 0.258). 
Table 4.6 indicates that cooperatives in the dairy sector are on average more (less) 
diversified than IOFs in Scandinavia and in the South of Europe (western and eastern 
Europe). The comparison of means between groups in Table 4.7 suggests that countries 
where dairy cooperatives diversify more than dairy IOFs, are not associated with higher 
cooperative market shares. Hence, Hypothesis 4b is rejected.  
 
 Mean Std. Dev. 
Scandinavia 1,09 1,30 
South  0,12 1,29 
West  -0,22 0,78 
East  -0,31 0,64 
Total 7,96E-10 1 
Table 4.6. Diversification degree of cooperatives relative to IOFs across EU regions 
 Effect size 
Cohen’s d (95% CI) 0.19 (-0.70, 1.07) 
Henge’s g (95% CI) 0.19 (-0.67, 1.02) 
Table 4.7. Effect sizes measuring the relationship between the measure of cooperative 
product diversification relative to IOFs and dairy cooperative market shares 
To conclude, our results suggest that a country’s degree of milk self-sufficiency 
correlates with dairy cooperative market shares. Differences in diversification strategies 
of cooperatives are not related to dairy cooperative market shares.  
                                                 
30 Sweden is excluded from the list because its milk self-sufficiency score is due to highly protected 
domestic dairy market and high barriers to entry, rather than climatic conditions.  
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4.5 Determinants of cooperative market shares in the EU sugar sector 
The sugar market in the EU is not dominated by cooperatives. As depicted in Figure 4.4, 
among sugar-producing EU countries, only seven have a cooperative market share 
exceeding zero. The largest cooperative market shares are observed in the Netherlands, 
France, and Germany (100%, 62%, and 60% respectively). The five largest sugar 
cooperatives are Tereos and Cristal Union in France, Royal Cosun in the Netherlands, 
Acor in Spain, and Cooperativa Produttori Bieticoli in Italy.  They have a turnover of 
3.8, 1.7, 1.7, 0.14 and 0.27 billion euros respectively. Overall, the average cooperative 
market share in the EU sugar sector (18.8%) is lower compared to the dairy sector 
(65.3%). 
 
Figure 4.4. Market shares of cooperatives in the national sugar market in EU countries, 
2010 (Bijman et al., 2012) 
Our paper differs from the “Support for Farmers Cooperatives” sugar sector 
report by Smit and de Bont (2012) in the way we classify two sugar enterprises in 
Germany – Südzucker and Nordzucker. As depicted in Appendix 4.1, the “Support for 
Farmers Cooperatives” report concludes that the market share of cooperatives in 
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Germany is zero, because both Südzucker and Nordzucker are classified as IOFs.31 We 
highlight two features of the cooperative enterprise in this paper. The two features are 
the transaction and ownership relationships between the upstream (farmers) and 
downstream (sugar processing enterprise) parties. Hence, when a sugar processing firm 
is controlled by farmers, who deliver sugar beets to it for processing, we refer to such 
an enterprise as a cooperative. The majority of shares of Südzucker, which are publicly 
traded, has always been owned by the southern German sugar beet farmers.32 
Nordzucker is not a publicly listed company. 83.8% are owned by Nordzucker Holding 
AG, 11.1% - by the Union-Zucker Südhannover GmbH, and 5.1% by other 
shareholders. A large proportion of the shareholders in Nordzucker Holding AG and 
Nordzucker AG, as well as the shareholders of UnionZucker Südhannover, are also 
active farmers who sell their beet to Nordzucker AG (Nordzucker, 2016). Together, 
these two enterprises account for around 60% of sugar supplied into the German market 
(Filippi et al., 2012). Hence, there is a 60% cooperative market share in Germany in 
Figure 4.4.  
The zero market shares of cooperatives in the Scandinavian countries are in line 
with our definition of a cooperative. For example, a sugar plant in Örtofta, Sweden, is 
owned by Nordzucker and processes around 2 million tons of beet, supplied by 
approximately 2,000 beet growers, during the campaign. Swedish farmers deliver their 
inputs to the Örtofta sugar processing plant, but do not have control over the downstream 
enterprise. Therefore, the share of sugar beets processed at Örtofta plant does not count 
towards a cooperative market share in the sugar sector in Sweden. 
Sugar beet differs from milk with respect to several product characteristics. 
Sugar beet is a root crop which is sown in the spring. The optimal harvest time is the 
beginning of September. It is a rotation crop because it is grown on farms in combination 
with other crops. It is a semi-perishable product, because sugar beet does not need to be 
transported to the processing plant immediately after harvest. The main role of sugar 
cooperatives is to process sugar beets and produce (refined) sugar. To prolong the 
processing campaign, a sugar processing enterprise compensates farmers for an early or 
late delivery of sugar beets. It turns out that a sugar plant processes sugar beets during 
six months, i.e. sugar beets can be delivered to the processing plants up to three months 
before or after the optimal harvest time. This is in contrast with milk, which is very 
                                                 
31 Four companies share the sugar market in Germany: Südzucker AG (turnover 6.2 billion Euros 
(2010/2011) and 18,000 employees) and Nordzucker AG (turnover of 1.8 billion Euros and 4,300 
employees), followed by family firm Pfeifer & Langen KG (turnover of about 1.2 billion Euros (2010) 
and 2,300 employees) with 20‐30%, and Dutch based Suiker Unie (5‐10%), a subsidiary of the Dutch 
sugar company Koninklijke Coöperatie Cosun U.A. (total turnover of 1,8 billion Euros (2011) and 
3,500 employees) (Filippi et al., 2012). 
32 At least 50% of Südzucker is owned by South German sugar beet processing cooperative 
(Süddeutsche Zuckerrübenverwertungs-Genossenschaft eG (SVZG)).  
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perishable. Hence, higher cooperative market shares in the dairy sector are in line with 
the predictions of the incomplete contracting literature, which highlights the role of 
higher temporal asset specificity in fostering vertical integration.    
Agricultural sectors are generally classified as some of the least complex 
sectors. The measures of product complexity are based on the use of intermediate goods. 
A complexity measure is equal to zero if there is only one input, and tends to one if the 
sector uses many inputs in equal proportions (Blanchard and Kremer, 1997). According 
to the Blanchard and Kremer’s (1997) industry complexity measure, sugar is more 
complex than dairy products with a complexity measure of 0.61 versus 0.57. Other 
agricultural commodities and corresponding complexity measures are 0.53 for flour and 
cereals, 0.58 for meat products, 0.62 for fruit and vegetables, and 0.74 for wines. 
Consequently, agricultural sectors are also some of the least institutionally dependent, 
because industries that require joining of a large number of inputs to production are 
more institutions dependent because there are more relationships that can be “potentially 
distorted due to imperfect institutions” (Levchenko, 2007). To summarize, the 
transaction cost theory predicts a higher degree of vertical integration in more complex 
industries. This prediction is not in line with low cooperative market shares in the sugar 
sector, which is more complex than dairy. However, the differences in complexity 
measures are minimal, so the role of complexity in explaining differences between 
cooperative market shares in the dairy and sugar sectors is negligible.  
Lastly, agricultural sectors differ with respect to capital intensity. To illustrate, 
we compute the share of raw product, supplied by farmers, i.e. either sugar beet or milk, 
in cooperative’s total operating expenses. For instance, consider the largest sugar and 
dairy cooperatives in the Netherlands. According to the most recent available financial 
statements of the sugar cooperative, the share of sugar beets costs in cooperative’s total 
operating expenses is 12%. The share of milk costs in the dairy cooperative’s total 
operating expenses is 30%. This suggests that sugar production entails higher levels of 
capital intensity than dairy production. Furthermore, the initial capital investments 
required to establish a sugar processing plant are generally higher relative to a milk 
processing plant. Then, low market shares of cooperatives in the EU sugar sector do not 
support the claim by Caves and Peterson (1986) that cooperatives may have an 
advantage in capital-intensive industries.  
 
4.5.1 Embeddedness, Institutional Environment, and Governance 
Table 4.8 reports the correlation coefficients measuring the association between sugar 
cooperative market shares and variables measuring embeddedness, institutional 
environment, and governance. In contrast with the dairy sector, almost none of the 
104 
 
variables are statistically significant in explaining sugar cooperatives market shares. 
This is illustrated by the absence of statistically significant pairwise correlation 
coefficients in the first column of Table 4.8. The only exception is religious 
heterogeneity with a positive and statistically significant effect size of 0.61 (p-value 
0.0115). However, this result is driven entirely by the highest measure of religious 
heterogeneity in the Netherlands, which also has the highest sugar cooperative market 
share. The sugar market of the Netherlands is discussed in more detail in the resource 
allocation level analysis in the subsection 4.4.2.1. 
4.5.2 Resource Allocation 
Since 1968 the European sugar market is regulated through the Common Organization 
of the Sugar Market (COSM). The two main mechanisms of regulation are production 
quotas and a minimum sugar price. Two recent important regulations in the European 
sugar market are highlighted. First, the European sugar market has changed dramatically 
after a reform of 2006.  The goal of the reform was to reduce European sugar prices to 
bring them more in line with those on the world market, to create a smaller and more 
competitive industry, to provide access for the least developed countries and to comply 
with the rules of the World Trade Organization (WTO). As a result, EU sugar production 
has been reduced from 19 million to 13 million tons (a reduction of 31.6%). Of around 
304 thousand sugar beet growers, 167 thousand stopped production (a reduction of 
55%); of the 189 European sugar factories, 80 have been closed (a reduction of 42%) 
and five EU countries have stopped sugar manufacturing entirely (European Association 
of Sugar Producers, 2016). The EU changed from being a net exporter to a net importer 
of sugar. The European Commission, the European Parliament and the European Court 
of Auditors have concluded that the EU has achieved the objectives of the reform for 
the sugar market. Second, the quota system in the EU ended as of 30 September 2017. 
This will probably change the functioning of the sugar industry in the EU. More 
specifically, the sugar production quotas and the minimum purchase price of sugar beet 
will be eliminated. It implies that each country and each sugar company in the EU can 
produce and market an unlimited amount of sugar. This is expected to lead to more 
fluctuations in the price of sugar and of sugar beets. 
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In 2016, 61 companies represented the EU sugar market across 20 EU member 
states (Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, 
France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Poland, Romania, 
Slovakia, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom). Table 4.9 reports the change in the 
number of companies in the EU sugar market between 2005 and 2016. It indicates that 
the number of companies decreased by 13, which is composed of 24 companies ceased 
to exist and 11 new ones were formed in Romania and Croatia.  
 
 2006 2016 Reduction of 
Number of companies 74 61 17% 
Number of factories 189 109 42% 
Number of growers 304,890 137,354 55% 
Table 4.9. Changes in the EU 28 Sugar Market (European Association of Sugar 
Producers, 2016) 
4.5.2.1 Sugar Market in the Netherlands 
Consider the case of the sugar market in the Netherlands. In 1899 the first cooperative 
sugar factory Sas van Gent was formed.  In 1919, IOF sugar-processing enterprise CSM 
(Central Sugar Company) was established. By 1966 there were twelve sugar factories 
in the Netherlands, and six of them merged into one cooperative Suiker Unie.  Between 
1966 and 2006 the share of sugar beets processed by the cooperative Suiker Unie was 
roughly the same – around 60%. This is due to the fact that in the Netherlands, the 
Ministry of Agriculture divided the sugar quantity quota according to a fixed allocation 
between Suiker Unie and CSM. In 1966 Suiker Unie was renamed to Cosun, and in 
2007 Cosun acquired CSM, because IOF CSM decided to divest its sugar activities. 
Hence, since 2007 100% of the sugar beets in the Netherlands are processed by one 
cooperative company. By-products of the sugar beet processing at Cosun are sugar beet 
pulp for animal feed, betacal (lime fertilizer for agricultural purposes), molasses for the 
fermentation industry and animal feed, and green gas (an energy source for the sugar 
factory) (Cosun, 2017). 
The Dutch Competition Authority approved the merger between Cosun and 
CSM because it was assessed that this merger will not result in a dominant position in 
the European market that could restrict competition (The Netherlands Competition 
Authority, 2007). The IOF CSM historically diversified in activities other than sugar 
processing, mainly biobased activities. In 1982 it acquired full control of Chemie 
Combinatie Amsterdam, or CCA, a producer of fermentative (natural) lactic acid and 
lactic acid derivatives. It also acquired various other branded food and confectionery 
manufacturers in Europe and the US. Since 2012, CSM is solely a biobased products 
company and is titled Corbion (Corbion, 2017). The cooperative Royal Cosun 
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developed a quite different product portfolio. A crucial input continues to be sugar beet, 
due to the single origin constraint (Cook, 1997; Deng, 2015). The sugar market in the 
Netherlands consists nowadays of one enterprise – Royal Cosun Cooperative.  
To sum up, the historical development of the Dutch sugar market in 
combination with the European sugar reform of 2006 resulted in the current cooperative 
market share in the Dutch sugar market of 100% (prior to 2006, 60%). This case is 
interesting because it illustrates the change from co-existence of two organizational 
forms in one market (forward integration, i.e. a cooperative, and long-term contracts, 
i.e. an IOF) to a fully forward integrated market.  
4.6 Conclusion and further research  
In this paper we empirically investigate the determinants of cooperative market shares 
in the agricultural sectors in the European Union. First, we find statistically important 
differences across sectors and countries. There are large and statistically significant 
differences in cooperative market shares between the dairy and all other sectors. Next 
to that, when considering all sectors, market shares of cooperatives are significantly 
lower in Eastern Europe relative to all other EU regions. These results indicate that the 
variety of cooperative market shares observed across sectors and countries in the EU is 
not a result of a random assignment, but partly constitutes a statistical regularity. 
Second, when focusing on the dairy sector, we observe the presence of 
substantial differences in the organization of the dairy production across EU countries, 
where cooperatives dominate in the North-West of Europe, and are less prominent in 
the South-East. Based on the four levels framework of social analysis by Williamson 
(2000), we find that the dairy cooperative market shares are higher in countries with 
high levels of trust and low levels of heterogeneity (embeddedness level), with strong 
contracting institutions (institutional environment level), and with high milk self-
sufficiency scores (resource allocation level). We do not find an association between 
dairy cooperative market shares and cross-country variations in cooperative laws and 
measures of value added by the downstream activities (as measured by the management 
practices and product differentiation). 
One puzzling result of our analysis is that higher dairy cooperative market 
shares are observed in countries with strong contracting institutions. It is not in line with 
the prediction of the transaction cost theory that vertical integration is preferred in 
settings where it is hard to write long-term contracts, i.e. where contracting institutions 
are weak. Hence, we can conclude that in the European dairy sector, cooperatives do 
not serve as a response to poorly functioning institutions. Besides, this result also 
implies that the determinants of cooperative market shares may not correspond to the 
determinants of vertical integration, due to conceptual differences between a 
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cooperative and vertical integration. This result may also reflect the influence of a third 
variable, which influences both the quality of institutions and cooperative market shares, 
and thus drives this positive correlation. For instance, more advanced countries may 
have better quality of institutions and at the same time provide a necessary “enabling” 
environment for cooperatives. Variables such as trust, the quality of institutions, 
economic development, and the presence of cooperative enterprises are interlinked, and 
may even reinforce each other.  
Third, in contrast with the dairy sector, none of the variables measuring 
country-level differences across the four levels of social analysis appear to be 
statistically important for explaining sugar cooperative market shares. With the example 
of the sugar market in the Netherlands, we highlight another determinant of the sugar 
cooperative market share. We show that it was the combination of policy changes and 
the product differentiation strategy of the competitor IOF, which resulted in the current 
cooperative market share (100%) in the Netherlands. Therefore, relative to the dairy 
market, which exhibits a clear pattern, cooperative market shares in the EU sugar market 
support the Atalay et al. (2014) view that vertical integration can be viewed as a by-
product of product portfolio development. It posits that the degree of vertical integration 
may not be a consequence of systematic make-or-buy decisions, but a consequence of 
firms’ efficient transfers of intangible inputs. In fact, the main reason for cooperative 
Royal Cosun to acquire the East German IOF sugar processing company in Anklam is 
its “organization capabilities”, namely cooperative’s expertise in sugar production and 
marketing.  
We propose several directions for further research. First, the study of 
cooperative market shares would benefit from the systematic data collection on farmer 
cooperatives in the EU. For example, the cooperative market shares, used in the paper, 
were estimated by country experts during the “Support for Farmers Cooperatives” 
project. On the one hand, such a measure benefited from expert knowledge, but on the 
other hand, it lacked cross-country estimation consistency.  
Second, once the abovementioned data weakness is resolved, the analysis of the 
determinants of cooperative market shares could benefit from a more dynamic approach. 
According to Hansmann (1999), “the market share of cooperatives in economic activity 
has grown throughout the 20th century”. To illustrate, the share of milk, handled by 
cooperatives in the United States, increased from 40% in 1936 to 81% in 2012 (USDA, 
2012). Such approach will clarify the patterns of path dependency in growing 
cooperative market shares. 
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Appendix 4.1. Cooperative market shares 
“Support for Farmers Cooperatives” (Bijman et al., 2012) differentiates between sectors 
and countries in the European Union and reports a total of 126 cooperative market shares 
estimates across 27 EU member states and 8 sectors. Market share is calculated as a 
percentage of farm produce handled by cooperatives. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4.10. Cooperative market shares. An empty cell indicates the absence of a sector 
in a country (Bijman et al., 2012) 
  
 Dairy Sugar 
Fruit & 
Vegetables  
Pig 
meat 
Cereals Wine Olives 
Sheep 
meat  
Austria 95 0 50  70 15   
Belgium 66 1.6 83 25 4.7   0 
Bulgaria         
Cyprus      10   
Czech 
Republic 66  35 25  8  20 
Denmark 94 0 50 86    0 
Estonia 35  4 1 10   0 
Finland 97  40 81 49    
France 55 62 35 94 74 38  0 
Germany 65 0 40 20 50 33   
Greece  0 35 0  15  0 
Hungary 31 30 18 25 12 9  20 
Ireland 99 0  0 0   0 
Italy 42 20 50  27 52   
Latvia 33  12  38   6 
Lithuania 25   0    0 
Luxemburg         
Malta 91  20 100  70 0  
Netherlands 90 100 95 0 55   0 
Poland 72 0 11  7   0 
Portugal 70  25 0 0 42 30 0 
Romania  0  0 1 1  1 
Slovakia 25 0 10 11 16 0  0 
Slovenia 80  70  42    
Spain 40 28 50 25 35 70 70 25 
Sweden 100 0 70 51    55 
UK  0 35      
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Appendix 4.2. Sector effects  
Hypothesis A1: Market shares of cooperatives in the EU dairy (fruit and vegetables, 
olives, pig meat, cereals, wine, sugar, sheep meat) sector are statistically different from 
other sectors.   
Table 4.11. Sector differences in cooperative market shares in the EU (* - significant 
at 95% confidence level) 
Standardized differences in means suggest that cooperative market shares in the 
dairy sector are significantly higher relative to all other sectors except for olives. A 
standardized difference in means above 0.8 is considered large. Therefore all 
statistically significant effect sizes, which range between 0.98 and 2.20, suggest 
quantitatively large difference between the dairy sector and six other sectors. 
Additionally, cooperative market shares in the sheep meat sector are significantly lower 
relative to all other sectors except for sugar. Hence, the hypothesis of zero difference 
between the dairy and other sectors (with exception of olives), and between sheep meat 
and other sectors (with exception of sugar) is rejected at the 95% confidence level. It is 
illustrated in Table 4.11 by the positive confidence intervals, which do not include zero. 
Lastly, there also appear to be large (Cohen’s d of 0.94) and statistically significant 
(confidence interval between 0.25 and 1.62) differences in the cooperative market shares 
in the fruit and vegetable and sugar sectors. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Cohen’s d (Confidence Interval) 
Mean comparison with 
EU 
Sector 
F&V 
 
Olives Pig meat Cereals 
 
Wine 
 
Sugar 
 
Sheep meat 
 
Dairy 
 
0.98* 
(0.34,1.62) 
1.15 
(-0.11,2.40) 
1.12* 
(0.43,1.79) 
1.41* 
(0.68, 2.11) 
1.43* 
(0.65,2.20) 
1.82* 
(1.03,2.53) 
2.20* 
(1.71,3.46) 
F&V 
 
 0.25 
(-0.96,1.46) 
0.32 
(-0.31,0.93) 
0.44 
(-0.20,1.09) 
0.48 
(-0.22,1.18) 
0.94* 
(0.25,1,62) 
1.55* 
(0.81,2.28) 
Olives 
 
  0.08 
(-1.14,1.31) 
0.17 
(-1.06,1.39) 
0.20 
(-1.06,1.46) 
0.62 
(-0.64,1.86) 
1.41* 
(0.08, 2.71) 
Pig meat 
 
   0.04 
(-0.62,0.70) 
0.07 
(-0.64,0.78) 
0.46 
(-0.22,1.14) 
0.82* 
(0.12,1.50) 
Cereals 
 
    0.04 
(-0.68,0.76) 
0.51 
(-0.18,1.20) 
1.04* 
(0.32,1.76) 
Wine 
 
     0.47 
(-0.27,1.21) 
1.04* 
(0.26,1.80) 
Sugar 
 
      0.34 
(-0.34,0.99) 
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Dependent Variable – Cooperative Market Shares 
Variable Sector Effect 
Dairy 51.32*** (6.66) 
Sugar 2.70 (0.32) 
F&V 25.29*** (3.25) 
Pig meat 18.49** (2.33) 
Cereals 17.30** (2.11) 
Wine 18.94** (2.08) 
Olives 13.98 (0.90) 
26 country controls  
(statistically significant are): 
 
     Finland 35.14* (1.72) 
   Netherlands  33.98* (1.78) 
Constant 3.49 (0.20) 
R2 = .59  
F = 4.47***  
*p<0.10, **p < .05, ***p<.01, t-statistic in parentheses 
Table 4.12. Ordinary Least Squares regression model estimating sector effects on 
cooperative market shares (n = 126) 
Results from the Cohen’s d sector analysis are confirmed with the OLS 
regression analysis in Table 4.12. Relative to the sheep meat sector, cooperative market 
shares are significantly higher in the dairy, fruit and vegetables, pig meat, cereals, and 
wine sectors. Regression coefficients also suggest quantitatively large effects (between 
17% and 51% increase in cooperative market shares). Interestingly, among the 26 
country controls, Finland and Netherlands appear to have significantly higher (by 
around 30%) cooperative market shares relative to other countries.    
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Appendix 4.3. EU region effects 
Hypothesis A2: Market shares of cooperatives across EU agricultural sectors are 
statistically different in Scandinavian (Western, Southern, Eastern) countries relative to 
other countries.   
 
EU region 
Cohen’s d (Confidence Interval) 
Mean comparison with 
West South East 
Scandinavia 0.44 
(-0.17,1.06) 
0.61 
(-0.22,1.25) 
1.73* 
(1.03,2.41) 
West  0.09 
(-0.38,0.55) 
0.87* 
(0.40,1.33) 
South   0.92* 
(0.44,1.40) 
Table 4.13. Regional differences in cooperative market shares in EU 8 agricultural 
sectors (* - significant at 95% confidence level) 
Regional differences in cooperative market shares across all sectors are evident 
from Table 4.13. It suggests that there are large and statistically significant differences 
in the cooperative market shares in the Eastern EU countries relative to the 
Scandinavian, Western, and Southern countries. 
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Dependent Variable – Cooperative Market Shares 
Variable Region Effect 
Scandinavia 37.83*** (5.12) 
West 24.16*** (4.46) 
South 19.49*** (3.42) 
7 sector controls 
(statistically significant are): 
 
   Dairy 54.44*** (7.04) 
   F&V 28.13 *** (3.62) 
   Pig meat 18.97** (2.37) 
   Cereals 19.63** (2.41) 
   Wine 19.45** (2.20) 
Constant -6.10 (-0.98) 
R2 = .48  
F = 10.63***  
*p<0.10, **p < .05, ***p<.01, t-statistic in parentheses 
Table 4.14. Ordinary Least Squares regression model estimating regional effects on 
cooperative market shares (n = 126) 
Similarly, results from the Cohen’s d regional analysis are confirmed with the 
OLS regression analysis in Table 4.14. Regression coefficients suggest large positive 
(between 19% and 37% increase in cooperative market shares) statistically significant 
effects of Scandinavian, Western, and Southern regions on cooperative market shares 
relative to the Eastern European countries. 
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Appendix 4.4: EU region effects, dairy sector 
EU region 
Mean 
Cooperative 
Market 
Share 
Std. 
Dev. 
Cohen’s d 
(Confidence 
Interval) 
Mean 
comparison with 
East 
Mean 
comparison 
with South 
Mean 
comparison with 
West 
Scandinavia 97 3 3.29**(1.16,5.33) 1.73*(0.15,2.86) 1.19(-0.36,2.66) 
West 78,3 18,5 1.95**(0.52,3.11) 0.67(-0.6,1.83)  
South 64,6 22,8 1.13*(0.02,2.07)   
East 41 19,6    
Total 65,3 26,7    
 
Table 4.15. Regional differences in cooperative market shares in the dairy sector in the 
EU. (** (*) - significant at the 95% (90%) confidence level) 
The first column of Table 4.15 summarizes the mean cooperative market shares 
in the dairy sector per European region. The last three columns of Table 3 report 
standardized differences in means of cooperative dairy market shares between regions. 
The two largest effect sizes indicate statistically significant (at the 95% confidence 
level) differences between Scandinavian and Eastern countries (Cohen’s d of 3.29) and 
between Western and Eastern countries (Cohen’s d of 1.95).  The difference between 
Scandinavian and Southern countries is of the lower magnitude (Cohen’s d of 1.73) and 
is significant at the 90% confidence level.  Lastly, there are also statistically significant 
differences (at the 90% confidence level) between Southern and Eastern countries 
(Cohen’s d of 1.13). 
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Appendix 4.5: Embeddedness variables, descriptive statistics across EU 
regions  
Region 
Mean 
Generalized 
Trust Std. Dev. 
Scandinavia 7,53 0,71 
West 5,87 0,59 
East 5,71 0,70 
South 5,68 0,71 
Total 5,95 0,85 
 
Table 4.16. Generalized trust across EU regions 
 
 
 
Mean 
Religious 
Heteroge
neity Std. Dev. 
Mean 
Linguistic 
Heterogen
eity 
Std. 
Dev. 
Mean 
Ethnic 
Heteroge
neity Std. Dev. 
Scandina
via 0,24 0,01 0,15 0,05 0,09 0,04 
South 0,27 0,13 0,18 0,16 0,16 0,13 
West 0,42 0,25 0.28 0,24 0,23 0,20 
East 0,47 0,16 0.28 0,18 0,33 0,15 
Total 0,38 0,20 0,24 0,19 0,23 0,17 
 
Table 4.17. Heterogeneity across EU regions 
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Appendix 4.6: Institutional environment variables, descriptive statistics 
across EU regions 
  
Property 
Rights Mean 
Std. Dev. 
Judicial 
Effectiveness 
Mean 
Std. Dev. 
Scandinavia 88,63 1,95 77,80 8,06 
West 86,25 3,39 77,69 7,67 
South 69,96 8,16 59,00 5,46 
East 68,31 7,30 56.22 13.31 
Total 76,31 10,77 65,70 13,66 
 
Table 4.18. Quality of institutions across EU regions (Economic Freedom Index, 
2017) 
 
 
Mean 
Liberal 
Voting 
Rules 
Std. 
Dev. 
Mean 
Favorable 
tax 
Std. 
Dev. 
Mean  
Min 
Member 
Requirement 
Std. 
Dev. 
Mean 
Min 
Capital 
 
Required 
Std. 
Dev. 
         
Scandinavia 1,33 0,58 0,67 0,58 1,33 1,53 0,00 0,00 
West 1,14 0,90 0,87 0,35 2,62 3,29 2318,75 6558,41 
South 0,67 0,82 1,00 1,00 4,14 3,08 2500,00 4183,30 
East 0,29 0,49 0,33 0,71 3,11 2,42 794,55 1159,62 
Total 0,78 0,80 0,70 0,72 3,04 2,79 1565,42 4107,69 
 
Table 4.19. Legal aspects of cooperative law across EU regions 
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Appendix 4.7: Governance level, quality of management 
 
County  Overall 
Management 
Monitoring Target Incentives Coop 
dairy 
market 
share 
Sweden  3.18 3.54 3.22 2.86 100% 
Germany 3.18 3.40 3.24 2.95 65% 
France 3.00 3.28 2.98 2.78 55% 
Italy 2.99 2.98 2.80 2.73 42% 
UK 2.98 3.16 2.93 2.88 - 
Poland 2.88 2.88 2.93 2.85 72% 
Ireland 2.84 2.95 2.76 2.81 99% 
Portugal 2.79 3.07 2.72 2.61 70% 
 
Table 4.20. Management practices in EU countries (Bloom and Van Reenen, 2010) 
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Appendix 4.8: Data  
Country 
Dairy 
coop 
market 
share 
Sugar 
coop 
market 
share Trust 
Ethnic 
heterog
eneity 
Linguis
tic 
heterog
eneity 
Religio
us 
heterog
eneity 
Prope
rty 
rights 
Jud. 
effectiv
eness 
Coop  
tax 
Libe
ral 
votin
g 
rules 
Austria 95 0 5.9 0.11 0.15 0.41 86 81.8 1 1 
Belgium 66 1.6 5.7 0.56 0.54 0.21 83.3 69.3 1 0 
Bulgaria   4.2 0.40 0.30 0.60 62.5 38.9 0 0 
Cyprus   4.5 0.09 0.40 0.40 75.4 60.7 1 0 
Czech 
Republic 66  5.3 0.32 0.32 0.66 70.3 55.9 0 1 
Denmark 94 0 8.3 0.08 0.10 0.23 86.7 68.5 1 1 
Estonia 35  5.8 0.51 0.49 0.50 82.6 82.8 0 0 
Finland 97  7.4 0.13 0.14 0.25 90.6 82.7 0 1 
France 55 62 5.0 0.10 0.12 0.40 85 72.7 1  
Germany 65 60 5.5 0.17 0.16 0.66 82.9 79.5 1 1 
Greece  0 5.3 0.16 0.03 0.15 52.5 56.1 2 1 
Hungary 31 30 5.3 0.15 0.03 0.52 60.1 51.8 1 0 
Ireland 99 0 6.4 0.12 0.03 0.16 85.8 78.3 0 0 
Italy 42 20 5.7 0.11 0.11 0.30 74.6 55.4 0 1 
Latvia 33  6.5 0.59 0.58 0.56 72.6 59.7 2  
Lithuania 25  6.1 0.32 0.32 0.41 73 62.4 0 1 
Luxemburg   5.5 0.53 0.64 0.09 85.8 77 1 2 
Malta 91  6.2 0.04 0.09 0.12 67.7 62.9 2 0 
Netherlands 90 100 6.9 0.11 0.51 0.72 87.4 69.9 1 2 
Poland 72 0 6.0 0.12 0.05 0.17 60.8 58 0 0 
Portugal 70  5.3 0.05 0.02 0.14 73.3 68.9 2 0 
Romania  0 6.4 0.31 0.17 0.24 63.9 58.5 0 0 
Slovakia 25 0 5.8 0.25 0.26 0.57 69 38 0  
Slovenia 80  6.5 0.22 0.22 0.29 75 55.1 0  
Spain 40 28 6.3 0.42 0.41 0.45 71.2 53.9 0 2 
Sweden 100 0 6.9 0.06 0.20 0.23 88.6 82.2 1 2 
UK  0 6.1 0.12 0.05 0.69 93.8 93 1 2 
Continued 
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Country 
Min 
capital 
requireme
nt 
Min 
member 
require
ment 
Comm. 
regime 
Fascist 
regime 
Mana
geme
nt 
Score 
Milk 
self-
sufficie
ncy 
Sugar 
self-
sufficie
ncy 
Product 
Differe
ntiation 
Dairy 
Prod
uct 
Diffe
rentia
tion 
Sugar 
Austria 0 0 0 0  134.7 104 -0.24  
Belgium 18550 3 0 0  120.2 139.1 0.00 0.14 
Bulgaria 0 0 1 0   0   
Cyprus 0 0 0 0   0   
Czech 
Republic 0 3 1 0  115.9 148.5 -0.79  
Denmark 0 0 0 0  247.4 368.3 0.74  
Estonia 2556 5 1 0   0 0.53  
Finland 0 1 0 0  106.9 54.05 1.75  
France 0 7 0 0 3 136.8 195.5 0.32 -0.24 
Germany 0 3 0 0 3.18 132.5 124.7 0.20  
Greece 10000 10 0 0  34.1 32.31   
Hungary 0 0 1 0  89.5 242   
Ireland 0 8 0 0 2.84 154.2 0 0.71  
Italy 0 3 0 1 2.99 67.3 25.7 0.29 0.00 
Latvia 2845 0 1 0   0 -0.20  
Lithuania 0 5 1 0  161.9 146.8 0.09  
Luxemburg 0 0 0 0   0   
Malta  5 0 0   0 0.00  
Netherlands 0 0 0 0  165.6 118.2 -0.68  
Poland 0 5 1 0 2.88 125.9 113.7 -0.16  
Portugal 5000 5 0 1 2.79 84.1 0.88 -0.44  
Romania 500 5 1 0  70.3 24.63   
Slovakia 1250 5 1 0  92 104.1 -0.33  
Slovenia 0 3 1 0   0 0.00  
Spain 0 3 0 1  67.5 44.23 -0.63 1.89 
Sweden 0 3 0 0 3.18  107.6 0.00  
UK 0 0 0 0 2.98 83.6 52.09   
Table 4.21. Data Matrix 
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Variable Explanation Source 
Dairy (sugar) 
cooperative 
market share 
The percentage of the value of farm 
produce (milk or sugar) handled by 
cooperatives in a country. It is a 
combined market shares of all 
cooperatives in the sector compared to 
the cumulative market share of all IOFs 
in the same sector, both measured at 
farm-gate transaction. 
Support for farmers’ 
cooperatives: Final 
report (Bijman et al., 
2012). 
Trust Generalized trust measure, which 
captures the extent to which “most 
people can be trusted” in a country.  
World Values Survey, 
2017 
Ethnic / 
linguistic / 
religious 
heterogeneity 
The measure reflects the probability that 
two randomly selected individuals from 
a population belonged to different 
ethnic / linguistic/ religious groups. It is 
calculated as one minus the Herfindahl 
index of group shares. A higher 
fractionalization measure implies a 
higher degree of heterogeneity.   
Fractionalization 
dataset (Alesina et al., 
2003) 
Property 
rights 
“The extent to which a country’s legal 
framework allows individuals to freely 
accumulate private property, secured by 
clear laws that are enforced effectively 
by the government”. The score consists 
of five equally weighted sub-factors: 
physical property rights, intellectual 
property rights, strength of investor 
protection, risk of expropriation, and 
quality of land administration. A higher 
score indicates a more effective legal 
protection of property in a country. 
Index of Economic 
Freedom (Heritage 
Foundation, 2017) 
Judicial 
effectiveness 
“The degree of efficient and fair judicial 
systems, which ensure that laws are 
fully respected, with appropriate legal 
actions taken against violations”. The 
score consists of six equally weighted 
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sub-factors: public trust in politicians, 
irregular payments and bribes, 
transparency of government 
policymaking, absence of corruption, 
perceptions of corruption, and 
governmental and civil service 
transparency. A higher score indicates 
better judicial effectiveness in a country. 
Favorable 
cooperative 
tax 
A score of 2 is assigned to countries, 
where cooperatives are exempt from the 
corporate income tax. A score of 1 is 
assigned to countries, where 
cooperatives have the same corporate 
income regime as IOFs, however 
several facilities are provided for the 
deduction of patron dividends paid to 
the members related to the economic 
transactions between the cooperative 
and its members. Zero score is assigned 
to countries which do not have special 
tax facilities for cooperatives or have 
tax facilities that have no impact on the 
promotion or success of cooperatives. 
“Support for farmers 
cooperatives: Legal 
aspects” (van der 
Sangen, 2012) 
Liberal voting 
rules 
A score of 2 is assigned to countries 
where the adjudication of voting rights 
is liberal and can be attributed to 
members according to their volume of 
economic transactions with the 
cooperative. A score of 1 is assigned to 
countries that allow cooperatives to 
depart from the principle of “one 
member - one vote”, but only to a 
limited degree. Zero score is assigned to 
countries that do not allow to depart 
from the “one member – one vote rule”.  
 
Minimum 
capital 
requirement 
Legal requirement regarding the 
minimum member capital upon the 
formation of a cooperative.  
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Minimum 
member 
requirement 
Legal requirement regarding the 
minimum number of members upon the 
formation of a cooperative. 
Communist 
regime 
A score of 1 is assigned to a country, 
which was under the communist regime 
after World War II, zero score 
otherwise. 
Historical facts 
Fascist regime A score of 1 is assigned to a country, 
which was under the fascist regime for 
more than 20 years, zero score 
otherwise. 
Management 
Score 
Management practices are measured 
based on three areas: (i) “monitoring - 
how well do companies monitor what 
goes on inside their firms, and use this 
for continuous improvement; (ii) targets 
- do companies set the right targets, 
track the right outcomes and take 
appropriate action if the two are 
inconsistent; (iii) incentives - are 
companies promoting and rewarding 
employees based on performance, and 
trying to hire and keep their best 
employees? A higher score indicates 
better managerial practices in a country. 
World Management 
Survey (Bloom and 
Van Reenen, 2010) 
Milk self-
sufficiency 
The percentage of a country’s milk self-
sufficiency is calculated as  
𝐶
𝐶+𝐼−𝐸
, 
where 𝐶 is the country’s total milk 
deliveries, 𝐼 is the milk equivalent 
imports, and E is the milk equivalent 
exports. A percentage above (below) 
one hundred percent indicates that a 
country is (not) milk self-sufficient.   
CLAL (clal.it , 2010) 
Sugar self-
sufficiency 
The percentage of a country’s sugar 
self-sufficiency is calculated as  
𝐶
𝐶+𝐼−𝐸
, 
where 𝐶 is the country’s total raw sugar 
equivalent production, 𝐼 is the raw sugar 
equivalent imports, and E is the raw 
Authors’ calculations 
(FAO statistics, 2010) 
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sugar equivalent exports. A percentage 
above (below) one hundred percent 
indicates that a country is (not) sugar 
self-sufficient.   
Product 
Differentiation 
Dairy / Sugar 
The degree of product diversification of 
cooperatives relative to IOFs in a 
country. It is calculated as a difference 
in means between the total 
diversification degree, as measured by 
the number of 4-digid industry codes, of 
cooperatives and IOFs in a country. A 
positive (negative) score indicates that 
cooperatives are more (less) diversified 
than IOFs in this country.  
Authors’ calculations 
(Bureau van Dijk) 
 
Table 4.22. Descriptions of variables 
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5. General Conclusion  
 
 
Chapter 1 of this thesis highlights the empirical prevalence of cooperatives. Besides 
being a prominent worldwide phenomenon, a cooperative form is interesting from a 
theoretical perspective because of its distinctive allocation of ownership. As opposed to 
a privately owned agricultural firm, an agricultural cooperative is owned by a society of 
farmer-members. Hence, farmers are the residual claimants in a cooperative. This 
feature has two implications. First, for all unforeseen contingencies, not specified in 
contracts, the decision rights are allocated to farmers, i.e. farmers hold the formal 
authority in a cooperative. So, a cooperative is member-controlled. Second, as owners, 
farmers are also the residual claimants of the income of a cooperative, i.e. a cooperative 
is member-benefitted. Another defining characteristic of an agricultural cooperative is 
the fact that farmers are not only owners, but also users of a cooperative enterprise, i.e. 
they deliver their farm products to a downstream firm. Therefore, there are two types of 
relations between the farmers and a downstream enterprise – an ownership, but also a 
transaction relationship.  
 Chapter 2 of this thesis provides a game-theoretic explanation for the observed 
variety of patterns of emergence of cooperatives. First, by considering two farmers and 
an outsider, and just one exogenous parameter – member heterogeneity, predictions are 
formulated regarding the bottom-up and top-down emergence of cooperatives. When 
the value of the outsider is low and member heterogeneity is limited, a cooperative 
emerges efficiently bottom-up by the initiation of all members. When heterogeneity 
increases, a coordination problem arises, and only one member takes a lead. We refer to 
such member as a coop champion. The game changes to a prisoner’s dilemma when 
heterogeneity is high, and therefore no cooperative emerges in the equilibrium. We 
consider a role of a third party in addressing these inefficiencies. The distinction is made 
between two types of outsiders: a selfish outsider, such as the “dragonheads” in China, 
and a benevolent outsider, such as NGOs. As the value of the outsider increases, a top-
down cooperative with a selfish outsider becomes uniquely efficient when the value of 
the outsider is in the intermediate high range and heterogeneity of members is low. 
Hence, in some instances a top-down cooperative with a selfish outsider may be desired. 
This range therefore provides a justification for the existence of the so-called 
dragonheads, i.e. the elites who initiate the formation of cooperatives in the local areas 
in China (Lin and Huang 2007). A top-down cooperative with a benevolent outsider 
becomes uniquely efficient when the value of the outsider is in the intermediate low 
range and heterogeneity of members is high. So, a benevolent type is more efficient at 
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resolving the farmers’ hold-up problem than a selfish type when heterogeneity of 
farmers is high, but the value of the outsider is limited.  
The efficient allocation of decision rights regarding the profit distribution in 
cooperatives is delineated in Chapter 3, from a relational contracting perspective. The 
decision about the retained earnings percentage in a cooperative is crucial because it is 
an important source of internal finance. Unlike an investor-owned firm, a cooperative 
cannot obtain external finance by issuing new equity. This would violate the member-
ownership requirement. A non-cooperative game between the upstream (farmers) and 
the downstream (management) parties is formulated, where the right to decide on the 
retained earnings percentage is allocated either to the farmers, or delegated to the 
management. In the equilibrium of the one-period game, an inefficiency arises in a 
member-controlled cooperative. There exists a range of parameters, such that 
cooperative members propose a retained earnings percentage which is too low, which 
consequently results in the downstream underinvestment. A hold-up problem arises, 
because the downstream party is unwilling to make downstream investment, as she is 
not able to secure a sufficiently high share of the total surplus in the ex-post bargaining. 
The model adds a novel perspective on the profit distribution decision in a cooperative 
by (i) formulating an infinitely repeated version of the stage game; and (ii) by 
delineating the stability conditions for the relational contract between the members and 
the management. If the long-run repeated nature of interaction in a cooperative is taken 
into account, the efficiency of a member-controlled cooperative improves for some 
range of the parameters. In particular, the results of the infinitely repeated game show 
that in some instances, the membership is able to credibly commit to a higher retained 
earnings percentage and the management is able to credibly commit to downstream 
investment. However, the results also indicate that when the cost of downstream 
investment is very high and the outside opportunities of the management are limited, 
the relational contract does not resolve the hold-up problem in a member-controlled 
cooperative.    
Chapter 4 investigates empirically the market shares of agricultural 
cooperatives in the European Union. It starts with an observation that cooperative 
market shares are higher in the North-West of Europe relative to the South-East, and in 
the dairy sector relative to all other sectors. While referring to the framework of four 
levels of social analysis by Williamson (2000), a number of theoretical predictions 
regarding the degree of forward vertical integration are formulated. Namely the 
distinction is made among the embeddedness, the institutional environment, 
governance, and resource allocation levels. The effect sizes (correlation coefficients and 
differences in means) are calculated by using the data from the dairy and sugar sectors 
in the European Union. The results indicate that dairy cooperative market shares are 
higher in countries with high levels of trust, low levels of heterogeneity, strong 
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contracting institutions, and in countries which are more milk self-sufficient. In contrast, 
almost none of the variables measuring the four levels of social analysis are statistically 
important in explaining the differences in cooperative market shares in the sugar sector. 
The EU sugar market policy changes and the product differentiation strategies of the 
investor owned competitor(s) are discussed as alternative explanations for cooperative 
market shares in the EU sugar sector.  
This thesis focused on agricultural cooperatives. More generally, the findings 
of this thesis contribute to the understanding of the emergence, governance, and market 
shares of collectively owned organizations. In an even broader context, cooperatives are 
part of the “social economy”. The objective of a social enterprise is to serve member 
interests, and hence it ensures societal impact, which goes beyond the profit-maximizing 
motive of an investor-owned firm. Given conceptual similarities of member-owned 
enterprises, our results are also relevant outside the agricultural sector. We highlight 
three potential applications. First, cooperatives in other industries, such as renewable 
energy, are also subject to the involvement of the outsiders (selfish or benevolent types). 
For example, given the EU level sustainability goals, by 2020 14% of the total energy 
production in the Netherlands must come from renewable sources. Consequently, the 
Dutch government is concerned with promoting sustainable energy sources such as 
wind energy cooperatives. Our results regarding the efficient governance of cooperative 
emergence in Chapter 2 (top-down vs. bottom-up) can be applied to the emergence of 
collective action in such industries. Second, as illustrated by Chapter 3, the delegation 
of authority to professional management improves the efficiency in a cooperative. 
However, our results indicate that an efficient outcome may also emerge in a member-
controlled enterprise under certain conditions in a repeated setting (when a relational 
contract between the membership and the management is stable). This result highlights 
the importance of informal agreements between the owners and the managers in the 
member-owned enterprises, regardless of the industry. Lastly, we hypothesize that the 
variables, which are the determinants of cooperative market shares in agriculture, are 
also relevant for the market shares of collective enterprises in other industries.   
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Summary 
This thesis focuses on agricultural cooperatives, i.e. on the enterprises collectively 
owned by farmer-members. Chapter 1 discusses the distinguishing features of this 
governance form. First, the owners of a cooperative are also users, because farmers 
deliver their farm products to the cooperative enterprise. Second, the allocation of 
ownership implies also that residual income and decision rights are allocated to the 
farmers in a cooperative.  
The first question addressed in this thesis is why there are so many types of 
emergence of cooperatives. Chapter 2 proposes an answer to this question by modeling 
cooperative emergence as a non-cooperative game between the farmers and the outsider. 
The main exogenous parameter in the model is member-heterogeneity. The main 
contribution of this chapter is the conceptualization of the bottom-up and top-down 
emergence patterns of cooperatives and evaluating the types of emergence from the 
efficiency perspective. The main results suggest that bottom-up emergence with the 
initiative of all farmers is efficient when heterogeneity and the value of the outsider are 
low. As heterogeneity of members increases, two types of problems arise among 
farmers: (i) first, a coordination problem, and as a consequence emergence with an 
initiative of one farmer only, and (ii) second, a hold-up problem, and as a consequence 
no emergence. A top-down cooperative with a selfish (benevolent) outsider is uniquely 
efficient when the value of the outsider is in the intermediate high (low) range and 
heterogeneity is low (high).  
Next, this thesis investigates the determinants of the retained earnings 
percentage in a cooperative, from a relational contracting perspective. Chapter 3 
formulates a non-cooperative game between the upstream (farmers) and the downstream 
(management) parties, where the right to decide on the retained earnings percentage is 
either allocated to the farmers, or delegated to the management. The main contribution 
of this chapter is twofold. First, it adds novel insight regarding the profit distribution 
decision in a cooperative by incorporating the relational contracting perspective. When 
the long-run repeated nature of interaction in a cooperative is taken into account, our 
results suggest that there exists a range of retained earnings percentages, such that a 
relational contract between the members and the management is feasible and stable, and 
therefore a member-controlled cooperative is efficient. Second, it formulates 
conclusions regarding the efficient allocation of decision rights in a cooperative.  
Lastly, Chapter 4 investigates empirically the market shares of agricultural 
cooperatives in the European Union. It starts with an observation that cooperative 
market shares are higher in the North-West of Europe relative to the South-East, and in 
the dairy sector relative to all other sectors. A number of theoretical predictions 
regarding the degree of forward vertical integration are formulated and tested by using 
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the data from the dairy and sugar sectors in the European Union. The results indicate 
that dairy cooperative market shares are higher in countries with high levels of trust, 
low levels of heterogeneity, strong contracting institutions, and in countries which are 
more milk self-sufficient. In contrast, these variables are not statistically important in 
explaining differences in cooperative market shares in the sugar sector. Sugar 
cooperative market share is instead the result of the combination of EU policy changes 
and the product differentiation strategy of the investor owned competitor(s). 
 
 
  
131 
 
Samenvatting (in Dutch) 
Dit proefschrift richt zich op landbouwcoöperaties, dus op de ondernemingen die 
gezamenlijk eigendom zijn van boerenleden. Hoofdstuk 1 bespreekt de onderscheidende 
kenmerken van deze ondernemingsvorm. Ten eerste zijn de eigenaren van coöperatie 
ook gebruikers, omdat boeren hun boerderijproducten aan de coöperative leveren. Ten 
tweede betekent de eigendomsstructuur dat ook het resterende inkomen en de 
beslissingsrechten worden toegewezen aan de boeren in een coöperatie. 
De eerste vraag in dit proefschrift is waarom er zoveel soorten coöperaties 
ontstaan. Hoofdstuk 2 biedt een antwoord op deze vraag door de coöperatieve opkomst 
te modelleren als een niet-coöperatief spel tussen de boeren onderling een 
buitenstaander. De belangrijkste exogene parameter in het model is lidheterogeniteit. 
De belangrijkste bijdrage van dit hoofdstuk is de conceptualisering van de bottom-up 
en top-down verschijningpatronen van coöperaties en het evalueren van hun types 
vanuit het oogpunt van efficiëntie. De resultaten tonen aan dat de bottom-up 
verschijning met het initiatief van alle boeren efficiënt is wanneer de heterogeniteit en 
de waarde van de buitenstaander laag zijn. Naarmate heterogeniteit van leden toeneemt, 
ontstaan er twee soorten problemen bij boeren: (i) ten eerste, een coördinatieprobleem, 
en als gevolg daarvan verschijning van een initiatief van één boer alleen, en (ii) ten 
tweede, een hold-up probleem, en als een gevolg ontstaat er geen coöperatie. Een top-
down coöperatie met een egoïstische (welwillende) buitenstaander is alleen efficiënt 
wanneer de waarde van de buitenstaander in het tussenliggende hoge (lage) bereik ligt 
en de heterogeniteit laag (hoog) is. 
Vervolgens onderzoekt dit proefschrift de determinanten van het ingehouden 
winstpercentage in coöperaties, vanuit een herhaalde interacties perspectief. Hoofdstuk 
3 formuleert een niet-coöperatief spel tussen de upstream (boeren) en de downstream 
(management) partijen, waar het besluitvormingsrecht over de ingehouden winst wordt 
toegewezen aan de boeren, of wordt gedelegeerd aan het management. De belangrijkste 
bijdrage van dit hoofdstuk is tweeledig. Ten eerste voegt het nieuw inzicht toe met 
betrekking tot de winstverdelingsbeslissing in een coöperatie vanuit het relationele 
contracteringsperspectief. Wanneer rekening wordt gehouden met de lange termijn 
interactie in een coöperatie, geven de resultaten aan dat er een aantal gereserveerde 
winstpercentages bestaat, zodanig dat een relationeel contract tussen de leden en het 
management haalbaar en stabiel is, en daarom een lid gecontroleerde coöperatie alsnog 
efficiënt is. Ten tweede formuleert het conclusies met betrekking tot de efficiënte 
toewijzing van besluitvormingsrechten in een coöperatie. 
Tenslotte onderzoekt hoofdstuk 4 empirisch de marktaandelen van 
landbouwcoöperaties in de Europese Unie. Het begint met de constatering dat 
coöperatieve marktaandelen hoger zijn in het noordwesten van Europa in vergelijking 
met het zuidoosten en in de zuivelsector in vergelijking met alle andere sectoren. Een 
aantal theoretische voorspellingen met betrekking tot de mate van verticale integratie 
worden geformuleerd en getest door gebruik te maken van de gegevens van de zuivel- 
en suikersectoren in de Europese Unie. De resultaten geven aan dat het marktaandeel 
van zuivelcoöperaties hoger is in landen met een hoog niveau van vertrouwen, lage 
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heterogeniteit, sterke instituties en in landen die meer melk zelfvoorzienend zijn. Deze 
variabelen zijn statistisch niet van belang voor het verklaren van verschillen in 
coöperatieve marktaandelen in de suikersector. Het suikercoöperatieve marktaandeel is 
het resultaat van de combinatie van EU-beleidswijzigingen en de 
productdifferentiatiestrategie van concurrenten die een andere ondernemingsvorm 
hebben. 
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Cooperatives received significant attention in recent years as an alternative to investor-owned 
corporations. The objective of a cooperative to advance the interests of its member-owners is appealing 
from a societal perspective, particularly when comparing it with a profit-maximizing objective of an 
investor-owned firm.  This thesis focuses on agricultural cooperatives, i.e. on the enterprises collectively 
owned by farmer-members. It advances the knowledge about a cooperative enterprise in three ways: (i) 
by conceptualizing and evaluating different patterns of emergence of cooperatives; (ii) by delineating an 
efficient allocation of decision rights regarding the profit distribution in cooperatives, from a relational 
contracting perspective; (iii) and by investigating the determinants of cooperative market shares in the EU. 
Chapter 1 discusses the distinguishing features of this governance form. First, the owners of a cooperative 
are also users, because farmers deliver their farm products to the cooperative enterprise. Second, the 
allocation of ownership implies that residual income and decision rights are allocated to the farmers in a 
cooperative. Chapter 2 models cooperative emergence as a non-cooperative game between two farmers 
and an outsider. Chapter 3 formulates a non-cooperative game between the upstream party (farmers) and 
the downstream party (cooperative management) regarding the distribution of profits of the cooperative 
enterprise. Chapter 4 provides an empirical analysis of cooperative market shares in the European 
Union. Lastly, Chapter 5 concludes and addresses how the results can be extended beyond agricultural 
cooperatives.
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in 1999 and is officially accredited by the Royal Netherlands Academy of Arts and Sciences (KNAW). The 
research undertaken by ERIM is focused on the management of the firm in its environment, its intra- and 
interfirm relations, and its business processes in their interdependent connections.
The objective of ERIM is to carry out first rate research in management, and to offer an advanced doctoral 
programme in Research in Management. Within ERIM, over three hundred senior researchers and PhD 
candidates are active in the different research programmes. From a variety of academic backgrounds and 
expertises, the ERIM community is united in striving for excellence and working at the forefront of creating 
new business knowledge.
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